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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the result of a one-year effort sponsored by the
NASA Langley Research Center under contract NASI-18004 to design and evaluate
a Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) algorithm for application to restruc-
turable flight control. The restructurable or reconfigurable flight control
system (RFCS) concept is a fault tolerant control concept which is capable of
automatically generating the control action needed for recovery from unantici-
pated emergencies as well as providing the stability and control augmentation
for controllable flight under these circumstances. Under NASA sponsorship,
ALPHATECH, Inc., has been developing and testing many component technologies
which will be necessary for near term demonstration and operational develop-
ment of the RFCS concept. Currently, the FDI system developed for this con-
tract is being integrated with other RFCS components for demonstration on
NASA's modified B-737 simulation, (see [I] - [4] for a general discussion of
the RFCS concept).
The FDI function is a critical component to the RFCS concept because
there will always be conditions which can not be handled by a normal (i.e.,
any acceptable normal) control system, (which, of course, includes the pilot).
Those failures which can not be so handled must be detected so that tile RFCS
knows when to reconflgure,and these failures must be isolated or identified so
that the proper reconfiguration action is taken. Although there are a variety
ALPHATECH, INC.
of failures which may be important, those which result in a loss of control
authority are most important since they not only result in emergency condi-
tions, but also impact how well one can reliably respond to such conditions.
This effort concentrated on the development of an FDI system to handle al____l
such failures. These failures are known generically as control element fail-
ures and include (though are not limited to) runaway, stuck, floating, and
partlally mlssing surfaces, as well as engine failures such as loss of thrust
and stuck throttle failure modes.
This project was divided into four major tasks. Task 1 addressed the
issue of fundamental limits to FDI performance for the decentralized FDI
approach previously developed by ALPHATECH, Inc. Task 2 was a preliminary
design effort which utilized ALPHATECH's design methodology and a preliminary
assessment of errors. Task 3 was an algorithm refinement phase which utilized
simulation results to provide better estimates of errors for use in the design
methodology, and Task 4 was an assessment of critical issues for further
development. The availability of flight recorded data from flights of NASA's
transportation systems research vehicle (TSRV) and NASA's modified simulation
for that aircraft motivated our application to the B-737 aircraft. The flight
recorded data also provided a unique opportunity for realistic evaluation of
performance limitations in Task I.
I.i CONTRIBUTIONS
The detection and isolation of _eneric control element failures has
received significant attention (e.g., see [5] - [13]) not only due to its
importance for RFCS but also because of the difficulties associated with the
need to use analytical redundancy in the solution method. Analytical
2
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redundancy (unlike direct or hardware redundancy) refers to the concept of
comparing dissimilar sensors using analytical or mathematical relationships
between those sensors. Analytical redundancy is necessary for many control
element failure modes because direct redundancy or built-in test equipment
(BITE) is not available (consider a partially missing surface, for example).
Furthermore, those control element failures which might also be amenable to
direct redundancy and/or BITE (e.g., a stuck surface due to a loss of hydrau-
lic pressure) can sometimes be handled more efficiently using analytical
redundancy. This is because BITE, by definition, tests only the "precondi-
tions" whlch are necessary for system operation (e.g., power applied). Ana-
lytical redundancy, however, tests the functionality of a particular system,
thereby encompassing all modes of failures. Furthermore, it does this without
hardware duplication, thereby reduclng initial cost and weight and increasing
overall system reliability and maintainability (fewer pieces of hardware to
fail) as well.
Unfortunately, the design of FDI systems using analytical redundancy is
difficult because of the sometimes significant inaccuracies associated with
the mathematical models which are employed. This fact provided the motivation
for ALPHATECH's development of an FDI design methodology which addresses the
impact of such errors. One major contribution of this effort was the refine-
ment and application of this design methodology for the control element FDI
problem. This methodology consists of methods for choosing the structure of
an FDI algorithm, optimizing its parameters in the presence of unavoidable
modeling errors, and performing sensitivity analyses. It is largely based on
the notion of discrimination metrics which can be used to bound, on an average
basis, the decision errors associated with an FDI process. Such analyses
ALPHATECH, INC.
require a statistical model of system behavior which includes a wide variety
of modeling errors (including parametric errors, unmodeled dynamics, nonline-
arities, etc.). A qualitative analysis and several "error budgets" are used
to derive these descriptions.
The other major contribution is the development and demonstration of an
FDI system for detecting and isolating al____limportant control element failure
modes. This system is an advance over systems which only handle a limited
class of failure modes (e.g., [51]). The key element in developing such a
system is the recognition that the failures which are important are those
which result in "large" failure signatures (as later defined in this report)
but that different failure modes give rise to different temporal signature
characteristics which are unknown a priori. The FDI system developed for this
project uses only qualitative information about failure signatures (we assume
they are coherent, although this is not a requirement for the design) and
detects and isolates failures using only failure "size" information.
The general FDI concept used in this project is known as a decentralized
approach because of our attempt to assess system redundancy and utilize only
the most well-known parts of the system for specific FDI tasks. This is in
contrast to centralized methods which integrate all information in an "opti-
mal" manner. Such methods work well in ideal circumstances but frequently run
into trouble when model error exists. The loss of optimality under ideal cir-
cumstances, which results from using the decentralized approach, is more than
compensated by the increase in robustness to modeling errors. The first
decentralization employed in this project is the decomposition of the control
element FDI problem into two separate subproblems; actuator-path FDI and
aircraft-path FDI. The actuator path problem is a "local" FDI problem which
4
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is concerne_ only with failures which occur between the location of (total)
actuator command measurements (e.g., in the flight control computer) and the
location of actuator output measurements (e.g., on a control rod). The air-
craft path problem is concerned with all failures which occur outboard of the
actuator output measurement. Two decoupled subsystems were designed to handle
each of these subproblems (see Section 2). The actuator path subsystem con-
sists of decoupled actuator path systems (one for each actuator) which make
use of actuation models. It can handle any combination of sequential or
simultaneous actuator path failures. The aircraft path subsystem utilizes
models which relate aircraft motion to the measured control values and can
only handle single failures. The ability to handle multiple aircraft path
failures depends on knowledge of failure signatures which is not available
without explicit control excitation (e.g., dither signals). Such an approach
was not considered in this work.
1.2 OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT
Section 2 formulates the overall control element FDI problem in terms of
the failure modes of interest, the goals and assumptions used for FDI design
and the various configuration options available for handling the actuator-path
and aircraft-path subproblems. Section 3 describes the decentralized approach
to FDI and includes a variety of examples of how decentralized "residuals" can
be generated and provides a decision structure which takes maximal advantage
of these residuals. A design methodology for this structure is presented and
many examples of hypothesis test designs which will be useful for the control
element FDI problem are given. Section 4 presents a method for evaluating
fundamental limits to FDI performance using discrimination metrics and solves
ALPHATECH, INC.
an example Which is used in Section 5. Section 5 applies the concepts devel-
oped in Sections 3 and 4 to the B-737 aircraft and goes through design and
analysis details and simulation results for both actuator-path and aircraft-
path subsystems. Conclusions and recomendations are given in Section 6.
ALPHATECH, INC.
SECTION 2
PROBLEM FORMULATION
The broad goal of this project is to develop a system for detecting the
occurrence of any control element failure (to be defined) and isolating or
identifying the affected control. Major failures should be detected quickly
so that appropriate reconfiguratlon can take place, but false alarms must also
be minimized.
We will assume single flight condition operation, full measurement of the
rigid body state vector (e.g., measurements of body referenced angular rates
and relative wind, as well as body referenced accelerometer measurements), and
models (not necessarily linear models) of the aircraft and actuator. Sensor
errors including noise, scale factor and bias (within some design specifica-
tion) and model errors including parameter errors and unmodeled dynamics (also
within some design spec.) must be accounted for in the design process.
The motion of the aircraft in response to control action under any opera-
tional status (failed or unfailed) is now assumed to be representable by a set
of differential equations, viz.
= f(x, 6E) (2-1a)
y = h(x, dE) (2-1b)
where x is some n-dimensional state vector that includes the effects of flexi-
ble modes and disturbances due to turbulence, in addition to the rigid body
ALPHATECH, INC.
states which describe body referenced motion of the aircraft through the
atmosphere; 6E is a vector of "effective" control values; and y is the vector
of measurable quantities. Equation 2-1 is true independent of the aircraft's
operational status.
Control element failures are now construed to mean: &E does not
"follow" the desired control commands. That is, each of the, m_ effective
controls, 6Ei, is derived from an independent set of differential equations
which do depend on the status of the aircraft (failed or not failed). These
equations written in operator form are
6Ei = gEi{6A i} + dEi (2-2)
6Ai = gAi{6c i} + dA i (2-3)
where 6c represents the control commands being input to the actuation mechan-
ism, 6A represents the output of the actuation mechanism, gA i and gEi are
causal operators, and dE and dA are time varying "disturbance" functions.
under no-failure conditions Eqs. 2-2 and 2-3 reduce to,
6Ei = 6Ai (2-4)
6Ai = gOA i{6c i}
for all i, where gOAi is a model of a working actuation mechanism.
(2-5)
*The definition of each actuator's input and output (_c and _A ) is not unique.
For control surfaces, inputs include DFCS outputs, electrical signals between
a DFCS and an actuator, and differential pressure in a hydraulic actuator.
Outputs could be taken at the actuator output, on a control rod, or at the
surface hinge. For this project we have assumed that measurements of 6A and
_c are available. Therefore, we can define each actuator's input and output
by the location of the corresponding measurements.
8
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Equations 2-2 and 2-3 are sufficient for describing all types of control
element failures. These failures are decomposed into two categories.
"Actuator-path" failures are those failures in which Eq. 2-3 differs from Eq.
2-5 and "alrcraft-path" failures are those in which Eq. 2-2 is different from
Eq. 2-4. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 describe a variety of control element failure
models in terms of Eqs. 2-2 and 2-3. Failure mechanisms which result in
behavior characterized by each of the models in Table 2-1 can be conceived.
In general, models and mechanisms depend on the exact locations of actuator
input and output measurements.
TABLE 2-I. ACTUATOR PATH FAILURES
Stuck
Floating
Runaway
Reduced Bandwidth
gA(6) = 0
gA(6) = 0
gA(6) = 0
gA(6) = gAF(6)
dA = Constant
dA = Follows local
dA = Slews to limit
dA = 0
TABLE 2-2. AIRCRAFT PATH FAILURES
Stuck
Floating
Runaway
Partial Loss (A)
(B)
gE(6) = 0
gE(6) = 0
gE(_) -- 0
gE(_) = k-_
gE(6) = k-6
(k = 1 - fraction-lossed)
dE = Constant
dE = Follows local a
dE = Slews to limit
dE = 0
dE = Follows local
9
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The availability of actuation input and output measurements has an impact
on the configuration of decentralized FDI systems. A centralized system would
simply combine the actuation models with the aircraft state equation in Eq.
2-1 and add the output measurements to the observation vector. In the decen-
tralized approach, an assessment of the "redundancy" available from each part
of the model is made and possible system decompositions (which utilize only
subsets of models) are explored. Actuation output measurements allow consid-
eration of separate actuator and aircraft-path subsystems as described below.
Figure 2-I describes the information flow which is available for FDI for
some measurement configuration. Several parallel actuator paths are shown.
Failures in each actuator can be independently detected through the use of the
analytical redundancy which is embedded in the independent actuator models.
That is, actuator-path failures can be detected by comparing a predicted actu-
ator output (based on the measured input and an actuator model) with the mea-
sured output.
COMMAND
CONTROLS
I "SENSORS"
l
1 I ACTUATOR I J
I IH OUTPUTS J AIRCRAFT I : _"-- AIRCRAFT
(_E - STATES
/ACTUATORS
l SENS SENSORS
(_m Xm
CONTROL
MEASUREMENTS
ACTUATOR - PATHS AIRCRAFT - PATH
Fig. 2-1. Measurement Configuration and Analytic Redundancy Implications
I0
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When an effective control value (i.e., the control value which actually
moves the airplane) differs from the measured output of the actuator, then an
aircraft-path failure exists. These failures can be detected by the use of
the analytical redundancy which is embedded in an aircraft model. That is,
aircraft-path failures can be detected by comparing the measured motion varia-
bles (which are a function of the aircraft states) with a prediction of these
variables based on the control measurements.
Clearly, from the figure, all control element failures (both actuator-
path and aircraft-path) could be detected using an aircraft model that
includes the actuator models thereby eliminating the need for actuator output
measurements and reducing the cost and weight associated with the sensor hard-
ware and redundancy management. Furthermore, such a system results in an FDI
algorithm which is based on sensors which are more likely to survive potential
causes of failures (e.g., battle damage, sabotage, etc.).
On the other hand, the parallel actuator path FDI algorithms tend to be
very simple and more reliable than the aircraft path algorithms. Also, on
most commercial and military aircraft, the cost and weight of establishing
actuator output measurements of some kind would not be prohibitive; (in fact,
any servo driven actuator already has an output measurement, although not nec-
essarily the best one in terms of failure mode coverage). As a result, we
expect that independent actuator path algorithms will be an important part of
control element FDI and have, therefore, considered their development for this
project.
Given the development of an actuator-path FDI system, the next question
is how to cover the remaining aircraft-path failure modes. There are two
options in this regard. The first option is to create a backup system to the
ii
ALPHATECH, INC.
actuator-path algorithm by incorporating the actuator models in the aircraft
model and using control commands as inputs. This would then cover both
aircraft-path and actuator-path failures. The second option is to utilize the
control measurements for prediction of aircraft motion in the aircraft path
algorithm. Since the latter option requires no ambiguity resolution
(alrcraft-path and actuator-path algorithms cannot disagree) and since this
option may provide a more reliable aircraft-path algorithm (no actuator model
errors), we have developed this second option for this project.
Figure 2-2 shows the resulting high-level structure for the FDI algorithm
being developed. At the top of this figure, actuator models and measurements
are used to compare predicted and measured actuator outputs. This comparison
consists of independent deflection residual signals. When the ith deflection
residual is large, a failure of the ith control element is indicated. The
decision processes for actuator path failures are decoupled and are responsi-
ble for deciding if each residual signal is large because of a failure or
because of model error excitation. In the lower part of the figure, measure-
ments of various aircraft states, along with the measured deflections and an
aircraft model, are used to form residual signals which correspond to the six
forces and moments which define the aircraft motion (details given in Section
5). The aircraft path decision process is then responsible for detecting when
these residuals are larger than expected (accounting for noise and model
error) and for deciding which control element failure is responsible for the
force and moment imbalance indicated by the relative sizes of the six
residuals.
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Figure 2-2. FDI Structure
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SECTION 3
A DECENTRALIZED APPROACH TO FDI
In this section we motivate the need for a decentralized approach to the
failure detection and isolation (FDI) problem. The term "decentralized" as
applied to the FDI problem is used to indicate the uncoupled use of parts of a
system model to develop "redundancy relationships," and the selective use of
these relations in the FDI process. This decentralized approach was first
used in the NASA F-8 sensor FDI project, [14] - [16], in order to allow clear
trade-offs between model error and failure sensitivity to be made. Such
trade-offs are the key to successful FDI design for systems which cannot be
precisely described by the kinds of models which form the basis of the many
"optimal" FDI methods, (e.g., see [17]). This is because modeling error
always exists (including parametric errors, unmodelled dynamics, and nonsta-
tionary inputs) and because the optimal methods, which guarantee optimality
under ideal conditions, are typically not "robust."
The success of the F-8 work spawned many research activities into robust
FDI methods. Willsky and his co-workers at MIT, ([18] - [21] first addressed
the residual generation problem in terms of solving for "parity checks" (which
can be interpreted as auto-regressive-moving-average models) which are insen-
sitive to model errors. Pattipati and co-workers at ALPHATECH ([22], [24])
extended these ideas to include the trade-off between model error and detec-
tion sensitivity and provided a unified framework for developing robust FDI
methods. Weiss and co-workers at ALPHATECH, at the same time, developed a
14
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control element FDI algorithm based on the conceptual framework of the F-8
sensor work, [5]. This algorithm provided a generic structure for robust
decisionmaking and, more importantly, began to address the need for robustness
optimization and sensitivity analysis in the design of decision processes.
These ideas have been extended during this project and are detailed in subsec-
tion 3.3.
3.1 OVERVIEW
Q What is failure detection and isolation (FDI)?
Obviously, FDI deals with the problem of detecting deviations from normal
behavior in specified components (sensors or effectors) and isolating the par-
ticular component which has "failed." The key point in this sentence is that
in order to detect and isolate deviations, one requires a specification or
model of "normal behavior" and of the anomalous behavior to be detected. Fur-
thermore, for each type of anomaly to be detected, these models must provide
sufficient redundant information to allow one to detect each anomaly and to
distinguish it from others. For example, in a triplex sensor system, in which
there are three identical sensors of each type, one can perform voting by
examining each triple to determine if its components are consistent (i.e.,
normal). If one sensor in the triple is significantly different from the
other two, then we could conclude that it has failed. In this scheme, the
model information used is that the three sensors measure the identical quan-
tity, and the model of a deviation can be specified in several ways, such as
in terms of manufacturer's instrument specifications. As a second example,
consider a relatively simple and often-used check in which successive samples
of the output of a particular sensor are examined to determine if there is an
15
ALPHATECH, INC.
obvious inconsistency. Here the model information used is a crude measure of
the bandwidth of the variable being sensed. Finally, consider a simple system
involving linear motion and in which one has a velocity sensor and an
accelerometer. Here the kinematic model v = a provides a mechanism for
obtaining one redundant relationship between these sensors.
In the terminology used by Chow and Willsky [18], [20], the three
examples just described are illustrations of direct (or hardware) redundancy,
temporal (or self-test) redundancy, and analytic (or functional) redundancy,
respectively. While there are clear differences among them, it is their
slmilarities--in terms of being based on models and, more explicitly, on
redundancy imbedded in those models--that we wish to stress. This permits us
to construct a unified framework in which to examine and compose different
approaches to failure detection and their robustness properties.
• What does an FDI algorithm do?
Roughly speaking, all failure detection systems can be described in terms
of the conceptual block diagram of Fig. 3-1. This diagram has been used quite
often (e.g., see [5], [23], [24], [18], [20]) and provides a framework for the
design and analysis of robust FDI systems. In Fig. 3-i, there are two funda-
mental parts of failure detection. The first of these is the generation of
sets of signals (called residuals) whose deviation from "normal behavior"
(typically meaning near zero without significant trends or patterns during no
failure operation) can be used as the basis for detecting and identifying
system failures. The second component of a failure detection system is the
decision process consisting of information collection and decision-logic func-
tions. Here, the residuals that have been generated are processed in order to
make FDI decisions.
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A number of issues arises in the design of each of these subsystems, and
to begin our discussion, let us focus first on the residual generation process.
3.1.1 Residual Generation
The way in which residuals can be generated varies greatly. For example,
in a triplex system, if Yl(k), yz(k), and Y3(k) denote the outputs of three
identical sensors, then rl(k) = Yl(k)-Y2(k) and r2(k) = y2(k)-Y3(k) can be
thought of as the residuals used in a voting system. In other FDI methods
which have been suggested (e.g., see surveys [17], [25]), Kalman filters may
be used to generate the residuals. In some of these methods, such as the
detection filter approach [21] and [26], [27] Kalman-like filters are
designed, but with gains chosen in particular ways so as to make particular
failures more readily apparent. The decentralized approach to FDI, which is
the topic of this report, provides a generalization of the residual generation
mechanism employed in the voting scheme described above. In this approach,
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each piece of the system model is examined to determine indivldual relation-
ships among the measured quantities. Residuals can then be generated from
these individual relations.
Now, although the use of Kalman filters for generating residuals may
allow us to bypass the explicit identification of system redundancy, the
absence of a specific assessment of redundancy frequently creates many diffi-
culties when Kalman filter approaches are applied in a "top-down" manner. One
of the reasons for these difficulties is the issue of robustness or model-
error tolerance. By their very nature, good failure detection algorithms
attempt to generate signals that are sensitive to system anomalies (i.e.,
failures). Given that all residual generation mechanisms use models of the
relationships among available (i.e., measured or commanded) signals, we imme-
diately see that the possibility exists for these residuals to be sensitive to
modeling errors as well as to system failures. What is needed, therefore, is
an FDI method with selective sensitivity. That is, an FDI algorithm should be
based on residuals which are maximally sensitive to failures and minimally
sensitive to model errors. It is here that the Kalman filter approaches run
into trouble. All residuals produced by a Kalman filter are produced using a
centralized system model. By definition, therefore, they tend to mix together
relationships that are known very well with those that are far more uncertain.
For this reason centralized approaches that are optimal when models are well
known become far from optimal when model uncertainty is taken into account.
As mentioned above, the term "decentralized," as applied to the generation
of residuals, refers to the identification and extraction of each individual
source of system redundancy which we call a redundancy or parity relation.
Selective sensitivity is achieved by examining each such relationship to
18
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determine its robustness (or lack thereof) to various possible model errors
and its sensitivity to specific failure modes. The most reliable set of rela-
tions providing the desired coverage (i.e., capable of detecting and identify-
ing a specified set of failures) can then be determined, and separate FDI
tests can ben be designed. Since only the most reliable relationships are
used in each test, the effects of model errors are minimized, and thus the FDI
tests can be implemented reliably. Furthermore, since each redundancy rela-
tion typically involves only small subsets of the set of available signals and
of the set of model parameters, the problem of failure misclassiflcatlon is
minimized, and the effects of particular worst-case model error scenarios can
be easily analyzed in great detail. Finally, since the resulting FDI system
consists of a collection of extremely simple, low-order sub-algorithms, the
overall system becomes easier to implement, verify, troubleshoot (either for
logical errors or to pinpoint weaknesses identified during optimal tests
caused by unanticipated sources of error), and modify.
To summarize, in order to achieve selective sensitivity in an FDI algo-
rithm, we generate residuals in a decentralized manner. Individual relation-
ships between the measurable variables can then be considered in terms of
their sensitivity to specific failure modes and to various sources of model
errors. Only the "best" relationships for detecting and distinguishing indi-
vidual failure modes or subsets of failure modes will then be used in the
hypothesis tests which make up the second part of the FDI structure of Fig.
3-I, the decision process. Details of the various decentralized residual gen-
eration methods are given in subsection 3.2.
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3.1.2 The Decision Process
The decision process accumulates information about the system operation,
performs a variety of hypothesis tests, and combines the results of these
tests into a logical decision about the system status.
The accumulation of information is necessitated by the fact that although
the instantaneous value of a residual derived from any particular parity rela-
tion provides one piece of information about possible failures, typically this
one piece of information is not sufficient for accurate detection and identi-
fication. Rather, the information contained in successive values of the
residual must be accumulated over time in order to achieve acceptable levels
of performance (see [20] for a discussion of the several ways in which infor-
mation can be collected).
The fact that information must be accumulated over time, coupled with the
fact that the failure onset time is unknown, creates a situation which has led
to a variety of failure decision mechanisms. The reason that so many methods
have been proposed stems from the considerable advantage obtained from knowing
or estimating the failure onset time as described below.
UNKNOWN ONSET TIME
The advantage of knowing the failure onset time is easily illustrated
using simple measures of failure distinguishability (see Section 4). Con-
sider, for example, the distinguishability of a constant, nonzero, bias which
occurs at an unknown time ("jump failure") and measurements which are contami-
nated by white Gaussian noise. One commonly used detection approach is to
operate on a sliding window of data and declare a failure when the output of
this operation exceeds a threshold.
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In particular, let y(k) represent the observed signal that obeys
under H0 :
under HI:
y(k) = n(k) for all k < kf, and
y(k) = q(k) for all k • kf
y(k) = m + n(k) for all k • kf (3-t)
Now, if the decision process is defined by applying a maximum likelihood
hypothesis testing technique over the sliding window, a decision statistic,
Sk (the log-likelihood ratio), is formed by,
N-I
m N m 2
Sk = _ -- y(k-j) 2 (3-21
j=0 On2 On2
Since Sk is Gaussian with equal variance under H0 and HI, we can easily
compute the distinguishability metric, or signal-to-noise ratio of Sk, viz.
SNR{Sk_kf } = _ [E {Sk_kf [HI } - E {Sk_kf IH0 }]2/Var [Sk-kf ]
(k-kf) m
N_-- °n
for kf • k 4kf + N (3-3)
for k • kf + N
If the failure onset time were known, however, the maximum likelihood
hypothesis test produces a decision statistic, Rk, from,
k
N 2/ (3-4)Rk = _ m y(j ) - _ m on2
j=kf on2
and hence,
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SNR {Rk_kf } = k_-kf m___
oR
Both SNR{Sk-kf} and B01{Rk_kf} are shown in Fig. 3-2. Notice that for
large values of N, (window size), one would expect considerable improvements
if R k were used instead of Sk for decisionmaking since the failure (bias) is
far more distinguishable (larger BOI) in this case, especially for small k-kf.
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Figure 3-2. Advantage of Known Onset Time
Since, of course, the failure onset time, kf, is unknown, alternative
methods which attempt to realize performance that approaches the level
obtained when the failure onset time is known have been investigated.
DECISION MECHANISMS
Several "optimal" and suboptimal methods for dealing with this issue are
discussed in [17], [25]. The optimal methods, which essentially view each
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sample instant as a potential failure onset hypothesis, are computationally
infeasible, and many of the suboptimal algorithms which are based on these
optimal methods can require extensive computational resources.
In [14] - [16] and more recently in [5], an alternative approach which
avoids these complexities while sacrificing little in performance has met with
considerable success. This approach is shown in Fig. 3-3. In this approach,
a trlgger process produces quick responding alarms on the basis of short,
highly sensitive tests with full coverage of all failure modes. These alarms
are then used to generate somewhat longer running, independent tests for
reliably identifying the failure mode and rejecting any false start. In order
to minimize the decision delay following a failure, each failure mode may have
a separate trigger test. The tests which are initiated by the trigger then
provide the final reliable (i.e., desired level of error probability) failure
decisions. In order to reject a false start from the trigger process, several
"verification" tests are triggered. These tests compare each failure mode
hypothesis, (say Hj), with the no-failure hypothesis (H0). Although any
trigger may initiate the verification process, only those failure modes which
have been verified will be chosen by the decision logic. If all failure modes
are not verified, a false-trigger is declared. In parallel with the verify
tests, several "isolation" tests are used to compare each 2air of failure
hypotheses which are potentially ambiguous following a given set of trigger
alarms. The results of these pair-wise decisions are then combined in the
decision logic to produce failure decisions.
There are several advantages to the decision structure just described.
First, and most important, is that the trigger mechanism effectively provides
an estimate of the failure onset time, kf, as the beginning of the trigger
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Figure 3-3. General Decision Structure
data window. This allows the use of tests based on the assumed failure onset
time to be used for verification and isolation thereby achieving a hlgh degree
of decision reliability over very short tlme intervals. Tests such as the
SPRT (a sequential decision mechanism requiring an assumed onset time) are
typically very effective in realizing these advantages. In particular, these
tests can easily be designed to be robust to unknown failure magnitudes in
that failures which are "larger" than those considered minimal will be
detected and isolated in a shorter period of time.
The second advantage of the decision structure outlined above is that
typically (e.g., see [15], [5]) [6] the computational complexity of this algo-
rithm is substantially smaller than the optimal and sub-optimal methods dis-
cussed in [17]. This is in addition to the expected performance benefits in
terms of FDI robustness.
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Finally, in addition to the computational advantages of the procedure
described above, the partitioning of the failure space into hypothesis pairs
allows us to make use of residuals in a selective way so as to minimize the
decision errors and delays of each test. That is, only those residuals which
provide reliable information about the hypothesis pair being tested are selec-
ted as inputs to that test.
HYPOTHESIS TEST DESIGN
The last i_sue we raise in regard to the design of FDI systems is the
design of the various hypothesis tests which comprise the decision process.
In classical hypothesis testing theory, such tests are completely defined by
specification of the joint probability density function (pdf) of the sequence
of residual signals. Such a characterization, however, is never completely
possible since modeling errors exist, failure severity is unknown and since
the inputs which excite the measurements are non-stationary and not always
completely measurable. Thus, the classical theories can serve only as a start-
ing point in the design procedure; defining a useful algorithm for hypothesis
discrimination. Selection of parameters within this algorithm, however,
requires a performance analysis which incorporates the uncertainties in the
probabilistic description used to define the algorithm.
This process is shown graphically in Fig. 3-4. The figure emphasizes the
fact that two classes of models, truth and design models, are needed; and that
a variety of analysis and synthesis tools need to be developed and used in
this process. For example, algorithm structures (i.e., equations for signal
processing) are typically determined using a simplified design model and
knowledge of various decisionmaking techniques. Of course, implicit knowledge
25
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Figure 3-4. Hypothesis Test Design Process
of the truth model may also be used to ensure that the subsequent sensitivity
analyses will meet the desired specifications. The truth model is then used
explicitly in choosing the parameters of the decision algorithm. In order to
ensure both maximal performance an___ddrobustness to off-nominal conditions, it
is important that the "truth" model be a statistical model which characterizes
variations in system qualities as much as possible. Finally, where such char-
acterizations are not possible, and where optimal synthesis techniques are not
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available, sensitivities to important variations must be evaluated. Itera-
tions between such an analysis and the choice of algorithm parameters can
occur and, in some cases, iteration on the algorithm structures themselves may
be necessary.
Also shown in Fig. 3-4 is an evaluation of fundamental performance lim-
its. These are really two kinds of limits of interest; one for problem feasi-
bility and one for algorithm design. In the feasibility analysis, one asks
the question How well can a decision mechanism perform under the best (but
reasonable) circumstances? This topic is addressed in [8] and in Section 4
and assumes, for example, that a detailed statistical design model exists and
that this model exactly describes the system behavior. If adequate
performance can not be ensured for this case, the situation is most likely
hopeless. For algorithm design, however, a truth model which statistically
characterizes all sources of error is needed to indicate when iterations on
the algorithm design are getting close to fundamental limits.
The advantage of the decentralized approach is that many of the analysis
and synthesis tools required in this design process are readily available.
Subsection 3.3 will detail these techniques and develop some new ones.
3.2 RESIDUAL GENERATION
As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of the residual genera-
tion function is to translate redundant information about the system (in the
form of models) into signals which exhibit a well-known and easily character-
ized behavior (e.g., near zero with no significant trends during normal opera-
tion). These signals are formed through the relationships among measured
variables embodied in the system model.
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A variety of techniques for generating decentralized residuals have been
developed (see [5], [22] - [24], [20]) and are described here. They are
divided into 4 separate categories: memoryless relations, finite-memory rela-
tions, open-loop relations, and closed-loop relations.
3.2.1 Memoryless Relationships
Memoryless relationshps are relationships among measured variables which
are valid at every time instant. They are easy to derive from static models
and have been used in numerous applications from triplex or quadraplex sensor
systems [6] to redundant arrays of inertial sensors [28].
In linear systems, memoryless relations are obtained as follows. The set
of m measured variables, y, is related to the set of n "influence variables,"
x, by,
y = Cx (3-5)
where C is the m x n observation matrix. Memoryless residuals or relation-
ships are formed by solving the equation wTc = 0 for all m-dimensional inde-
pendent non-zero "parity check" vectors, w. The parity check vectors imply
that under ideal conditions (no model error or noise), a relationship of the
form wTy = 0 is valid. When a failure (e.g., sensor drift, large change in C)
occurs, the residual, 9, formed using this relationship, may deviate signifi-
cantly from its nominal characteristics. That is, when no failure exists
= wTy-- wTCx = 0 (3-6)
and when a failure occurs, x is something different. For example, in the case
of triplex sensor systems, we have
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[1]C = 11 (3-7)
wI = [i,-1, o1 (3-8)
w 2 = [I, O, -I]. (3-9)
Note that other parity check vectors satisfy wTC = 0, but all are linear com-
binations of Eqs. 3-8, 3-9 since Wl, w2 is a basis for the left null space of
C.
Of course, the C matrix in Eq. 3-5 represents only a model of the
redundancy relationships available in the static system under consideration.
In order to develop residuals which are minimally sensitive to model errors
and noise under normal operation, consider the uncertain system,
y = C£x + n£ (3-10)
where the observation matrix C£ is parametrically related to the random
variable £ (representing uncertainty; £ takes on a finite number of values in
the mathematical framework of [22], n£ is a zero mean Gaussian noise process
with covariance R£, and x is a random variable with zero mean and covariance
Z£. From Eq. 3-10, the probability density function of y is
p(y) = f p(y[£) p(£) d£ (3-11)
where p(yl£) is a Gaussian density with zero mean and covariance,
cov (yl_) = C_r_c_r+ R_ (3-12)
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In reference [24], several methods of generating robust residuals using this
formulation are given. They include minimization of the variance of the
residuals, minimizing the average entropy and several methods which make
explicit use of failure models to guarantee sensitivity to particular failures
as well as insensitivity to model error and noise. In minimizing the variance
of the residuals, for example, we define a t-dimensional residual vector, v;
= WTy (3-13)
The function to be minimized is J=Trace[E{ vTv}] which can be written
J ffiTr{WT[/(C_E£cT£ + R£) p(£) d£]W}
= Tr{W T C W} (3-14)
where C is used to denote the term in brackets. If we constrain W so that it
is non-zero, (e.g., wTw = I), then it can be shown that since _ is synetric,
the solution is to take the columns of W as the eigenvectors corresponding to
the t-smallest eigenvalues of C.
One can interpret this result geometrically by considering the following
example. Let E£=I and R£=0 for all £ and let
[cos(£)_C£ = (3-15)
Lsin (_)]
where £ is a uniform random variable on [81, 82]. In this case C can be com-
puted and the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue computed.
Through a change of variables, it can be shown that the "optimal" residuals
are computed by projecting y onto a space which is orthogonal to the vector,
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I cos
sin
(81 + e 2)
2
(81 + e 2)
2
1 (3-16)
This situation is depicted in Fig. 3-5:
__5PACE SPANNED BY
IMAL PARITY CHECK
R-2955
Figure 3-5. Geometrical Interpretation of Robust Residuals
If the linear relationship of Eq. 3-5 is not available, it may still be
possible to generate memoryless residuals. Suppose
Yl = f(Y2 ) (3-17)
models a static relationship between measured variables Yl and Y2" Then the
residual,
v = Yl - f(Y2) (3-18)
can be computed at each time instant and used for FDI.
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As an example of this kind of memoryless relation, consider the force
balance relationship in a rigid aircraft model. The aerodynamic forces on an
aircraft can be related to the relative velocity of the aircraft with respect
to the air mass, V, the angular velocity of the aircraft about its C.G. (_)
and the deflections of the control surfaces, 6, by
F = f(V, _, 6) (3-19)
This force, in turn, can be directly related to the output of the compensated
(for off C.G. effects) accelerometer measurements. That is, since the
aircraft obeys [29],
m(; + _ x V) = F + mg (3-20)
and the accelerometer readings (which measure specific force) obey,
Am = V + _ x V - (3-21)
a set of three translational residuals can be defined by,
= m Am - f(V, _, 6) (3-22)
when air data, inertial data, and surface deflections are all measured. When
the aircraft is operating normally, sensor errors and errors in the aero-model
cause these residuals to deviate from zero. If a control derivative changes
or a measured deflection differs from an actual (or effective) deflection,
these residuals can deviate significantly from their behavior under normal
conditions, and are, therefore, useful for detecting such failure modes.
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3.2.2 Finite Memory Relationships
A finite memory relation is one in which measured variables over a finite
window in time are used. In the linear case, they can be derived similarly to
memoryless relations as follows. Consider the linear system
where
x(k+l) = Ax(k) + Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + Du(k)
x(k) = NS - dimensional state vector.
y(k) = NO - dimensional output vector.
u(k) = NC - dimensional input vector.
(3-23)
A redundancy relationship is now defined as a linear combination of
measurements and controls over a finite window of observation. Specifically,
if we let yT(k) = (yT(k), yT(k+l), ... yT(k+P)), and uT(k) = (uT(k), uT(k+l),
P P
... uT(k+p)), then redundancy relationships take the form
v(k) = WT _Yp(k)7 = Wy T Yp(k) + WuTUp(k)
!
Up(k)J (3-24)
where v(k) is the t-dimensional residual vector which, under ideal circum-
stances (no noise or modeling error) is identically zero, and W is the parity
check matrix. Next, we can expand Yp(k) in terms of the system matrices
(A,B,C,D,) as (see [24])
Yp(k) =
-c
C A
_C Ap _
x(k) +
D 0 ...
CB D
_C AP-IB CB D
Up(k)
(3-25)
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or
Yp(k) = Mp x(k) + Np Up(k) (3-26)
Thus the residual _, Eq. 3-24, can now be written as,
= (3-2 7 )
I LUp(k)_
When no modeling error or noise is present, we can make 9(k) identically zero
by choosing W as an orthogonal basis for the left null-space of the matrix,
Mp =
(3-28)
That is, we find all the vectors for which wT Mp = 0 and form the parity check
matrix using these vectors for its rows.
Comments
Io
.
o
The minimum number of independent parity checks for any p is
NO(p+I)-NS when NO(p+l) > NS.
As discussed in [30], one need only look at values of p=O, ... ,
NS to find all of the independent parity checks.
The solution for W can also be obtained by finding the vectors
which satisfy WvTMp=O, and then solving Wy T Np + WuT = 0 where
Wr = (WyT, WuT)_
Uncertainty and noise can be added to the system model of Eq. 3-23 as in
the static (memoryless) case and similar results derived [24]. The window
length, p, however, in this case is not as easily determined.
In addition to the linear case above, finite memory relationships can
also be obtained for general (nonlinear) system dynamics when sufficient state
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measurements are available. Consider the nonlinear time-invariant, discrete-
time system model,
Xk+ 1 = f(xk, Uk) (3-29)
Yk = Xk + Vk (3-30)
zk = uk (3-31)
Finite-memory nonlinear relationships between the measured variables (Yk and
zk) are then, obviously, given by
Yk+l = f(Yk, Zk) (3-32)
The residual, v = Yk+l - f(Yk, Zk), can then be generated.
Several comments about these relationships and their associated residuals
are pertinent at this point. First, note that although Eq. 3-32 is written in
vector form, each component may be considered as a separate relationship and
evaluated in terms of its usefulness for FDI. Furthermore, full state
measurement is not necessary for generating those individual relationships in
Eq. 3-32 which only depend on a subset of states.
As an example of nonlinear finite memory relations, consider the
so-called "rotational" residuals used in [5] and [14]. In order to form rota-
tional residuals, we first write a discrete time, nonlinear, time invariant
state space model for the aircraft; e.g.,
x(k+l) = a(x(k)) + b(u(k)) (3-33)
where x(k) is the n-dimensional state vector and u(k) is the m-dimensional
input vector. Moment balance and rotational dynamic relationships give rise
to three components of Eq. 3-33 which correspond to the angular velocity
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states, _(k). Since we have sufficient measurements of the states, x, and
inputs, u, for these three equations, three rotational residuals can be
defined by,
_)P)
= _q = _(k+l) - a_(xm(k)) - bin(urn(k)) (3-34)
_r
where am(-) and be(') are the components of a(-) and b(-) which correspond to
the states, _, and where xm and um are the required state and control measure-
ments.
3.2.3 Open Loop Relationships
If we have insufficient state measurements for individual finite memory
relationships, we may derive residuals in an open loop manner as follows.
Consider the general non-linear system model of Eq. 3-29.
mate of xk may be obtained from the recursive procedure,
Xk+l = f k, Zk)
An open-loop esti-
(3-35)
If the measurements are given by
Yk = h(xk) + Vk (3-36)
Zk = Uk (3-37)
then a residual vector may be formed from
^
_(k) = Yk - h(xk) (3-38)
Comments:
I. The residuals in 3-38 are only considered as decentralized
if f and h represent a decoupled subset of a complete system
model, (e.g., an actuator model).
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. In order for Eqs. 3-35 - 3-38 to be useful, the system Eq.
3-35 must be stable so that initial condition errors do not
cause serious deviations of the residual from zero.
As a simple example, consider a first order linear system representing,
possibly, an actuator model. Let,
6A(k) = ;(k)
where
= a x(k) + (l-a)  c(k) (3-39)
6A = estimated surface deflection
x = estimator state variable
6c = commanded deflection
The residual, v, is the difference between the measured surface
deflection, 6A, and the estimated deflection, 6A" That is,
,J(k) = _A(k) - 6A(k) (3-40)
The linear model in Eq. 3-39 is typically chosen to match the DC gain and low
frequency phase of the true actuator. In addition, rate and position limits
can easily be added to the residual generation procedure by appropriate modi-
fications of the estimate, 6A, at each stage.
3.2.4 Closed Loop Relationships
This case is the most general and is equivalent to the Kalman filter (or
extended Kalman Filter) approach if no use is made of the natural system
decoupling. In general, if the system and observation model are given by Eqs.
3-29 and 3-36, 3-37 respectively, then a closed-loop residual can be formed
from,
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X--k+l= f(_k + GVk, Zk) (3-41)
= Yk - h (xk) (3-42)
Clearly, the open loop case Eqs. 3-35 - 3-40 is equivalent to the closed loop
case with G = 0. Also, when the functions f(',-) and h(-) are linear, it is
possible to relate the set of finite memory relationships to the closed loop
relationships as well. This can be seen in the one dimensional linear full
state measurement case as follows.
Let the system be described by,
Xk+ I = AXk + B_k (3-43)
The one dimensional closed loop residual, vCL, is given by
X--k: A[ -Xk-I + G(Xk_ 1 - Xk_l )] + BBk-I
VCL(k) = Xk - Xk
(3-44)
(3-45)
Obviously, when G=0 we get the open loop case, and when Gffilwe get the finite
memory case. Furthermore, rewriting Eq. 3-45 in terms of the state and esti-
mate at time k-l, we can derive the following relationships;
VcL(k) = -AG vCL(k-l) + _oL(k) (3-46)
VcL(k) : VFM(k) + A(I-G) _CL(k-I) (3-47)
where VFM(k) denotes the finite memory residual (G-I) and _oL(k) denotes the
open loop residual (G=0).
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In general, closed loop residuals (G#O,I in the above) will have failure
effects which appear in all the residuals in a fairly complex manner. Further-
more, the affects of modeling error on closed loop residuals are not easily
characterized [6]. Thus, decentralization of the closed loop residual gener-
ation process is possible only when the system has naturally decoupled modes.
Finally, we note that the choice of Kalman gain, G, for FDI purposes, is
not necessarily straightforward. The ideal choice of G would produce residu-
als which are insensitive to model error and noise, and respond quickly to
failures, with high sensitivity, in a well-deflned and robustly distinguisha-
ble manner, for each class of failure types. Although this is a tall order,
if we take advantage of system decoupling, we may reduce some of the require-
ments on G by ensuring that only a subset of failures appear in the residuals
generated by Eqs. 3-41, 3-42 and only a subset of model errors affect the
behavior of vk under normal circumstances. Some recent work in the area of
robust Kalman filter design for FDI is given in [31].
3.2.5 Summary of Residual Generation Issues
We have seen that decentralization of the residual generation process
consists in defining residuals in such a way that both failures and model
errors affect only small subsets of residuals. This will, in turn, allow us
to make selective use of the redundancy relations in the decision process.
Only those relations or residuals which provide significant information about
a specified set of hypotheses need to be considered when defining algorithms
for distinguishing those hypotheses.
All of the residuals we have defined are, of course, based on design
models. The complexity of the residual generation process is, therefore,
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directly related to the complexity of these models. In some cases, it may be
appropriate to use a combination of residual generation techniques to form a
suitable set of individual or decentralized residuals. Whatever the process,
however, it is important to recall that we will always use a model of reality
and, in so doing, we require that an analysis of modeling error be made before
any residual is used in the decision process.
3.3 DECISION PROCESS DESIGN
In subsection 3.1, we described a general structure for the information
collection part of the decision process. This structure consists of a
two-level process with three functional blocks: trigger, verify, and isolate
(see Fig. 3-3). Each block is composed of a variety of statistical tests
which are designed independently to make reliable decisions and make use of
only the best relationships in each particular test.
Figure 3-4 illustrated the basic methodology behind the design of these
tests. In this subsection we will develop, largely by example, some of the
most useful analysis and synthesis tools which comprise this methodology.
First, however, a short review of concepts in statistical hypothesis testing
is given.
3.3.1 Review of Statistical Hypothesis Testin_
A great deal of literature has appeared throughout the years on the sub-
ject of statistical hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, many results are based
on the same fundamental concepts involving probability theory and Gaussian
statistical assumptions. These concepts are now described.
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UNITARY DECISIONMAKING
The first concept typically appears in the statistics literature (e.g.,
see [B-stat]) and involves the problem of deciding whether or not an observed
set of samples (measurements) can be described by some assumed underlying
probability distribution. What is generally true, however, is that given this
assumed distribution, one can only reliably reject this "hypothesis." Hence,
in the statistics literature, one finds referral to forming a "null hypothe-
sis" in which all hypotheses besides the one we really wish to acc_ are mod-
eled by a single distribution. If the null hypothesis is reliably rejected,
then its complement can be reliably accepted.
To see why hypotheses can only be reliably rejected, consider the case
where a random vector, y, is assumed to have a jointly normal distribution
under the null hypothesis, Ho. Denote this by y-N[m; E] corresponding to the
probability density function (pdf)
py(y) ffi I I (y_m)T[-i (Y-m) (3-48)
[2_ix]]n/2 exp -
where n is the dimension of the random vector, y, and I'I denotes the determi-
nant function.
We now wish to define a decision region, D, in which the condition ygD is
very unlikely. Figure 3-6 shows one definition of D for the zero/mean one
dimensional case (note that D is not unique). The area under the shaded por-
tion of the curve is a. For multivarlable zero-mean unimodel densities, we
can choose D as follows:
D = {Y: Pr[,yH2)NYH 2] 4 e} (3-49)
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Figure 3-6. One Dimensional Rejection Region
where R-| denotes Euclidean norm (others are possible) and where = specifies
the level of significance. When the random variable y is used to represent a
residual vector and the norms in Eq. 3-49 are taken with respect to some
covariance matrix, E, then the rejection criterion Y_D is equivalent to the
well known weighted-sum-of-squared-residuals (WSSR) test.
In the FDI process, rejection tests are useful in the trigger process
(which monitors operation). However, since no mention of alternate hypotheses
(failures) is made, there is no guarantee that the rejection test of Eq. 3-49,
if used as a trigger, would be sensitive to all important failures. In fact,
it is certain that this test is not maximally sensitive to all failure modes.
Thus, in failure detection, since alternate hypotheses are sometimes available,
we need to consider binary, or in general, M-Ary decisionmaking.
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M-ARY DECISIONMAKING
The general problem here can be described as follows. Consider an
observed signal y(k) which can be characterized in a probabilistic sense by
two probability density functions (pdf's) each being valid under two different
hypotheses. (Only 2 pdf's are considered here for simplicity, however, multi-
ple hypotheses may also be considered). That is, we can define two condi-
tional pdfs, p(YIHo) and p(YIHl), where Y is any specified set of the signal
y(k), (e.g., y={y(k); k=ko, ... , kl}).
The problem which must be solved is the definition of decision regions D i
which map the observables, Y, into decisions about the system status. That
is, we will decide that Hi is true when Y _ Di, i=0, I.
In order to choose D i in an "optimal" manner, we must specify an optimi-
zation problem. Two commonly mentioned problems are the Bayesian and Neyman-
Pearson problems both of which are now described.
Bayesian Hypothesis Testing - In this method we attempt to choose Di
through minimization of an expected cost function associated with the four
different decision regions shown in Fig. 3-7. The total cost C is given by
c = cij'Pr(Y DilHj) (3-50)
i,j
Where Cij is the cost of deciding that hypothesis i is true when in fact
hypothesis j is true (i.e., Y _ Rij). The optimization problem,
min E{C}
Di,i=0,1
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Figure 3-7. Decision Regions
then, has the solution [32],
P(YIHI ) PO (CIo - COO)
DI = Y: P(YIHo) > P1 (Co1 - CII)
DO = y: y_ DI(Y ) (3-51)
where P1 and P0 are the a-priori probabilities of each hypothesis. Notice
that the form of the solution involves the comparison of the ratio of two
pdf's or "likelihood ratio", to a threshold which is a function of the costs
of Various decision conditions. The form of this solution is quite general as
it is also the form of the solution to the Neyman-Pearson problem described
below.
Neyman-Pearson Formulation - This method recognizes that the Bayesian
costs are difficult to specify and formulates a problem in terms of specific
performance traits. In particular, let PFA denote the probability of
incorrectly deciding that H I is true when H0 is, in fact, true. Also, let PD
denote the probability that the correct decision, HI, is made when H 1 is true.
The optimization problem,
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max PD
subject to PFA = Y (3-52)
then, has the solution,
D I = Y: _(Y]H0 ) > t
DO = {y: y _ DI(Y)} (3-53)
where we have,
PFA =
P(Y[H 0) dY
D1 (3-54)
PD
P(YIHI) dY
DI (3-55)
Thus the form of the solution to this problem is the same as the Bayesian
case. The threshold, t, must be determined so that Eq. 3-54 is satisfied, and
the resulting performance, PD, is determined from Eq. 3-55. The tradeoff
between PFA and PD is typically expressed by a graph called the receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) as shown in Fig. 3-8. At the extremes we see that:
I. if t = _, then PFA = 0 and PD = 0, and
2. if t = O, then PFA = 1 and PD = I.
Of course, neither extreme is useful and the choice of operating point depends
on some idea of acceptable performance. When this idea is expressed in terms
of the Bayesian cost, the operating point is determined by the threshold
choice of Eq. 3-51.
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Figure 3-8. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Example -As an example of the above concepts, consider a situation in
which under H0, Yk is a white gaussian noise process while under HI, y(k) is
the same noise process plus a constant. That is,
H0: Yk = nk
HI: Yk = nk + m (3-56)
Now, if decisions are made on the basis of a fixed set of samples of y(k), say
y = {y(k): k=l, 2, ... , N}, the decision rule becomes
N D I
£ = Z mT_ 1 (yj - m/2) > t I (3-57)
j=z <
DO
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where E is the covariance matrix of the white noise process and tI = £n(t)
since Eq. 3-57 is the natural logarithm of the decision rule of Eq. 3-53. The
decision statistic, £, is called the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) and Eq. 3-57
is an example of an "LLR test". We also note at this point that if Eq. 3-57
operates over a moving window of data, y(k), as is frequently done in prac-
tice, then the LLR decision statistic can, more generally, be viewed as the
output of a finite impulse response filter. This "filter" interpretation is
useful from the standpoint of complexity reduction since similar filters with
fewer states can be used and analyzed.
Returning to our example above, we wish to characterize the performance
of the test in Eq. 3-57. Since Y is jointly Gaussian, the decision statistic
£ is a Gaussian random variable, and can, therefore, be characterized in terms
of its mean, £, and variance, o£ 2 under each hypothesis. These are given by
HO: _ = -NmTE-Im/2 < 0
o£2 = NmTE-Im (3-58)
HI: £i = -£0 > 0
o£2 = NmTE-im (3-59)
The probability of false alarm PFA can be computed as a function of tI using
Eq. 3-58 and percentage points of the Gaussian distribution. If we let Q(E)
represent the area under the zero mean unit normal function from (E, =), then
we have
PFA = Q (3-60)
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Furthermore, PD may be computed from
tl-_l.l
PD = Q m (3-61)
Eqs. 3-60 and 3-61 completely specify the ROC. If we wish to make PFA = I-PD
(i.e., equal costs for both types of errors), it can be shown [32] that
tI = 1/2 (_I +T0) = 0 resulting in performance which is completely character-
ized by the quantity d2 = (£I _ _)2 /0£2 (Note that d 2 is precisely the
signal-to-nolse ratio used in Eq. 3-3). That is, larger values of d imply
smaller probabilities of incorrect decisions. Furthermore, it can be shown
[32] that, for any t I, PD can be determined from d and PFA, with larger values
of d corresponding to larger values of PD- This is shown in Fig. 3-9. For
the example we are considering here,
d2 = N mT_-im (3-62)
Thus, we see that tradeoffs exist between performance (as expressed by d2) and
window length, N, failure size, m, and noise covariance, E.
The Sequential Probability Ratio Test - The LLR tests described above are
known as fixed sample size tests for obvious reasons. Another test which has
been used extensively for FDI is the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
[5] [33]. Rather than basing decisions on a fixed sample of data, the SPRT
decides automatically when enough samples have been taken to make a reliable
decision. That is, given PFA and PD, the SPRT chooses one of three decisions
after each sample: H0 is true, H I is true, or take another sample. These
choices are completely defined in terms of an LLR statistic and two thresholds
by
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Figure 3-9. Detection Probability Versus d
£k > t+ ===> decide H 1
£k < t- ===> decide H0
t- 4 £k • t+ ===> take another sample
(3-63)
where £k = £n [p(YklHl)/P(YklH0)] and Yk = {Y(J): J = 1,2 ..., k}. Under
ideal circumstances, the test is guaranteed to terminate and is the optimal
test in the sense of minimizing the number of samples [33]. Also, if we
choose t+ and t- by
t+ = £n _i_---_I
t- = £n [IB/l-o.]
(3-64)
then it can be shown that [34] PFA <_ and PD > I-B.
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DISCUSSION
This concludes the review of basic hypothesis testing theory. The
results presented show that in many cases of practical interest, the hypothe-
sis tests which comprise the decision mechanism part of the FDI process con-
sist of the formation of a decision statistic (e.g., the log likelihood ratio)
and the comparison of that statistic with one or more thresholds. Optimal
computations of the parameters of the mechanism for generating decision sta-
tistics and the thresholds were given on the assumption that the underlying
pdfs accurately described the behavior of the observed quantities.
As we have argued in subsection 3.1, however, it is rarely possible to
adequately characterize these pdfs in practice. Therefore, the design of
hypothesis tests can use these classical ideas only as a means for determining
algorithm structure. The parameters, however, must be chosen not for optimal
performance in the nominal case, but for robust performance, i.e., maximal
performance when averaged over all sources of modeling error. In the next
subsection we go into greater detail on these ideas.
3.3.2 Decision Process Design and Analysis
As discussed in subsection 3.1, the classical techniques discussed above
form only a basis for defining the structure of the hypothesis tests which
comprise the trigger, verify, and isolate phases of the decision process. The
parameters of these algorithms, however, must be selected so that the result-
ing tests are robust to errors in the statistical characterizations which were
used to develop them. The tools which will be developed in this section are
based on the notion that these tests can be "robustified" by selecting their
parameters to "optimize" and/or tradeoff desired performance measures with
respect to a statistical truth model. That is, rather than using the
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parameters specified applying classical theories to the design model, we wish
to select parameters which optimize performance and achieve the desired
tradeoffs when averages are taken with respect to a truth model that includes
all error sources.
To be more explicit, we assume in this methodology that the truth model
can be described by two pdfs for every hypothesis. The first pdf is the
conditional distribution of the measured quantities conditioned on a random
vector which represents the sources of error which are ignored in the design
model. This is denoted by p(yS, Hi). The second pdf is a characterization
of the model error vector, 8, p(OlHi). The design model is based on the
assumption that 8 takes on a specific value (usually zero). Thus, the
structure of the decision algorithms are determined using p(ylS=8o, Hi). The
algorithm so determined will have a number of parameters, generically denoted
by P. To select P, we go back to the original hypothesis testing algorithm
(e.g., max PD subject to constant PFA) and select P using the truth pdfs,
P(YlHi) = fP(YlS, Hi) P(elHi) dO (3-65)
Although this concept handles many sources of uncertainty, there may be
other unknown quantities which can not be adequately represented by a random
variable with some known distribution (e.g., failure magnitude). In this case
we must look at the sensitivities of the various performance measures to vari-
ations in the unknown quantities.
*A natural question arises here: Why not design everything for the truth
model? The answer is that one would then expect good performance only for
the truth model and little robustness to its assumptions. The truth model
is not reality either. It is just a vehicle for obtaining a warm feeling
about the robustness of the algorithm based on the design model.
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EXAMPLE 1 (DETECTION)
This example deals with fixed sample size tests. It illustrates the use
of the classical theories to define an algorithm structure and the use of a
truth model to select parameters of that structure based on optimization and
engineering tradeoffs. This example, while very simple, will be very useful
in designing trigger tests for aircraft path failures.
The design model for this example is given by Eq. 3-56. Under Ho the
observed vector process is white Gaussian noise, and under H I this noise is
contaminated by a constant vector. The decision process structure for a fixed
sample size, N, is given in Eq. 3-57. Since we wish to select the parameters
of this algorithm using a truth model, we rewrite 3-57 as
N D1
S = pt _ yj >
j=l <
Do
t" (3-66)
Thus, the parameters which must be chosen (given N) are a projection vector,
P, and the threshold, t". The truth model we will use to select these
parameters is given by
Ho : Yk = b + nk (3-67)
H 1 : yk = b + nk + m (3-68)
where b is a random zero mean Gaussian constant vector whose covariance matrix
is Eb, nk is a zero mean white noise process with covariance matrix, En, and m
is a known constant vector. As discussed in subsection 3.3.1, the performance
of the test in 3-66 can be completely characterized by the distinguishability
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metric d 2, however, we now compute d2 using the truth model of Eqs. 3-67 and
3-68. In particular we can compute the mean and variance of S under H o and H I
2 2
(denoted by So, SI, Oo, and oi) as
so = 0 (3-69)
This gives,
02 = o2 = o2 = pt(N2 Eb + N Zn)P
1 0
(3-70)
SI = N ptm (3-71)
d 2 = N(ptm) 2
pt(NE b + En)P
(3-72)
Recalling that large values of d 2 result in large probabilities of detection
and low probabilities of false alarm, we wish to choose P to maximize the
right hand side of Eq. 3-72. To do this, define the following quantities,
w
C =N lb+ En, (3-73)
_t_ = _, (3-74)
= Q P, (3-75)
m = Q-t m. (3-76)
This allows us to rewrite Eq. 3-72 as
d2 = N(_t m) 2 / (_t _) (3-77)
which is clearly just the square of the magnitude of the projection of m onto
P. Thus d2 is maximized when P = Km (K is any real scalar) and using Eqs.
3-73 through 3-76 we can solve for P as
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P = K_-I m (3-78)
Next the threshold t" is chosen. We recall that the structure of Eq.
3-66 could be derived from the problem of maximizing PD subject to a given
value for PFA" To achieve the desired PFA we must compute it as a function of
t" using the truth model. Since this example deals with Gausslan statistics,
this computation is straightforward. In particular,
PFA = Q (t"/o) (3-79)
where o is defined in Eq. 3-70 and Q(-) is the error function discussed in
subsection 3.3.1. The threshold t" is then chosen using percentage points of
the Gaussian density. For example_ to achieve PFA = 10-4 we need t"
approximately equal to 3 o.
Similarly, for a known value of m, we can compute PD using Eq. 3-61 and
the truth model pdfs. When 'm' represents a failure, however, it is sometimes
of interest to define a minimal failure in terms of a desired value of PD"
This can also be done using Eq. 3-61 and the truth pdfs. For example, to
achieve PD = i0-_, we need (_I - t") = 3 o. Furthermore, since d 2 (and,
therefore, PD) is monotonic in SI, we can guarantee that any failure magnitude
which is larger than the minimal one defined in this way will achieve a PD
which is no smaller than the desired value. This is a very desirable trait
for failure detection systems in which the size of a failure is infrequently
known a priori.
Another tradeoff which can be accomplished using the above computations
is the choice of sample size, N. Since all the computations are a function of
N, we could, for example, proceed as follows:
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I. Vary N
2. Choose P to optimize d 2
3. Set t" to achieve PFA
4. Compute minimal failure size for given PD"
Notice that, in contrast to Eq. 3-62, as we let N --> =, d 2 approaches a
finite value. That is, there is a fundamental limit to the reliability of
decisions due to the presence of model error -- an intuitively pleasing
result.
EXAMPLE 2 (ISOLATION)
This example is a generalization of Example 1 and will have implications
in terms of isolation test design for aircraft path failures. We consider
fixed sample size tests for the problem of distinguishing the two hypotheses:
HI : Yk = ml + nk (3-8o)
H2 : Yk = m2 + nk (3-81)
The truth model is described by
HI : Yk = ml + nk + b (3-82)
H2 : Yk = m2 + nk + b (3-83)
where m I and m2 are two constant vectors and nk and b are the white noise and
random bias vectors of Example I. The LLR test obtained using the design
model Eqs. 3-80 and 3-81 is
D I
N I 1 _ t (3-84)
I (ml-m2)TZnlyj - _ mI Z_nlml + _ m_Znlm2
j=l D 2
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As in Example 1Eq. 3-84 can be rewritten as,
N D1
s=pt_yjX t,
j=1 D2
(3-85)
The distinguishability metric, d2, calculated using the Gaussian statistics of
the truth model in Eqs. 3-82 and 3-83 is
d 2 = (N ptAm)2/_2 (3-86)
where _2 is defined in Eq. 3-70 and Am = (m I - m2). Given m I and m2, the
choice of P which maximizes d 2 is
p -- C---I Am (3-87)
The choice of t' can be made for either HI or H2 in a manner similar to Exam-
ple i. Alternatively, a Bayesian cost can be defined as in Eq. 3-50 and the
decision regions computed by solving the Baysian optimization problem using
the truth model statistics defined by Eqs. 3-82 and 3-83.
The similarity to Example I breaks down when we try to define minimal
failures. This is because, for the test described by Eq. 3-85 with the pro-
jection vector defined by Eq. 3-87, the d 2 metric (Eq. 3-86) is not necessar-
ily monotonic with failure size. That is, if the d 2 metric is computed using
cim i in place of m i in Eq. 3-86, then as ci increases from I, d 2 may go up or
down. In fact, it can be shown in some cases that the probability of making
an incorrect decision may actually approach i as ci approaches infinity. This
fact can easily be seen in Fig. 3-10. The figure shows the decision region in
the space spanned by the decision statistics Zyi(k) for i = I, 2 (the compo-
k
nents of a two dimensional measurement y(k). These decision regions are
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determined by Eq. 3-85 with a threshold that weights the costs of incorrect
decisions (for both c i = I) equally in a Baysian problem. It is easily seen
from the figure that if the magnitude of m I is actually larger than its design
value, then the likelihood that the statistic lies in D 2 can become quite
large. Thus, this particular choice of parameters is not robust to changes in
the magnitudes of the vectors m i.
EXAMPLE 3 (ROBUST ISOLATION)
The problem in the previous example illustrates that we can not always
use the structure defined by a design model and expect adequate performance.
This is because some unknown parameters, such as failure size, result in vari-
ations in performance which are too large to be acceptable. When this is the
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case, there are typically two approaches which can be taken. The first and
most often used approach involves estimating the unknown parameters and form-
ing a generalized likelihood ratio test [32]. While this approach performs
well in some cases, it is also possible that, due to mismatch between the
truth model and the real world, estimation errors can cause severe performance
degradation. Furthermore, the analysis and design of such algorithms is com-
plicated by the fact that a more detailed truth model is needed. The alter-
nate approach, which is described here by example, is sometimes referred to as
invariance. In this approach we try to develop tests whose performance is
invariant to changes in these "nuisance" parameters.
In this case we consider the design model hypotheses,
Hi : Yk = ci mi + nk i = I, 2 (3-88)
where ci is an unknown scalar. When both ci were known, the binary decision
problem of Example 2 completely specified both test structure and thresholds,
and performance measures could be computed. In Example I, however, notice
that one option we had in the design process was to turn the problem into one
of rejecting Ho with high confidence (satisfy PFA) and then evaluate what
alternate hypothesis parameters (failure size) would ensure adequate
performance (PD)" We take the same approach in this example for each
hypothesis described by Eq. 3-88. We will see that ci invariant decision
regions using this approach can easily be described.
We start with the problem of rejecting H I using an N-window of observa-
tions. Using the results of subsection 3.3.1, we can define for any value of
Cl, an _ significance rejection contour by
N N
D(cl) = {Yk : Pr[ II_ (y(k) - cI m[) II2 _ _ _ (Yk - clml )H2]_ _} (3-89)
k=l k=l
58
ALPHATECH, INC.
Note y(k) denotes the random variable and Yk are sample values. The sums in
Eq. 3-89 are taken over the N-window of data and the norms are taken with
respect to the white noise covariance matrix to be consistent with the design
model Eq. 3-88. Since c I is unknown, however, we want a decision region for
rejecting H I such that the significance of the resulting test is invarlant
under changes in cI. That is, we want a decision region which is the locus of
points in measurement space defined by Eq. 3-89 for all Cl, or
D ffi D(c 1) (3-90)
For two dimensional measurements, Yk, this region is easily derived from Fig.
3-11. To define this region in general, let W represent a transformation
matrix such that zk = W y(k) (note we can consider each time instant sepa-
rately in this case because the mean vector mI is constant). If W m I = 0,
then p(z k I HI) = p(W nk I HI) which is not a function of c I. If the measure-
ment vector is n-dimensional, then the transformation matrix W spans an n-I
dimensional subspace. The generic rejection test would then be defined by the
region D which can be rewritten,
-I -I
D = { Yk : Zk = W Yk and Pr[ _(zktC z zk) • _ ZktC z Zk)] _ = } (3-91)
k k
where C z is some positive symetric matrix (usually the covariance matrix of
Zk, though others may be desirable).
Given a choice for C z and Ac, the region D completely defines a rejection
test for H I which is insensitive to changes in cI. In this example, however,
there is an alternate hypothesis which we have not yet discussed. Since there
is only one alternate hypothesis, H 2, in this example, we would like to define
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Figure 3-11. Two Dimensional Visualization of Decision
Region D = Complement of D
the H 1 rejection region to be maximally sensitive to H 2 (rather than being
generic). That is, we want to define D so that the smallest possible values
of c 2 will make the probability that Yk lies in D large. To do this, let us
first define the rejection test based on the design model as:
S1 = P1 t [ Yk > D1 tl (3-92)
Note that this test is not in the same form as Eq. 3-91 indicates, but is con-
sistent with the test structures in Example 2. Again, this test assumes the
failure sign is known. To be a rejection test for H I we know, from the above,
that PI must be orthogonal to m I. The remaining degrees of freedom are then
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chosen to optimize the sensitivity to H2 using, for example, the truth model
of Eqs. 3-82 and 3-83. The d2 metric is used now as a measure of sensitivity
because, for the test defined by Eq. 3-92 with Pltml = 0, d 2 is monotonic c2.
That is,
d12 = [E{SI I H2} - E{SI I HI}]2 / Var[Sl [ HI or H 2]
= c22[Pltm2 ]2 / Plt[N2Yb + NEn]P I (3-93)
Equation 3-93 is maximized for any value of c2 by choosing P1 as follows. Let
E = N2Eb + NEn = QtQ, P1 = QPI, and mi = Q-tm i for i = I, 2. Then the desired
optimization problem is,
max [ P1 t m2 I/Pit P-1
s.t. _i t ml = 0 (3-94)
The objective function in Eq. 3-94 is easily seen as the projection of m 2 onto
P1 and the constraint requires that P1 lie in the null space of m I. Thus the
solution is just the projection of m2 onto the null space of m I. Finally
solving for PI, we have,
PI = K Z-l[m2 - (m2tE-iml)/(mltZ-Iml)ml ] (3-95)
where K is just a normalization constant.
We can now follow the same procedure for H2 and obtain a test based on a
decision statistic $2, which rejects H2 with maximal sensitivity to H I. The
two hypothesis tests define decision regions in which it is possible to
reliably reject each hypothesis. This is shown in the two dimensional case in
Fig. 3-12. Note that in contrast to Example 2, there are four regions of
interest:
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Figure 3-12. Decision Regions for Two Rejection Tests
Region
Region
Region
Region
I) H 1 can be rejected, but H2 can't
2) H2 can be rejected, but H 1 can't
3) Both H I and H 2 can be rejected
4) Neither H I nor H2 can be rejected
--> Decide H 2
--> Decide Hl
--> Reject H l and H 2
--> Can't decide
Thus, these two tests allow us more flexibility in the decisionmaking process
when events occur that can be described by neither of the hypotheses.
Finally, we note that it would be possible to simplify this two-test
t
decision process by considering the test,
(St - $2) > tI' -->
(S 1 - $2) < -t 2' -->
Otherwise _>
Decide H2
Decide H I
Can't decide (3-96)
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This test is not equivalent to the two test procedure. The can't decide mode
may incorporate parts of both regions 3 and 4 of the two-test procedure depend
ing on the choice of tI' and t2'. Clearly tI' = t2' = 0 is not a reasonable
choice. However, the choice of tI and t2 and the relationship of these thesh-
olds to the two-test procedure thresholds has not been fully investigated. A
reasonable choice would be to choose tI = t2 such that, independent of the
hypotheses failure size (el) , the probability of making a wrong decision is
guaranteed to be low. For example, if we want Pr[(S 1 - $2) > t I HI) < _
independent of el, we assume cI = 0 (the worst ease) and set the threshold at
the _ significance level for the assumed Gausslan distribution of (S1 - $2).
EXAMPLE 4 (UNKNOWN FAILURE SIGNS)
In the above examples, we assumed that even if the "failure" magnitudes
were unknown (ci in Example 3), the sign of the failure was known. This exam-
ple justifies a rather obvious modification to the tests described in the pre-
vious examples to account for uncertain signs. The modification results in
taking the absolute value of the decision statistics, i.e., performing two-
sided tests.
Consider the design model of Example I with uncertain failure sign given
by,
Ho : Yk = nk
H I : yk = im + nk (3-97)
where i takes on a value of 1 or -I. The generalized likelihood ratio test
for an N-window of measurements yN is defined by,
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D!
Max P(YN I HI, i) / Max P(YN I Ho, i) >< t
i i D O
(3-98)
The denominator of Eq. 3-98 is not a function of i and the numerator can be
maximized by maximizing the natural log of the numerator (assume Gaussian
statistics and nk white as in Example I).
depend on the choice of i, we get
N
i = arg max i[m [.Yk]
k=l
If m and
i = -I.
Ignoring the terms which don't
(3-99)
N
Yk are the same sign, i = I; and if they are opposite signs, then
k=l N
Thus, i = sgn (mk[lYk)'a Putting this solution back into Eq. 3-98,
taking logarithms, incorporating all the constants into a threshold and
expressing the decision statistic in general form (as we did in Example I) we
have the test,
N D 1
I et_ yk I >< t '
k=l Do
(3-100)
SEQUENTIAL TEST DESIGN
The design of sequential tests such as the SPRT mentioned in subsection
3.3.1 is somewhat different than the fixed sample size tests described in the
above examples. Sequential tests address the binary decision problem only.
Samples (measurements) are taken until a decision can be made in favor of one
hypothesis or the other. The number of samples needed to complete the test is
a random variable. Characteristics of both hypotheses must be specified in
some detail which, for the FDI problem implies that we must choose "minimal"
failure magnitudes and ensure that larger failures result in shorter test times.
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As discussed at the very beginning of this subsection, we want to specify
sequential tests using a design model and then choose their parameters based
on a truth model. Consider as an example, the design and truth models of
Example I. The SPRT is easily derived and written in a general form as
k k
Sk = GI _ (ptyj) - _ GD > t+ -->
j=i j=i
Decide H I
< t- --> Decide H o
< t+ and > t- --> Take another sample (3-iOi)
where GI, GD, P, t+, and t- are parameters to be specified. Furthermore,
since we know that model error exists, the theoretical guarantee that this
procedure terminates is no longer valid. Thus, it is often useful to specify
a time limit. When the time limit is reached and no decision has been made,
we may either exit with no-decision as a conclusion or perform a fixed sample
size test at this time. A prototype design procedure which makes use of the
truth model is given below.
Step i:
Choose a maximum sample length, N.
Step 2:
Select P to maximize the distinguishability metric, d2(N), for the
maximal length test as in Example 1 (the answer is the same since d 2 is not a
function of G I or GD)
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Step 3:
In keeping with the ideal parameter values GI pt = mtZn and GD = mtZnm/2
N
we proceed as follows. Determine the value of S = E{I ptyk} which makes d2(N)
k=l
acceptable. Set G I = S and GD = $2/2. This results in a test in which values
of [ptyj less than S/2 tend to drive the statistic to its negative threshold.
J
Step 4:
Determine thresholds t+ = -t-.
The last step is the most difficult since no closed form solution exists
which relates the desired performance measures (e.g., PFA and PD) to the
choice of thresholds when the truth model and the design model are not identi-
cal. Reference [35] presents a numerical method which could be used for such
calculations, however, the results are incorrect as detailed in [36]. The
difficulty is easily illustrated by the following equations.
Let Sk be the decision statistic at stage k in the SPRT defined in Eq.
3-101 with thresholds t+ and t-. Also, let Si = (SI, $2, ..., Si). We can
relate PFA and PD to t+ and t- by,
PFA = i=l_/P( Si I Ho) dSi
L+A_ {Si : t- 4 Sj 4 t+, j=l, ..., i-i and Si > t+} (3-102)
I HI) dSi
L+ (3-103)
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Also, we have probabilities of correct rejection (PCR) and missed detection
(PMD) which are given by,
PCR = _ I p( Si i Ho) dsi
i=lJ
L-=A {Si : t- _ Sj (t +, j=l, ..., i-I and Si < t-} (3-104)
L- (3-105)
Note that for N < _, we have PFA + PCR _ 1 since there is a finite probability
that no decision is made (i.e., t- < Sj < t+, j=l, ..., N). Also, Eqs. 3-102 -
3-105 assume that no decision is made if SN e L+ or L-. In some cases, it may
DI _
be appropriate to define the terminal decision rule SN >< t if SN g L+ or L-.
Do
In this case Eqs. 3-102 - 3-105 would have to be modified.
Equations 3-102 through 3-105 must now be evaluated using the truth pdfs
of Sk (as opposed to those assumed in defining Sk as a function of Yk)-
Unfortunately, closed form solutions for these equations are available only in
the simplest cases. If, for example, Sk was an uncorrelated Gaussian process
(not likely, in view of equations like Eq. 3-101), then we could write
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N i-1
PFA = i_l= Pi° m=_l (l-rm°)
N i-I
PMD = i_l=_ qi° m=_l (l-rml)
(3-I06)
(3-107)
j N
PNo Decision = E (l-riJ) (3-108)
i=l
where Pl j A Pr {Si>t+IHj} = Probability of Deciding H 1 at time i, given
Hj and no decision up until time i
qi j _ Pr {Si<t-IHj} = Probability of Deciding Ho at time i, given
Hj and no decision up until time i
riJ _ l-piJ - qij = Probability of deciding to take another
sample at time i, given Hj and no decision
up until time i.
Note that pij and qij are easily computed if Si is Gaussian.
While Eqs. 3-106 - 3-108 may provide approximations to the desired quanti-
ties when Si is not uncorrelated, it is not clear how accurate the approxima-
tion is or when it would break down. In order to get more accurate estimates
of the desired quantities, numerical integration or simulation methods are
needed. For the control element FDI algorithm developed in Section 5, some
interesting heuristic methods of computing thresholds for sequential tests are
developed.
THRESHOLD SCHEDULING
The computations described above are useful when errors in the pdf speci-
fications can only be described in a statistical sense. If this statistical
description adequately characterizes the worst errors throughout the opera-
tional region (or envelope) of the system under consideration, we can be quite
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confident that the resulting FDI design will meet its performance specifica-
tions under all conditions.
The problem in such a worst-case analysis, however, is that the errors
encountered at the limits of this envelope may be so severe that exceptionally
conservative designs result. That is, only failures of extreme severity would
be large enough to appear significant over the worst-case modeling error.
The natural alternative to a worst-case design is one in which we con-
sider a limited envelope for our baseline design and modify the algorithm
towards a more conservative design when large errors are anticipated. The
mechanism which accomplishes this adjustment is known as "threshold scheduling"
and has proven to be an important part of many FDI systems [5], [14] - [16].
The basic idea behind threshold scheduling can be illustrated by considering
the problem of detecting inertial sensor failures using dual redundant sensors
while accounting for misalignment errors. The residual, formed by comparing
two similar sensors at each time, k, in this case is given by
v(k) = Yl(k) - Y2 (k) (3-109)
where
yi(k) = aix(k) + qi(k)
x(k) = variable being measured
ai = actual scale factor (both equal to i with
zero alignment error)
qi(k) = zero mean white Gaussian noise
Thus, we can express the residual, under normal operation, as,
v(k) = Aa x(k) + N(k) (3-110)
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where Aa = al-a 2 and N(k) = ql-q2" Now, in order to achieve a false alarm
rate of I in I0,000, we know that (using percentage points for the normal
distribution) our thresholds (if we perform no information collection) must be
±3.5 oN when either Aa=0 or x=O. The problem is that large values of x result
in large residuals when Aa is non-zero, and the term Aax(k) may get, in the
worse case, sufficiently large so that only enormous differences between Yl
and Y2 can be detected with a threshold that guarantees PFA for worst-case
errors. Threshold scheduling overcomes this worst-case performance by adjust-
ing the threshold on the basis of a failure-insensitive, deterministic esti-
mate of x(k) and a specification of the worst-case scale factor differential.
Thus, the sensor FDI test becomes,
^
I _(k) I > 3-5ON + Aama x x(k) ===> Failure Detected (3-111)
The above example illustrates the need for threshold scheduling and the
basic concepts involved (note, that no attempt is made here to elaborate on
how a failure-insensitive estimate could be obtained). In order to apply
these ideas to other FDI designs, we now describe some of the general
principles involved.
First, we note that the errors which are important for threshold schedul-
ing are those whose statistical contribution to error in the residual depends
on a deterministic signal. In the example above, we saw that the determinis-
tic signal x was used to schedule thresholds. Such a signal provides knowl-
edge about the potential for large errors at each point in time.
Next, the statistical nature of the error source is described by specify-
ing the pdf of the error as a function of this deterministic signal. Again,
in the above example, we effectively assumed that Aa was uniformly distributed
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on [-Aama x, Aama x] resulting in an error term which is uniformly distributed
on [-Aa i(k), AamaxX(k)]. Note, we could also have assumed that Aa was
max
Gaussian with a known variance, and obtained a different scheduling algorithm.
The threshold schedule can now be determined by specifying the perform-
ance characteristic which must be preserved throughout the entire operational
envelope. For example, the threshold in Eq. 3-111 is the result of requiring
that the false alarm performance be maintained. If missed detection perform-
ance were to be maintained, we would need to characterize the pdf of the
residual under failure conditions along with the error and compute the sched-
uled thresholds accordingly. Note that we cannot maintain both performance
measures simultaneously in a fixed sample test since only a single threshold
can be modified.
Sequential Test Scheduling - In sequential testing procedures such as the
SPRT, two threshold must be scheduled. Since, in these tests, we are willing
to declare that no decision can be made, it is, therefore, possible to main-
tain both PD and PFA, although as errors get large, the likelihood of not mak-
ing any decision increases. As with the determination of nominal thresholds,
the computations involved in determining threshold schedules for sequential
tests are more complex than the fixed sample size case. However, a reasonable
approach is to choose the threshold at each stage, k, such that the probabili-
ties P(Sk>t+IHo ) and P(Sk<t-IH I) (conditions which, respectively, result in a
false alarm and a missed detection at stage k) are equivalent to those
achieved in the original SPRT with no error. (Note, Sk is the SPRT decision
statistic as, for example, in Eq. 3-101). Such a procedure is simple since
each threshold only depends on an estimate of the impact of errors on Sk
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independent of other estimates at other stages, and has performed quite well
in practice [5].
To see this, consider Example [ with the SPRT defined by Eq. 3-101. Sup-
pose that in addition to the random bias error in Eqs. 3-68 and 3-69, there is
an additional error term Ek, which is a function of a known deterministic sig-
nal that is independent of which hypothesis is true. That is, the truth model
is now
Ho Yk = qk + Ek + b
HI Yk = qk + Ek + b + m (3-112)
Let to denote the threshold we select assuming Ek = 0, for all k, and let
tE(k) denote the threshold at time k based on the criterion that the probabil-
ity of false alarm at stage k, given that we've reached stage k, is the same
for Ek = 0 and Ek _ O. That is we want to ensure that Pr[S k > to I Ho, E = 0] =
Pr[S k > tE(k) { No, E _ 0]. Since Sk is Gaussian, this condition implies
that:
to - Soo(k) = tE(k ) - SoE(k )
where S--oo(k) = E{S k I Ho, E = 0}, and SOE(k) = E{S k I Ho, E # 0}.
example_ we have,
(3-113)
For this
k
tE(k) = to + _ GIPtEj (3-114)
j=l
Equation 3-114 defines a threshold scheduling algorithm for tile SPRT of
Eq. 3-101. If the sign of Ek is unknown, we would like to use the worst case
combinations and so the second term in Eq. 3-114 becomes
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k
ClPt Sgn(EjP t) Ej
j=l
(3-115)
where Sgn(Ejp t) is a diagonal matrix of Is and -Is such that if [Ejpt]ii > 0,
then [Sgn(Ejpt)]ii = 1 and if EjP t < 0 then [Sgn(Ejpt)]ii = -I. For imple-
n
mentation purposes we note that Pt Sgn(Ejet)Ej = _ I PiEj i I where n is the
i=l
dimension of P and Ej and Pi and Ej i denote the ith element of P and Ej
respectively.
Scheduling in Single Input Single Output (SIS0) Systems with Transfer
Function Errors - The The problem to be formulated here is motivated by the
problem of detecting "actuator path" failures as shown in Fig. 3-13. In this
problem, we have nearly perfect measurements of both the input to the actuator
and its output.
6C
ACTUAL
ACTUATOR
I SENSOR I
(Sm
R-3226
Figure 3-13. Measurements for Actuator Path Failures
Figure 3-14 shows the "open loop" residual generation process for linear
single-input, single output (SISO) systems (see subsection 3.2 for definition
of open-loop residuals). Although closed loop or finite memory residual proc-
esses may be considered, we consider only the open loop case since it has been
used successfully in cases where the SISO system is a stable, high bandwidth
low-pass system.
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Figure 3-14. Open-Loop Residual Generation in SISO Systems
The residual process, v(t) in Fig. 3-14, is non-zero because the true
A
transfer function from u to y is different than the model we use to produce y.
Typical model-errors are due to high frequency dynamics and nonlinearities
which cannot be easily characterized and variations in hardware (over time and
from implementation to implementation). The residual process _(t) is a non-
stationary process because the input, u(t) is nonstationary. Furthermore, the
size of the residual scales with the size of u(t). To see this, consider the
case where both the true system and the model are linear systems. In this
case, we have
where,
t
_(t) = f e(_) u(t-_) dT (3-116)
0
e(T) = h(T) - h(T)
h(T) = true-system impulse response
h(T) = model
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To design an FDI system which detects failures of the true system, we must
first characterize the residual process when no failure exists. Since, in Eq.
3-116, e(_) is not known, and in fact may vary over time and implementations
of h(t), let us characterize it by the functional relationship e(T;8) where 8
is an unknown random paramter. The parameter, 8, is the only random element
in the description of v(t). Although u(t) could be characterized in some
cases by a piecewise-stationary stochastic process, such a characterization
would be of little use since we have a perfect measurement of u.
The "size" of v(t) with no failure present can now be characterized as a
function of the complete past history of the input; i.e., {u(T), Te [0,t]}.
To see this, let us compute the mean square value of v(t) with respect to the
variations in 8. That is, if we compute;
v2 = £8{v(t)2}
where C 0 denotes expectation with respect to the distribution of 8, then v2
can serve as a measure of the possible size of the residual under no failure
and used as a basis for FDI.
To compute v2, we formally have,
E t
f
0
tt 1f f dTl dT 2 f(Tl,_ 2) u(t-T I) u(t-T 2)0 0
(3-118)
(3-119)
whe re
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f(rl,T2 ) = _8 {e(Tl;8) e(T2;8)} (3-120)
Thus, we see that knowledge of u over the interval [0,t] and a statistical
characterization of the error impulse response function is sufficient for
computing v 2.
Unfortunately, the calculation in Eq. 3-119 is not an efficient one
since, in general, f(TI,T 2) iS not seperable (if f(TI,T 2) = fI(_I_2[_2 ) then
Eq. 3-119 amounts to the product of two linear filters). To see this, let's
consider a simple example (of no particular interest to the actuator FDI
problem).
Suppose we let e(T;8) be given by,
e(T;O) = ee -eT (3-121)
That is, the error transfer function in a first order low pass filter with
unknown cut-off frequency, 8. This might correspond to a case where the true
system is well known at high frequencies but uncertain at low frequencies.
Note that Eq. 3-121 specifies a magnitude an___dphase relationship between u and
v. Many characterizations of unmodelled dynamics presume only a magnitude
relationship with unknown phase [37]. This characterization will be discussed
subsequently.
If we denote the probability density function of 8 by p(8), then;
= f p(O) 02e-O(_l+T2) dO (3-122)f(TI,T 2)
If, in addition, we assume that 8 is uniformly distributed over the interval
[0L, 0H] , then, using integration by parts
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OH
/ 1f(z I,T 2) = 0H_0 L
0L
02e-0('q+'r2 ) dO (3-123)
1
0H-0 L
02e-O('rl+T2) 2
J
-(TI+T2) (TI+T2) 3
e--0(TI+T2 ) (I + 0(TI+T2))
OH
%
(3-124)
There is no apparent way to separate Eq. 3-124 into a product of functions,
each involving only T 1 or T2. In addition, even this example demonstrates
the complexity of calculating v2, using Eq. 3-119.
Part of the complexity in the above formulation is due to the significant
amount of structure imposed on the error transfer function. As we mentioned
above, transfer function errors are more commonly specified in terms of their
magnitude response alone, with no knowledge available about phase. This leads
us to search for scheduling methods which are based on the magnitude (or
squared magnitude) of the Fourier transform of e(T), viz. E2(m). We can do
this using Parseval's relation as follows. Define a positive function of
frequency L(_) such that L2(_) ) E2(_) for all _ is guaranteed. Let N(_)
represent the Fourier transform of the residual sequence v(t) and U(u) be the
Fourier transform of the input u(t). Then the following relations hold:
N2(0j) = E2(0_) U2(_)
N2(00) (L2(_) U2(o_)
(3-125)
(3-126)
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and using Parsevals relation,
oo co t
f v2(t) dt < f [ f I£(T) u(t-T) dT]2dt (3-128)
where £(t) is the inverse Fourier transform of L(m). Equation 3-128 suggests
a test which will reliably reject the hypothesis that a SISO system with trans-
fer function error (i.e., error between reality and the model used to form a
residual), is operating normally. The right hand side of Eq. 3-128 says that
the input is filtered using any filter whose squared magnitude in the fre-
quency domain bounds the actual frequency domain error. The output of this
filter is then squared and integrated. This is then compared to the integral
of the squared residual. The right hand side of Eq. 3-128 is the threshold
and it is scheduled dynamically based on the temporal characteristics of the
input. Of course, in a practical system, we would deal with these relation-
ships in the discrete time domain and perform sums only over finite intervals
to ensure that the values in Eq. 3-128 remain bounded.
OTHER DESIGN ISSUES
The design of fixed sample size hypothesis tests discussed in this sub-
section have all been based on a steady state analysis of the decision statis-
tics which are used for decisionmaking. That is, only the steady state pdfs
are used to optimize parameters and compute thresholds. In using these tests
in the trigger process (see subsection 3.1), we clearly would like to minimize
the number of samples required or equivalently the bandwidth of the resulting
filter. This is because we recognize that there is a tradeoff between the
size of failures one can detect and the speed in which this detection can take
place. Some new ideas which are based on the notion of transient gain are
derived here.
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The transient gain of a filter H(_) (or its Fourier transform h(t)) is
defined as
GT(h) = sup JT(h * Y) / JT(Y)
y e L2(0,T) (3-129)
where * denotes convolution, and where
T
JT(X) = I/T f Ix(t)l 2 dt
0
In [38] JT(V), (where v is the residual vector of a Kalman filter), is
used as a trigger statistic and the "size" of JT is established for various
values of T using uniformly distributed modeling and sensor errors.
The notion of transient gain is one which may be useful in designing
trigger filters• To simplify the results which follow, we will deal with
discrete time processes and finite impulse response (FIR) filters• The dis-
crete version of Eq. 3-129 is
(3-130)
GT(H) = sup n HTY T U / N YT U (3-131)
where HT is the impulse response matrix, viz.
HT =
h0 0 0 ... 0
h I h 0 0 ... 0
h2 h I h0 ... 0
hT hT-I ..- h 0
(3-132)
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and YT t = (y(0), y(1), ..., y(T)). Now, in the design of trigger filters
(choosing H) we would like to maximize the transient response to a failure
subject to a constraint on the steady state variance of the output. That is,
given the variance of the output of this filter, we can first choose a fixed
threshold which achieves some desired false alarm rate. Of all the filters
which result in the same output variance, we would like the one which responds
as quickly as possible. Formally stated, we want to choose the (T + i)
impulse response coefficients which
max GT(h)
subject to:
h_hTt Cy h__T = 02 (3-133)
where _T is the vector of impulse response coefficients (i.e., the first col-
umn of H T) and Cy is the autocorrelation matrix for YT- The solution of this
problem requires a gradient scheme since both the objective and constraints
are nonlinear in the decision vector h T. Such schemes would be facilitated by
observing that_
GT(H) = Xmax (HTHT t) = _max (HT) (3-134)
where %max denotes the maximum eigenvalue and _max denotes the maximum
singular value of the corresponding matrix.
Other options which are similar to the above (some of which are easier to
solve) are given below.
I. Minimize the variance of the output subject to a constraint
transient gain.
2. Minimize the variance subject to a fixed step-response transient
gain. That is, assume that y(j) is a constant in computing G T.
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.
e
This is solved by taking the filter coefficients as Cy -I times a
vector of ones. This is also the solution to the maximization of the
ratio of step response to variance of the output.
Maximize the norm of the impulse response vector, hT, subject to a
constant variance of the output. This is equivalent to maximizing
the magnitude of the output at time T subject to a unit norm input
and a constant output variance. The solution to this problem is to
take hT as the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue
of Cy. Note that the similarity between this result and the robust
parity check results of [24] are not coincidental since the problem
statements are effectively equivalent.
Maximize the worst case transient gain (by selecting y(j) to minimize
GT) subject to a constraint on steady state variance. That is,
select hT to
max mln GT(h)
hT y(j) : j=0, ..., T
subject to:
hT t Cy hT = o2 (3-135)
3.4 SUMMARY
In this section we have developed a general structure for FDI systems and
discussed many details associated with the design of each element of this
structure. At the top level, the FDI function is decomposed into residual
generation and decision processes. In the residual generation process, infor-
mation about normal (unfailed) system redundancy (including temporal, direct
as well as analytic redundancy) is used to form residual signals which are
well behaved under no failure conditions and which deviate in easily charac-
terized and distinguishable ways when failures occur. While Kalman filtering
methods can be used to generate residuals without an explicit analysis of
redundancy, the failure to assess redundancy and their associative errors can
result in poor performance. This is because Kalman filtering is a centralized
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approach to residual generation (using the system model as a whole) and will
tend to mix well known relationships with poorly known relationships. The
decentralized approach to residual generation breaks up the system model into
individual relationships among measured variables (static and dynamic balance
equations). These relationships can then be examined independently in terms
of their usefulness in each part of the decision process.
The decision process collects information contained in the residuals over
time by nonlnvertibly compressing the residuals into various decision statis-
tics and comparing these statistics to threshold (or to each other in some
cases). Because of the need to process residuals over time, the unknown fail-
ure onset time plays a large role in determining the structure of the decision
process. Many decision mechanisms have been proposed for dealing with the
uncertainty about failure onset. We have adopted the structure used in [14]
which consists of trigger, verify, and isolate subprocesses. The trigger
process is used as a quick response alarm to indicate the possibility of a
failure. Its thresholds are set to ensure quick detection of important fail-
ures. Furthermore, the sensitivity to all important failures are maximized by
designing a separate trigger test for each failure mode rather than using the
common practice of mixing all information together in a rejection test for
normal operation (e.g., WSSR). The verify process is used to achieve the
false alarm rate specifications by setting its thresholds to reliably reject
false triggers. The isolation process is run in parallel to the verify proc-
ess and performs binary hypothesis tests comparing all pairs of triggered
failures.
Finally, in designing the hypothesis tests which colaprise the decision
process, we defined a design procedure which involved four major steps. The
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first step was to define an algorithm structure for each hypothesis test using
a simplified "design model" which statistically describes the nominal behavior
of the residuals under each hypothesis of interest. The second step was to
select the parameters of this algorithm using averages oaken with respect to a
truth model. The truth model also statistically characterizes the residuals
under the alternative hypotheses, however, it includes variations due to model-
ing error that was neglected in the design model. Although it would be con-
ceivable to design an algorithm for the truth model in the first place, the
point of using separate models for design and analysis is to gain confidence
in algorithm robustness. Finally, sensitivity analyses are made to see how
performance varies with respect to uncertainties which are not easily charac-
terized by a statistical truth model (such as failure magnitude). Iterations
between this process and the first and second step may be necessary.
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SECTION 4
ANALYTIC METHODS OF EVALUATING FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS TO FDI PERFORMANCE
In the generic FDI design methodology discussed in subsection 3.1, we
argued that the evaluation of fundamental limits to FDI performance was neces-
sary both to determine feasibility of performing the FDI function and in deter-
mining sensitivities of performance to different system characteristics. In
this section we develop an approach for performing these analyses based on the
concept of distinguishability metrics. Such metrics were used in the design
process as an objective function for the optimization of algorithm parameters.
In this section we will assume that a statistical truth model of the observed
quantities which adequately characterizes all important uncertainties is avail-
able for every hypothesis (mode of operation). For characteristics which
can't be described statistically (e.g., failure size and signature), we will
perform a parametric analysis of performance limitations.
4.1 DISTINGUISHABILITY METRICS
The basic idea behind our approach is to evaluate the distinguishability
of pairs of hypotheses in terms of the smallest likelihood of making an incor-
rect decision based on some set of observations. This likelihood is nonzero
because each hypothesis can only be described statistically.
It is well known [32] that the decision rule which achieves the slaallest
error probability, Pe, is the maximum a-posteriori (MAP) decision rule which
achieves
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Pe = f rain [p(ZplHi), p(ZpIHj)] dZp (4-1)
Equation 4-1 is, however, not particularly easy to evaluate even using
numerical integration algorithms and even when the densities are Gaussian.
For this reason, it is useful to define measures which can be related to Pe,
but are easier to evaluate. Such measures and their application to FDI were
the topic of references [22] - [24] and have found wide applicability in areas
such as patten recognition [39], [40], control systems [41] - [43], communica-
tions [44], information theory [45], [46], and statistics [47] - [48]. We now
define some of these measures and describe some of their useful properties.
If we view the pdf of a random variable, say _, as a vector in an infi-
nite dimensional space, then the 'distance' between the two vectors (pdfs),
Pi(_) and pj(_), can be computed in a variety of ways. For example, the stan-
dard Euclidean or 2-norm is defined as
L2 = f [Pi(_) - pj(_)]2 d_ (4-2)
The Kolmogorov distance, or l-norm, is defined as
K = f IPi(_- Pj(_)I d_ (4-3)
These two distance measures, while retaining some very nice topological
properties [44], are either difficult to compute (in the case of K) or not
easy to relate to Pe (in the case of L2). In reference [24], two measures
which can be easily computed and related to Pe were identified.
J-divergence which is defined by
Jij(_) = f [Pi(_) - pj(_)1 gn-
Pi(_)
d_
Pj(_)
They are the
(4-4)
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and the Bhattacharyya distance which is defined by
i/2
Bij(_) =-£n f [Pi(C) Pj(_)] d_
Some general properties of J and B are given below.
(4-5)
i. Jij > 0
2. Jii = 0
3. Bij > 0
4. Bii = 0
Also note that neither J nor B necessarily satisfy the triangle inequality;
i.e., for i ¢ j _ k,
Jij + Jjk # Jik
Bij + Bjk ¢ Bik
The most important property of J and B is that they can be used to bound
Pe as defined in Eq. 4-1. The following relationships are derived in
[44] - [46]
1/2 - 1/2(i - 4qiq j e-2Bij) I/2 < Pe < (qiqj)I/2 e-Bij (4-6)
i/2 min(qi,q j) e-Jij/8 _ Pe < (qiqj)I/2 (Jij/4)-I14 (4-7)
with the upper bound in Eq. 4-7 valid only for Gaussian densities. In Eqs.
4-6 and 4-7, qi and qj are the a-priori probabilities associated with the
two densities Pi(_) and pj(_).
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In the Gaussian case (which is of frequent interest) both metrics are
relatively simple to compute. For example, if Pi(_) = N{mi; Ci} and
pj(_) = N{mj; Cj}, then we have
-1
F,'-..,.,,-, _-I
Bij = I/2 £n det {1/2 (Ci+C j) Ci-I/2cj-I/2 } + 1/8 (mi-mj)T h_ j (mi-m j )
(4-8)
Jij = I/2Tr{CjCi-I + CiCj -I + [Ci -I + Cj -I] [mi-mj] [mi-mj]T} - t (4-9)
where t is the dimension of _.
When the vector _ represents a time series, some other interesting
results can be derived. Let
= {z(1), z(2), z(3), ...z(N)} (4-10)
where z(k) is a stationary Gaussian vector time series. For a particular
hypothesis, say Hi, this time series is completely characterized by its (time
varying) mean sequence, mj(k), and its covariance function, Cj(k), where,
mi(k) = E { z(k) I Hi } (4-11)
Ci(k) = E {(z(j) - mi(j)) (z(j+k) mi(j+k)) t I Hi} (4-12)
The distinguishability metrics discussed above can be computed for the vector,
_, from its mean vector m_ i, and (Toeplitz) autocovariance functionmatrix C_ i,
which are functions of m i and C i in Eqs. 4-11 and 4-12, respectively. Thus,
given an N-window of observations, all of the metrics described above can be
computed. Although such analyses can be quite useful, it is also of interest
to develop measures which are not dependent on an assumed window size. This
desire leads to the consideration of asymptotic measures in which limits as N
tends towards infinity are considered.
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In [49], for example, asymptotic measures are defined for the case where
the difference between the mean sequences is persistently exciting. If this
is the case, then the (biased) sample correlation matrix of the difference
between the mean sequences exists and is defined by,
N
Rij(k) = lim (N -I) _ [mi( j + k) - mj(j + k)] [mi(j) - mj(j)] t (4-13)
N-->® j=0
Since mi(k) , Ci(k) and Rij(k) are vector and matrix time sequences, we can
take Fourier transforms element by element to obtain mi(m), Ci(m), and Rij(m).
The transformed quantities are then used to compute asymptotic distinguisha-
bility measures. For example, the asymptotic B distance, is defined by
Bij = lim Bij(N) / N (4-141
N÷_
where Bij(N) is the B distance between hypotheses H i and Hj based on the
N-window of data defined in Eq. 4-10. It is then shown that Bij can be com-
puted using a frequency domain integral. In the one dimensional case with
equal covariance functions under H i and Hj(C i = Cj = C) this integral reduces
to_
2ql
Bij = 1/4 (2_) -I f Rij (_) C-I (_) de
o
(4-15)
Some interesting properties of Eq. 4-15 are described in [49]. For example,
(Dirac) delta functions in Rij(_) can be easily handled. This corresponds to
the case where the difference between the means is a sinusoid. The sinusoid
is persistently exciting and, therefore, results in a finite limit to Eq. 4-14.
Note, however, that since Bij is finite, the limit of Bij(N) is infinite.
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In the FDI problem we are frequently interested in cases where signals
are not persistently exciting and, hence, there is a finite limit to Bij(N ).
If this is the case, then the asymptotic measure in Eq. 4-14 is zero and pro-
vides no information. We now extend the results of [49] for nonpersistent
excitation in the one dimensional case with equal covariance functions. The
general case is handled in a similar manner.
First expand Eq. 4-15 (without the limits) in terms of the difference
between the mean sequences. This gives
2w = N
N-IBij(N) = K f d_ C-I(_){ _ e-J _k N-I _
o k--0 t=0
[mi(t+k ) - mj(t+k)][mi(t) - mj(t)]}
(4-16)
Now multiply both sides of Eq. 4-16 by N-I and change summation variables
(n I = t+k). This gives
27 _ N
Bij(N) = K f dm C-I (=) _
o nl=0 t=0
e-Jaml ejmt[mi(nl)-mj(nl)] [mi(t) - mj(t)]
(4-171
Taking limits as N goes to infinity we recognize that the double summation is
just the product of the Fourier transform of the difference between the means
and its complex conjugate. Thus, we have,
2_
BijW = lira Bij(N) = K f am C-I (m) [mi(_) - mj(m)] 2 (4-18)
N+= o
which is the desired result. This equation holds when the limits exist and
this occurs only when the mean sequences have Fourier transforms. The latter
requirement implies that both mean sequences be square integrable (i.e., have
finite total energy). Thus, the limits do not exist for means which satisfy
89
ALPHATECH, INC.
the persistent excitation requirement of [49]. If we do admit delta func-
tions, however, then the result is consistent with the original result in that
BijW is infinite. Following [49] and arguments similar to the above for the
vector case (again assuming equal covariance functions), Eq. 4-18 becomes,
2_
BijW = lim Bij(N) = 1/4 (2_) -I ; dm [mi(m)-mj(m)] t c-l(m) [mi(_) - mj (m)]
N-->_ o
(4-19)
EXAMPLE
Let mj = 0, and mi(k) be a narrow band process with finite energy cen-
tered near mc (and near 2_ - mc due to sampling) in the direction v i. For
example mi(k) = [EPN(k) sin(_ck)]vi where pN(k) is a pulse function of length
N (N large). Then we have,
Bij w = (E2/4) vi t c-l(_c ) v i (4-20)
4.2 EVALUATION METHODS FOR CONSTANT DIRECTION FAILURE SIGNATURES
In this subsection we consider the problem of evaluating the
distinguishability of hypotheses of the form,
H i : z(k) = Cifi(k) + n(k) (4-21)
where z(k) is an n dimensional observation vector, n k is a stationary Gaussian
colored noise process, C i is an n dimensional failure direction, and fi(k) is
a failure signature. This problem is of interest since many FDI schemes
attempt to make decisions based on observations such as Eq. 4-21 (e.g., Yk
representing detection filter residuals; the decentralized aircraft-path
residuals to be defined in Section 5; or input disturbance estimates in the
control element FDI scheme of [50]).
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The distinguishability of two hypotheses Hi and Hj may be determined
using the metrics in subsection 4.1 when Ci is known, the covariance function
of n(k) is given and fi(k) is adequately characterized (either deterministi-
cally or stochastically). However, for the FDI evaluation problem we are more
interested in learning what characteristics of fi(k) are required to achieve
some desired level of distinguishability. Thus the methods to be developed
below will be seeking information about the "size" (e.g., total energy) and
spectral content of the failure signature which is needed to achieve a given
level of failure distinguishability.
4.2.1 Detectability
Let the hypothesis Ho, characterized by Ci = 0, convey the hypothesis
that the system is in normal operation (i.e., no failure). The ability of any
FDI system to detect H i is then computed by examining distinguishability mea-
sures between Ho and Hi . Since z(k) is a time series, we can either make use
of time domain measures by forming an N-window of measurements, or compute
asymptotic measures in the frequency domain. Both cases are considered here.
TIME DOMAIN METHOD 1
In this method we assume that fi(k) = Esi(k) and that some particular
sequence si(k) for k=l, ...N, is of interest. For example, si(k) = 1 might be
used to evaluate how large the average value of fi(k) needs to get to be
detectable; or si(k) = sin (=c k) might be used to evaluate the frequency
regions of greatest detectability. Let E be defined as in Eq. 4-10 with mean
under H i , mE i, and covariance matrix under both H i and Ho, CE. If Bd is a
desired level of detectability (determined using the bounds of Eq. 4-6, then
we can compute the value of E which achieves Bd from
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Emin 2 = Bd[m tc -Im_ ]-I (4-22)
Furthermore it is easy to see that for E 2 ) Emin 2, B is larger implying
greater detectability for "larger" failures. Note, however, that many smaller
failures may also be frequently detected by an FDI scheme. This is because
Eq. 4-22 merely gives the failure size such that both the probability of false
alarm and the probability of missed detection are small• Thus, for an FDI
test which achieves the desired PFA, smaller failures (than Emi n) could be
detected, but with less reliability (i.e., larger PMD).
TIME DOMAIN METHOD 2
In this method, we also assume that fi(k) = Esi(k) , but ask the question
How large must E be so that the worst case sequence si(k) , where si(k) is
constrained to have unit energy, is detectable? Again, using _ as defined in
Eq. 4-10, the covariance matrix under Hi and Ho, C_, is easily computed. The
mean vector is expressed by
m_ i = E CNS N (4-23)
where CN is an nN x N matrix defined by,
-Ci
0
CN=
0
and sN is an N x 1 vector defined by,
0 0 ... 0
Ci 0 •.. 0
•.. Ci
(4-24)
sNt = (si(I), -.., si(N)) (4-25)
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The worst case signature with, for example unit energy, is defined as the one
which causes B to be a minimum. Thus s N is found by solving,
min I/8 E 2 sNt [CNtC_-ICN] sN
s.t. sNts N = 1 (4-26)
The solution to Eq. 4-26 is found using Raylelgh's inequality: sN is the
eigenvector of the matrix in brackets corresponding to its smallest elgen-
value, Zmln, and the minimum is, therefore, E2Zmln • Thus, Emln 2, the smallest
value of E 2 which gives B = Bd is just,
Emin 2 = 8 B d / Zmln (4-27)
TIME DOMAIN METHOD 3
The last time domain method is directed at evaluating average limits when
the failure signature fi(k) can be described stochastically. As we will see,
this method results in extreme conservatism in terms of detectability and is,
therefore, not recommended. The extreme conservatism comes from the fact that
fi(k) is described as a zero mean Gausslan process. Although this may in some
cases be an accurate description of behavior under the "failure" hypothesis,
the utility of labeling undetectable signals (i.e., frequently near zero) as
failures is questionable.
In this case, we let fi(k) = Esi(k) be described by a first order
difference equation,
xf(k) = Afxf(k-l) + Bf w(k-l)
si(k) = Cfxf(k) + Df w(k) (4-28)
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where xf is an m dimensional state vector and w(k) is a Gaussian white noise
sequence. Using Eq. 4-28, fi(k) is a zero mean Gaussian process with autoco-
variance function Ef(k) = E2_s(k), where _s(k) is the autocovariance function
of si(k ) (computed from Eq. 4-28, e.g., see [22]). Define _ as in Eq. 4-10,
with m_ = 0 under Hi and Ho, and with autocovariances,
Eo(k) = E[z(j)zt(J +k) [ HO] (4-29)
Zi(k) = E[z(j)zt(j+k) [ Hi] = _o(k) + CiCitZf(k) (4-3o)
Plugging these statistics into Eq. 4-8 yields,
B = 1/2 Ln det { [_.ir.o-1] 1/2 + [_o_.i-1]1/2} (4-31)
where Zi and Eo are the covariance matrices of E under H i and Ho respectively.
Equation 4-31 can be simplified using Eq. 4-30 for more efficient calculation.
However, its extreme conservatism makes it a poor choice for FDI evaluation.
To see this, consider the case where N = I, Ef = 1 and z(k) is a one dimen-
sional process. For the high signal to noise ratio case (Ci2>> Eo), Eq. 4-31
is approximately
B _ 1/2 Ln [(Ci2/E o + 1)/2] 1/2 (4-32)
For a reasonable value of B (say I0) Eq. 4-32 implies that Ci must be on the
order of 109 times greater than Zo I/2 in order to be detectable! Furthermore,
the conservatism of Eq. 4-32 is not entirely due to the looseness of the guar-
anteed performance bounds in Eq. 4-6. In the one dimensional case the value
of Ci which achieves any desired Pe (for equal false alarm and missed detec-
tion probabilities) can be computed. To achieve Pe = 10-4 (corresponding to
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about B = I0 for the upper bound in Eq. 4-6) we require that .01(Ci 2 + _o) I/2
2.5 Eel/2 (this is derived using Eq. 4-I knowing that the pdfs under the two
hypotheses cross at only two points). Thus even using more exact calculations
for the one dimensional case requires that C i be about 250 times as big as
Eo I/2 to be detectable. Although this is considerably smaller than Eq. 4-32
would indicate, it is still exceptionally conservative. _
FREQUENCY DOMAIN METHOD 1
Since z(k) is a time series, we can use the asymptotic measures described
in subsection 4. i to evaluate detectability. In none of these methods will
fi(k) be described as a zero mean process due to the discussion above. How-
ever, such methods are easily derived. In the first method, as in the first
time domain case, we assume that some aspect of fi(k) is known. To use the
frequency domain integral in Eq. 4-19, however, it is evident that only the
squared Fourier transform of fi(k) (its power spectrum) needs to be specified.
Thus, this analysis is not specific to a particular signature, but is valid
for the class of failure signatures which have the same power spectrum. Let
Sn(_) denote the spectral density of n(k), and fi(k) = Esi(k) with si(k) a
t 2unit energy signal with power spectrum ms2(_) (i.e., m s (_) dta = 1). Then,
o
to achieve Bw = B d, Eq. 4-i9 requires,
21_
Emin 2 = Bd/ [I/4(2_) -I f ms2(_) CitSn-l(_) C i d_]
o
(4-33)
*Note that in the one dimensional nonzero-mean case, calculations using B dis-
tance instead of actual error probabilities result in estimates of signature
size which are about a factor of 9 too big.
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Candidates for ms(m) include wideband processes (e.g., the Fourier transform
of e-ak, or PN(k); a pulse of length N) and narrowband processes (e.g., the
Fourier transform of PN(k) sin(_ck))- For wideband processes it may be of
interest to plot the integrand of the denominator of Eq. 4-33 vs. _ to high-
light the regions in the frequency domain which contribute most to detecta-
bility. For the narrow band processes, plots of Emi n vs. mc also indicate
frequencyregions which are highly detectable.
FREQUENCY DOMAIN METHOD 2
Paralleling the development of time domain methods above, we again assume
fi(k) = Esi(k) and find E such that the worst case signature spectrum, ms(m),
is detectable. The worst case signature minimizes Bw subject to the unit
energy constraint on si(k). Thus we must first solve,
2_
rain f E2ms2(m) citSn-l(m) Ci dm
o
(4-34a)
2_
s.t. f ms2(m) dm= 1
o
(4-34b)
Since all factors in the integrand of Eq. 4-34a are positive, the solution is
for ms(u) to be a narrow band process at the frequency for which citSn-l(m) C i
is minimum. The minimally detectable energy is then computed as in Eq. 4-33.
This solution is, unfortunately, of little use in practical problems since S n
must be estimated and, therefore, the exact frequency which results in minimal
detectability is of little interest. The dual problem to Eq. 4-34, however,
may be of interest. That is,
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2/[
rain E 2 f ms2(_ ) de
o
21T
s.t. I/4 (2w) -l f E2ms2(m ) citSn-l(m) Ci de = BdW
o
(4-35)
The solution to Eq. 4-35 is not immediately obvious. However, a similar
problem can be stated which has a simple solution. Let f(m) = E 2 ms2(m) , and
g(_) ffiCitSn-l(m) Ci. The constraint in Eq. 4-35 can now be rewritten using
inner product notation to denote the integral over the interval [0, 27], as
<f,g> = BdW (4-36)
The minimum norm function, f, which achieves Eq. 4-36 can be easily found. It
is,
f = [BdW / <g,g> ] g (4-37)
Thus, we have,
27
f*(_) ffi[CitSn-l(m) Ci]BdW/ [1/4 (2_) -I f (CitSn-l(m) Ci)2dm]
o
as the solution to
21T
rain f f2(m) de
o
21T
s.t. 1/4 (27) -1 f f(m) CitSn-l(m) Ci de = BdW
o
(4-38)
(4-39)
The energy in the signature f(k) needed to achieve Eq. 4-37 is computed from
Eq. 4-36 using
2_
Emin 2 = f f* (_) d_ (4-40)
o
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4.2.2 Distinguishability
Failure distinguishability refers to the inherent ability to distinguish
failure modes from each other (not including the no-failure mode). Although
any of the calculations discussed in subsection 4.1 provides, in principle, a
direct means for evaluating failure distinguishability , there is a problem in
that the signature energies for different failure modes mmst be specified.
One logical approach might be to use the minimally detectable energies deter-
mined from a detectability analysis such as those described above. However,
it is possible to show that such an approach does no____tguarantee that larger
failure signature energies are more distinguishable. In order to provide a
more meaningful distinguishability analysis in this regard, we define a new
distinguishability concept.
As is well known in the statistical literature, the assumption of a par-
ticular statistical behavior for an observation under some hypothesis, Hi,
allows significance only in the testing of the null hypothesis, Hi . That is,
given a model for Hi, we can only design a test which reliably rejects that
hypothesis. Now suppose we wish to define a region in measurement space which
represents a highly significant decision that the ith control element is not
failed. Furthermore, suppose we wish to define this decision region so that
the resulting test is invariant with respect to the failure signature energy
Ei •
As in subsection 3.3, let the e-significance level test for a known
signal energy (consider one sample of z(k)) be defined by
D(E i) = {Z : Pr [az(k) - Cifi(k) |2 ) UZ - Cifi(k) U2 ] _ a} (4-41)
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The E i invariant decision region is then the locus of points in measurement
space defined by Eq. 4-40 for all possible Ei, or
D = N D(E i) (4-42)
Ei
Thus, as in subsection 3.3, the decision region, D, is defined by projecting
the q-significance contour for any Ei into the null space of Ci-
We can now define the minimum signature energy needed to distinguish
failure i from failure J, El/j, as the minimum signature energy required to
achieve some desired value of a given metric (e.g., Bw) after projection into
the null space of failure J. Notice that this definition is not symmetric
(i.e., El/j ¢ Ej/i)- Furthermore, note that this analysis quantifies the
limits to performance of the "isolation" hypothesis tests discussed in subsec-
tion 3.3
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SECTION 5
CONTROL ELEMENT FDI DESIGN AND EVALUATION FOR THE B-737 AIRCRAFT
In this section, the ideas described in Sections 3 and 4 are applied to
the control element failure detection and isolation problem. Aircraft-path
and actuator-path failures are considered in independent subsystems as dis-
cussed in Section 2. For both subsystems we have assumed that all sensors
have been validated (i.e., contain only "in-spec" errors). For the actuator-
path subsystem, multiple simultaneous and sequential failures are allowed.
For the aircraft-path subsystem, only single failures are allowed. Also, no
aerodynamic effects other than those due to control element failures are
allowed (note: such effects are likely to be detected, however, isolation
performance is severely affected).
Both subsystems make use of the "trigger/verify/(isolate)" structure dis-
cussed in subsection 3.1 for handling the unknown onset-time problem. In the
aircraft-path subsystem, we have concentrated heavily on developing a formal
design methodology which allows the designer to assess FDI performance capa-
bilities and limitations as a function of both sensor noise and model uncer-
tainty. This was done to convert, as much as possible, the typical algorithm
tuning process into one of validating model error assumptions. Except for
defining threshold scheduling procedures, this has been successfully
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accomplished. For the actuator path subsystem, two separate hypothesis test-
ing algorithms were examined. The first algorithm was designed using only
static thresholds which are selected on the basis of average error budgets.
The second algorithm used threshold schedules which assumed that all error
sources could be bounded by a high-pass transfer function error.
In the remainder of this section, we will detail the design, development,
and evaluation of both aircraft-path and actuator-path control element FDI
systems. Evaluation of the algorithms was accomplished using data generated
from NASA's modified B-737 simulation. This simulation is a six degree of
freedom simulation with nonlinear aerodynamic models, realistic actuation mod-
els (high order dynamics, rate limits, cable stretch, etc.), a Dryden wind
model, and sensor errors including white noise, biases, and scale factors. In
the case of aircraft-path failures, we will also evaluate fundamental limits
to FDI performance based on flight test data obtained from NASA's Transporta-
tion Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV).
5.1 AIRCRAFT PATH FAILURE DETECTION AND ISOLATION
The aircraft path FDI problem described in Section 2 is an attempt to
characterize a very broad class of failure modes for which a single FDI system
is desired. The failure modes considered as aircraft path failures are those
failures in which the effective control value (i.e., the value of unfailed
control "deflection" which results in the same applied aerodynamic forces and
moments as the failure mode) is different than the measured control value.
Thus, any failure occurring outboard of the measured control value is consid-
ered as an aircraft path failure. This includes the traditional "partially
missing" aircraft path failure mode as well as stuck, floating, runaway, etc.,
i01
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when these failures occur in the aircraft path. To achieve such generality in
the FDI system, specific temporal characteristics of failure signatures will
not be used explicitly. Thus, systems such as [51] are not of interest. The
OSGLR method described in [I0] provides insensitivity to failure signature
information through estimation of temporal basis coefficients. In [52] this
method was applied using standard Kalman filtering techniques to generate
residuals. However, the method is also applicable to other types of residu-
als. In our approach, we make a broad assumption that the failure signature
is coherent. That is, we assume that the signatures of important failures
remain large and of one sign throughout the length of time needed to detect
and isolate failures. This assumption leads to specific structures for the
FDI process. We then concentrated our efforts in developing analytical design
and evaluation methodologies for selecting parameters and predicting perform-
ance. In this section we detail the application of these methodologies.
5.1.1 Decentralized Residual Generation
The first step in designing a system to generate residuals for aircraft
path FDI is the assessment of the various sources of analytic redundancy which
are available.
Figure 5-I shows the interrelationships of the various elements which
describe the dynamics of a rigid body aircraft. The vector equations and var-
iable definitions are shown in Table 5-1 and are derived in [29]. All quanti-
ties are in c.g. -- centered body-axis coordinates (unless specified otherwise).
(In addition to these elements one might include relationshps between actuation
effort (hinge moment) and V, 6, _, and g as a potential source of redundancy.
However, these are typically unreliable [53].
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V,uo6 ; _ F
KEY: R-2352
FB = FORCE BALANCE
HB = HOHENT BALANCE
TD = TRANSLATIONAL DYNAMICS
RO = ROTATIONAL DYNAMICS
TK = TRANSLATIONAL KINEMATICS
RK = ROTATIONAL KINEMATICS
Figure 5-1. Generalized Rigid Body Aircraft Model
TABLE 5-1. ELEMENTS OF AN AIRCRAFT MODEL
FB: Fa = f(V w, _, 6)
MB: Ma = g(Vw, Ww, 6)
TD: m(V + _ x V) = Fa + m_
RD: I_ + m x lw = Ma
TK: P = RB I (9) V
RE: _ = H(e) -I
Fa = Aerodynamic force vector
Ma = Aerodynamic moment vector
V = Translational velocity vector
= Angular velocity vector
P = Position vector in ECEF coordinates
0 = Euler Angles
Vw = Translational velocity of aircraft
relative to air mass E V
0_w = Rotational velocity of aircraft
relative to air mass = m
= Surface deflections
= Acceleration of gravity
m = Mass
I = Moment of inertia matrix
RBI = Rotation matrix from body-axes to
ECEF axes
H = Transformation matrix (see [I0])
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Although several aircraft relationships could be considered in the resid-
ual generation process, it is the force and moment balances which provide the
most useful information about aircraft path failures. This is because these
relations are the only ones affected by failures an___ddbecause other relations
have potential for adding only uncertainty due to model error (e.g., effects
of wind acceleration on TD).
If measurements of both inputs and outputs of these relations were
available, static or memoryless residuals could be generated. For the force
balance relation, this is the case because accelerometer measurements are
available. That is, let Am be the measured specific force from three orthog-
onal accelerometers centered along the body axes. Then we have
Am = V + _ × V - g (5-1)
The force balance equation in Table 5-1 then allows the formation of an
independent estimate of these measurements from air data, angular velocity,
and deflection measurements. A set of three translationa residuals can then
be defined by,
vX
9T = 9y = Am - f(V), _, 6)/m (5-2)
9Z
For the moment balance relation, memoryless residual generation would
require direct measurement of aerodynamic moments. Since these are not avail-
able we will use the rotational dynamic relations in addition to the moment
balance equations to form finite memory "rotational" residuals as follows.
First, write a discrete time, nonlinear, time invariant state space model for
the aircraft, viz.,
[04
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x(k+l) = a[x(k), 6(k)] (5-3)
where x(k) is the n-dimensional state vector and 6(k) is the m-dimensional
input vector. The moment balance and rotational dynamic relationships give
rise to the three components of Eq. 5-3 corresponding to the angular velocity
states, m(k). Since we have complete measurements of the states, x, and
inputs, 6, for these three equations, three rotational residuals can be
defined by,
vR ffi VQ = _(k+l) - a=[x(k), 6(k)] (5-4)
VR
where a=(-) is the component of a(.) which corresponds to the states, =.
The rotational and translational residuals defined above are clearly
decentralized in that they only use those parts of the system model which con-
tain direct information about the failures of interest. In an ideal world,
the other relations provide the information which would be necessary to opti-
mally incorporate all measurements into the residual generation process
through use of a Kalman filter. However, errors in these relationships can
make such an approach suboptimal for the failure detection problem. With the
decentralized approach we are sure that the errors in unused relations will
not have any effect on FDI performance and for those errors which do, analyti-
cal evaluation of their impact will be possible.
The use of static and finite memory residual formulations is chosen for
the simplicity of failure characterization. In particular, we see that, for a
broad class of force and moment relationships, failures will show up in fixed
directions in the residual space defined by Eqs. 5-2 and 5-4. For this to be
the case, the functions f(-) and a_(.) must be of the form,
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f(.) = fl(x ) + _ bi gi(6i ) (5-5)
l
am(. ) = al(x ) + [ digi(6i) (5-6)
where, again, x is a vector of measureable states needed in Eqs. 5-2 and 5-4.
The failure direction corresponding to the i th control element failure in the
residual space defined by v t = (vTt , VR t) is then Ci t = (bi t , dit) • Although
Eqs. 5-5 and 5-6 may seem restrictive, they are in fact typical of standard
aircraft models (i.e., linear aerodynamic models). The details of these equa-
tions for the B-737 are now given.
The standard non-dimensional description of forces and moments referenced
to a body fixed coordinate frame takes the form
X = Q • S • CXB (5-7)
Y = Q • S • CYB (5-8)
Z = Q • S • CZB (5-9)
L = Q • S • b • CLB (5-10)
M = Q • S • c • CMB (5-11)
N = Q • S • b • CNB (5-12)
where Q represents the dynamic pressure (in units of ibs/sq, ft.), S represents
a reference surface area (sq. ft.), b is the reference wing span (ft.), and c
is the reference mean chord length (ft.). The non-dimensional coefficients
(CXB, CYB, CZB, CLB, CMB, CNB) at any point in time are typically related to
the instantaneous values of control surface deflections, engine throttle set-
ting, relative velocity and direction of the air mass, and inertial angular
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rates. In some cases, air mass acceleration is included using angle of attack
rate, e. For our purposes we will assume that these relationships are primar-
ily linear (except in the case of the rotary terms p, q, r where total veloc-
ity is used as a divisor to obtain non-dimensional coefficients).
Thus, neglecting terms which are typically close to zero, the six nondi-
mensional coefficients are assumed to be in the following form.
c
CXB = _-_ CXq-q + CXa.a + KX + _ Cx_" _i
i i
b
CYB = CyB B + _V [Cyp p + Cyr r] + Ky + [ Cy6 6i
i i
c
CZB = CZa a +_-_ [CZq q] + KZ + [ CZ6._i
i i
CLB = CL8 B + 2_ [CLp p + cLr r] + KL + [ CL6i6 i
i
c
CMB = CMa a + _ [CMq q] + KH + _.. CM6i_ i
1
b
CNB = CN8 B + _ [CNr r + CNp p] + KN + [ CN_ .6i
i i
where,
(5-13)
(5-14)
(5-15)
(5-16)
(5-17)
(5-18)
V = total velocity (f/s)
= angle of attack (radians)
B = sideslip angle (radians)
p = roll rate (r/s)
q = pitch rate (r/s)
r = yaw rate (r/s)
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and where _i represents the II control elements including left and right aile-
rons, stabilizers, elevators, spoilers, throttles, and a rudder. All control
element values are measured in degrees except throttles which are measured in
kilopounds of thrust• Appendix A provides a derivative of the coefficients in
Eqs. 5-13 to 5-18 from linear models•
Thus, the three translational residuals are
Vx = Axm - X/m (5-19)
Vy = Aym - Y/m (5-20)
Vz = Azm - Z/m (5-21)
where Axm , Ay m, Azm are the c.g.-centered body-referenced accelerometer mea-
surements, and X, Y, Z are estimates of the aerodynamic forces (also c.g.-
centered body-referenced) obtained by using measured values of the states and
control elements in Eqs. 5-7 - 5-9, and 5-13 - 5-15. The aircraft mass is
denoted by M.
The rotational dynamic relations (neglecting cross products of inertia)
are :
Ix P + (I z - ly) RQ = L (5-22)
ly Q + (Ix - Iz) PR = M (5-23)
Iz R + (ly - Ix ) QP = N (5-24)
where Ix, ly, Iz = moments oE inertia about the body axes (slug - ft2).
Three estimates of angular acceleration are then
108
ALPHATECH, INC.
. _y - _z £ (5-25)
p - ix rq + I-_
^ Iz - Ix
= ly rq + _y (5-26)
^ I x - Iy 1_
_- = qp +-- (5-27)
Iz Iz
where L, H, N are obtained from using measured values in Eqs. 5-10 - 5-12 and
5-16 - 5-18.
Using the trapezoidal rule for approximating the integrals of Eqs. 5-25 -
5-27 over a single time interval of A results in the residual equations,
Vp = p(k) - [p(k-l) +-_-- ((k) + p(k-l)] (5-28)
and similarly for q and r. Note that if Eq. 5-28 was scaled by I/A, these
residuals will have units of angular acceleration (r/s2).
Finally, for completeness, we note that preprocessing of the accelerom-
eter data and e and B vane measurements may be necessary to obtain the c.g.
centered, body-referenced measurements required in the above. Letting
(£x, £y, £z) denote the coordinates of any sensor in the desired c.g. centered
body axis coordinate frame, then accelerometer compensation takes the form,
AxCOmp = Axm - [_£x(r 2 + q2) + £y(pq - r) + £z(pr + q)]
Ay C°mp = Ay m - [£x(Pq + r) - £y(p2 + r2) + £z(r q - ;)]
AzCOmp = Az m - [£x(rP - q) + £y(rq + ;) -£z(q 2 + p2)]
(5-29)
(5-30)
(5-31)
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Compensation of the a and B vane measurements takes the form,
aC°mp = am + _x(q/V) - Ey(p/V)
BC°mp = Bm - _x(r/V) - £z(P/V)
(5-32)
(5-33)
Derivation of these equations appears in [29].
Equations 5-19 through 5-21 and 5-28 and the associated roational dynamics
and forceand moment balances provide the information necessary to generate the
six desired residuals. Unfortunately, for thls project, the nondimensional
coefficients of the B-737 aircraft were not available. Linear models were
available, however. Recognizing that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the nondimensional coefficients in Eqs. 5-13 - 5-18 and any linear
model, it is possible to derive the nondimensional coefficients from these
linear models. This derivation is given in Appendix A along with a comparison
of actual nondimensional coefficient values for two flight conditions.
5.1.2 Detectability of Aircraft Path Failures Using Flight Test Data
The availability of flight test data from NASA's B-737 aircraft provided
a unique opportunity for realistic evaluation of the feasibility of performing
control element FDI using aerodynamic models of the aircraft. This is because
many errors which are difficult to simulate are excited during actual flight
(e.g. wing bending, nonstationary inputs) and realistic values of errors which
are normally accounted for (e.g. sensor noise) are present. Unfortunately,
sufficient time was not available to perform a complete analysis. Such
analysis would require a flight test program to guarantee that all important
error sources were excited over a full range of operating conditions. Thus,
this section is meant to demonstrate the application of the concepts developed
II0
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in Section 4. The results which follow should be considered optimistic due to
the fact that only a limited amount of data was processed. In particular, we
used only the data from the first 50 seconds of TSRV flight R380, Run 12JR.
During this interval the aircraft performed a mild turn maneuver at approxi-
mately constant altitude and throttle setting. Mild turbulence is believed to
have been present. Figures 5-2a to 5-2q show traces of interesting quanti-
ties for this maneuver. The flight condition used to obtain linear models
corresponding to this data is defined by:
V = 160 KIAS
h = 3500 ft
Gear up
Flaps = 15°
= 0
The evaluation of detectability presented here is aimed at evaluation of
limits to performance using the decentralized residuals described in 5.1.1.
Although the general framework presented in Section 4 would, in principle,
allow an assessment which is independent of residual generation mechanization,
such an assessment would be much more difficult due to the complex nature of
the effects of failures on the measured quantities. In contrast, the effects
of failures on decentralized residual is easy to characterize resulting in a
greatly simplified analysis. Furthermore, decentralized residual generation
was required for further development and this analysis proved useful in the
FDI design procedure.
The basic premise behind the results of this section is that the residu-
als could be characterized by the alternate failure (and no failure) hypotheses
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Figure 5-2 (a-q). Flight Data From TYRV R380, Run 12JR
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(Continued). Flight Data From TYRV R380, Run 12JR
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Figure 5-2 (a-q) (Continued). Flight Data From TYRV R380, Run 12JR
I15
ALPHATECH, INC.
described in Equation 4-21. That is, failures show up in fixed directions,
modulated by a failure signature, and the errors could be described by a
colored noise process whose statistical behavior is independent of the system
status (i.e., the same for all hypotheses). This latter property is critical
in enabling us to infer the statistical behavior of the residuals under failed
modes from the data obtained from normal flight. To see that this is a rea-
sonable assumption consider a model for the decentralized residual of the
form,
P
v(k)= no(k) + [
i=1
A
(Ci-Ci)_iE(k) + Ci[6iE(k) - _im(k)] (5-34)
where q0 is a random noise term and where, for each of the p control elements,
^
_im is the measured deflection, 6iE is the effective deflection, Ci is the
vector of dimensional control derivatives used in generating residuals, and C i
is the actual dimensional control derivative. Under the jth failure hypothe-
sis (j=0 indicates no failure) we have
6iE = _im for i # j (5-35)
6iE # _im for i = j (5-36)
The random noise term, q0, takes into account the effects of sensor noise as
well as modeling error in the formation of the residuals and is, therefore, in
general, a nonwhite (and generally nonstationary) process which must be char-
acterized. The term (6i E - _im) in Eq. 5-34 is termed the failure signature
and is denoted by fi(k). The failure signature is important because when it
is large, failures are observable. Furthermore, when fi(k) is large, the
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undesirable effect on the aircraft is most pronounced so that we must have a
A
control system which is tolerant of the resulting disturbance vector Ci fi(k)
when fi(k) is small. The results of this section quantify "small" in terms of
failure detectability.
Let us now define the behavior of the residuals under no failure by a
stochastic process, n(k), vlz.,
p ^
H o : v(k) = n(k) = _ (Ci-Ci)6im(k) + n0(k) (5-37)
i=l
A simplifying approximation to Eq. 5-34 for the ith failure hypothesis (i_O),
is then,
^
v(k) = n(k) + Ci fi(k) (5-38)
Equation 5-38 assumes that the statistical behavior of 6iE, under the ith
failure hypothesis, is the same as 6im and that this statistical behavior is
independent of the failure mode. Clearly, there are many specific failure
mechanisms in which this is not the case. The assumption is nevertheless,
very useful in our general failure mode context. For any specific failure
mechanism, one must decide whether the results derived here are conservative
or optimistic due to this approximation. The advantage of Eq. 5-38 is that
the process n(k) is observable from flight recorded data (during normal
flight) and can, therefore, be realistically characterized.
Having justified the model of Eq. 4-21 for the decentralized residuals we
now evaluate the detectability of control element failures using the asymp-
totic measure Bw defined in Section 4. The procedure is as follows.
I. Compute the six residual signals from Eqs. 5-7 through 5-33 using
data recorded during flights of the NASA TRSV.
I17
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.
o
Compute estimates of the power spectral density (PSD) matrix for the
six dimensional residual process.
Determine the (dimensionalized) failure directions from the aircraft
model.
Determine the smallest signature energies, for each control element
failure, which are required to make specific signature spectra detec-
table. Plot signature energy versus frequency for narrow band signa-
tures and determine total signature energy for a broadband signature.
RESIDUAL GENERATION
Figures 5-3 through 5-8 show the decentralized residuals computed using
TSRV data sampled at 20 Hz (the figures show a lower sampling rate). Sensor
compensation (see 5.1.1) was used to accommodate lever arm effects and other
sensor validation, averaging, and scaling procedures were used (see Appendix C.
Next to each residual is its sample autocovariance function (ACF). The sample
ACF is computed from,
N-_mlR(m) = 1/N [u(n) - "_1 [,o(n+m) - "_1t (5-39)
n= l
N
= I/N _ _(n) (5-40)
n=l
for lags m=0, I, ... i00. For negative lags we use the property R(m) = Rt(-m).
Note that R(m) is a biased estimate of the underlying ACF but typically has
smaller mean square error (see [59]). Also, for the 50-second data set sam-
pled at 20 Hz, N=IO00. The ACFs shown in Figs. 5-3 to 5-8 are the diagonal
elements of R(m). There are several salient features of the residuals which
are evident from the figures. First, all of the residuals have significantly
nonzero means. This is expected due to the inaccuracy in predicting the basic
aerodynamic forces and moraents of the airframe and due to the nonzero average
values of many of the measurements coupled with inaccuracy associated with the
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corresponding coefficients. Secondly, there is a nearly white component as
evidenced by the near discontinuity at m=0. This component is due to elec-
tronic sensor noise and due to discretization error. The third error which is
evident is a high frequency oscillatory error. The frequency of this error
differs between residuals and may be due to vibration of the inertial plat-
form. The oscillation frequencies vary from about 4 Hz to less than I0 Hz.
Wing bending probably plays no part in these errors since the lower frequency
oscillations are in the x and y residuals. In the roll residual, a damped
oscillatory error at about 3 Hz may be due to wing bending. Finally, in many
of the residuals, one or two first-order-like errors are evident. The time
constants of these errors are around one second. These errors are almost cer-
tainly due to the excitation of parametric errors in the aerodynamic model by
the (forced) motion of the aircraft.
POWER SPECTRAL ESTIMATION
The qualitative modal analysis discussed in the previous paragraph sug-
gests that the estimation of the spectral density matrix ought to be accom-
plished using some of the more advanced time series methods (e.g., see [54]).
However, time did not permit full investigation of these methods for the vec-
tor case. Therefore, spectral densities were estimated using the Blackmun-
Tukey procedure (i.e., the discrete Fourier transform, DFT, of R(m)).
I00
Sn(_ = _ R(m) e-J m_ (5-41)
M=-I00
for we [0, 27].
elements which must be real). Also we have the property Sn(_+_) = Sn(m-_) H
where H denotes complex conjugate transpose. Figures 5-9 to 5-14 show the
diagonal elements of Sn.
Note that Sn is, in general, complex (except for the diagonal
That is,
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The residuals we have generated typically have a large nonzero mean over
any meaningful interval of interest. It is typical, however, to assume that
this mean is zero when estimating (or modeling) power spectra. The tacit
assumption is that for any interval of data, one can eliminate the mean value
of the process and characterize only the deviations from that mean (assuming
that the measured mean is actually the statistical mean). However, for our
purposes we wish to characterize the low frequency energy which is indicated by
the presence of the nonzero mean in the residuals. In the estimation of the
autocorrelation function, it is typical to either remove the mean and then add
in v vT to R(m) or to perform what is known as a circular correlation [55]
(i.e., assume that the observed sequence is periodic such that v(k+N) = _(k)).
Both of these approaches address the problem that, for large nonzero mean
processes, the computations given for R(m) in Eq. 5-40 result in a triangular
autocorrelatlon sequence (which does not accurately reflect the, presumed,
theoretical sequence) and, that because we only have estimates of the autocor-
relation over a finite window, the resulting power spectral estimates may have
negative values near (and sometimes not so near) zero frequency when _ is
large.
To get around these problems and still characterize the very low fre-
quency behavior of the residuals, we assume that the observed mean value
really represents a single sample from a filtered low frequency noise
sequence. That is, since
_ 1 N
= - [ v(j ) (5-4Z)
N j=l
we know that most of the high frequency energy in v will not have an impact on
when N is large. If we assume that the only component of v which can effect
v has a spectrum of
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SLF(8) = G(l-a2)/ {(l-a cos(B)) 2 + (a sin(8)) 2} (5-43)
then one can show that E{_ 2} is approximately equal to G as long as -in(a) <<
2_/N. Now since we have only one sample of _ (for each window over which we
wish to estimate the power spectrum) it is difficult to compute a meaningful
statistical average. Therefore, we will assume that the observed value of
represents a typical value and model the low frequency energy in each residual
using Eq. 5-43 with G ffi_2. In practice, we have chosen -in(a) = 0.6/N. Note
Note that with typical values of v and N, SLF(0) is very large; however, this
is consistent with the expectation that for very low frequency noise, signals
with very large total energy will be needed to achieve detectability. The
spectra $4(8) are then added to the spectrum in Figs. 5-8 to 5-13 to evaluate
detectability.
FAILURE DIRECTIONS
^
The failure directions, CI, of Eq. 5-38 are given by the dimensional
derivatives of each control element. Defining the six dimensional residual
vector as vT = (_x, _y, _z, Vp, Vq, Vr), failure directions are given by,
x y z p q r
Left Stabilator .21E-I .0 -.25 .12 E-I -.36 E-I .88 E-3
Right Stabilator .21E-I .0 -.25 -.12 E-I -.36 E-I -.88 E-3
Rudder .0 .20 .0 .15 E-I .0 -.17 E-I
Left Elevator .99 E-2 .0 -.12 .56 E-2 -.17 E-I .51E-3
Right Elevator .99 E-2 .0 -.12 -.56 E-2 -.17 E-I -.51E-3
Left Aileron .II E-I .18 E-2 -.13 .12 E-I -.47 E-2 .96 E-3
Right Aileron .ii E-I -.18 E-2 -.13 -.12 E-I -.47 E-2 -.96 E-3
where the numbers are given in acceleration units per degree of deflection.
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DETECTABILITY EVALUATION
To evaluate detectability, we considered two types of failure signatures:
broad-band and narrow band. For narrow-band failure signatures, we can use Eq.
4-33 to determine the minimum signature energy needed to achieve some desired
value of Bw for various frequencies of excitation. Figures 5-15 through 5-21
plot Emi n versus frequency for each control element using Bd = 3 and the power
spectral density estimates described above. As expected, large amounts of
energy at low frequencies are needed because of the large mean values for the
residuals. The plots also indicate that aileron and elevator failures may need
large signature energies at high frequencies. This is probably due to the high
frequency errors evidenced in the roll residual (Vp).
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Figure 5-15. Detectability of Narrow Band, Left Stabilator
Failure Signatures Versus Frequency
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Figure 5-19. Detectability of Narrow Band, Right Elevator
Failure Signatures Versus Frequency
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Figure 5-21. Detectability of Narrow Band, Right Aileron
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To examine broadband failures signatures, we assume that the failure
signature could be represented by,
(l-a 2)
mj(_) = (5-44)
(l-a cos _0)2 + (a sin _)2
By using Eq. 5-44 in Eq. 4-33 and performing the required integrations numeri-
cally, we can determine the minimum broadband signature energies required for
detection. Table 5-2 shows the results with a = .4 (- 8 r/s bandwidth) and
BWd = 6. Notice that the results are not symmetrical with respect to surfaces
on either side of the airplane. This is most likely due to the fact that the
errors which give rise to our power spectral estimates were not symmetrically
excited during the interval of data we used.
TABLE 5-2. DETECTABILITY OF BROADBAND FAILURE SIGNATURES
Control Element
Total Signature
Energy (degrees)
Left Stabilator 0.44
Right Stabilator 0.45
Rudder 0.62
Left Elevator 0.95
Right Elevator 0.98
Left Aileron 1.85
Right Aileron 1.92
The values in Table 5-2 are notably small since they represent total sig-
nature energies (i.e., the integral of the squared signature over time). Even
signatures whose total energies are factor of i0 greater than those in Table
5-2 would be acceptable. A signature energy of I0 degrees can be achieved by
a constant deflection of 0.5 degrees for one second at the 20 Hz sample rate.
However, these numbers should only be treated as lower limits to performance
(best case) for a very specific failure signature which is known and for a
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perfectly known power spectrum. A more in-depth analysis might include pulse-
like signatures since they may be bore representative of actual signatures and
might utilize PSD estimate from a broader set of flight data. Detectability
in terms of pulse height versus pulse width could also be plotted. Further-
more, distinguishability of failures should be determined using the methods
described in subsection 4.2.2.
5.1.3 Aircraft Path Decision Process Design
The goals and assumptions to be used in this design were detailed in
Section 2. These included:
I. No multiple failures
2. Single flight condition
3. No additional aerodynamic failure effects
4. No detailed assumptions about failure signature models
5. Validated sensors
The control elements we will consider as possible failures in this design are
left and right engines (LT and RT), ailerons (LA and RA), horizontal tail (LHT
and RHT), and rudder (R). The horizontal tail is a fictitious surface which
represents both stabilizer and elevator surfaces. This is done because our
preliminary evaluation of distinguishability indicated that same-side elevator
and stabilizer surfaces are indistinguishable based on force and moment bal-
ance magnitudes along (i.e., without using temporal signature information).
Aircraft path engine failures are those occurring outboard of the "engine
actuator" output measurement. Since we have chosen (Section 5.2) the engine
actuator path as the path from the throttle command to the engine pressure
ratio (EPR), aircraft path engine failures are those in which EPR follows the
throttle command but the resultant thrust is inconsistent with EPR (e.g.,
thrust _eversers deployed).
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ALGORITHM STRUCTURE
The overall structure of the decision process will include trigger, ver-
ify, and isolate test procedures as discussed in Section 3.1. This structure
is chosen as a trade-off between computational complexity and performance in
solving the unknown onset time problem. For the aircraft path control element
FDI problem, this structure takes the form shown in Fig. 5-22. The decentral-
ized residuals defined in subsection 5.1.1 are the only inputs to this deci-
sion process. All decisions are, therefore, based on the relative sizes and
spectral characteristics of these six residuals. The trigger process is a
system monitor which is used to indicate the possible presence of abnormal
behavior. In order to maximize the sensitivity of the trigger process to
individual control element failures, separate trigger tests are used for each
element. That is, each test is designed so that i__fa detectable failure of
control i occurs, then its corresponding trigger test will "pass." Note that
the conclusion that control i is failed if its corresponding trigger passes is
invalid since such a conclusion is based on the converse of the previous sen-
tence. One consequence of this structure is that it is possible to have
redundancy in the trigger tests. For example, if a single residual is the
only source of information for several triggers, then the resulting trigger
tests will be all identical.
The verify and isolate processes are initiated when a trigger test passes.
The verify process is initiated by the trigger process and is used to reject
false triggers. The verify process, therefore, plays a major role in achiev-
ing the desired overall false alarm rate. The isolate process runs in "paral-
lel" to the verify process and is responsible for making decisions regarding
the identity of the failed control element. In principle, only the implied
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Figure 5-22. A/C Path Decision Process
R-4434
ambiguity group resulting from a set of triggers (not the union of all trigger
tests which pass) needs to be "isolated." However, for simplicity, all verify
and isolate tests will be initiated following any passed trigger test for the
current design.
The matrix of verify and isolate tests in Fig. 5-22 indicates that we
will be using sequential tests which provide "votes" which indicate which of
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any pair of system hypotheses is more likely (i=O indicates normal operation;
the control elements are indexed by i=l, ..., 7). The full matrix of isola-
tion test flags, lij , take on values of 1 when j is more likely than i, 0 when
i is more likely than j, and 2 when the sequential test has not yet completed.
When the i,j th test is completed and no decision can be made, lij and lji are
both set to O.
To declare that the jth control element has failed, Vj=I and lij=l for
all j_i. That is, the jth column of the matrix in Fig. 5-22 must contain all
l's. Only one such column is possible due to the palrwise comparisons. Other
information is available from this test matrix and some alternate uses are
described in [56].
HYPOTHESIS TEST DESIGN DETAILS
The generic decision-process design procedure discussed in subsection 3.1
will be applied to this problem using the theoretical developments of subsec-
tion 3.3 The first step in this procedure is to develop structures for the
hypothesis tests indicated in Fig. 5-22 based on a design model. For this
model, we will assume that over the time interval needed to detect and iden-
tify failures, the failure signature is coherent (i.e., of one sign) and that
this interval is substantially shorter than the time constants of some assumed
very low frequency residual errors. We also assume (for defining test struc-
tures) that another residual error is broadband (i.e., white) noise associated
with sensor noise and discretization errors. These errors will be modeled as
Gaussian processes whose covariance characteristics are the same under all
modes of operation.
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After defining the hypothesis test structures from the above design model,
the parameters of those tests must be chosen. To do this, we will hypothesize
a statistical truth model for the residual error which is more detailed than
the design model description. This model is then used to optimize parameters
and perform sensitivity analyses. In general, such a model might take the
form,
xr(k ) = Ar xr(k-I ) + Br wr(k-I ) (5-45)
v(k) = Cr xr(k) + Dr wr(k) (5-46)
where v(k) is the six dimensional residual, xr is the nr dimensional "truth-
state" vector and w r is a white noise vector with covariance matrix Qr- In
the design procedures to be discussed below, we will assume that the residuals
are independent and that each residual can be represented by the sum of a
white noise term, nw, a first order low pass markov process, nL, and a first
order high pass Markov process, nH. The white term represents sensor noise
and discretlzaton errors. The low pass term represents "in-band" errors (i.e.,
those errors which are excited in the same frequency range as the failure sig-
natures). The high pass term represents unmodeled dynamics. Thus we have,
vj(k) = nwJ(k) + nLJ(k) + nHJ(k)
xLJ(k) = aLJxL j(k-1) + (l-aLJ)wL(k-l)
xHJ(k ) = aHJxHJ(k-l) + (l-aHJ)wH(k-l)
nLJ(k ) = xLJ(k )
(5-47)
(5-48)
(5-49)
(5-5o)
nHJ(k) = wHJ(k) - xHJ(k) (5-51)
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The parameters of this model (cutoff frequencies and noise variances) are
computed from an error budget which is described in subsection 5.1.4.
Prefilters - The use of colored, stochastic residual errors in the design
model indicates that a "prewhitener" is necessary for each hypothesis test
[32]. Ideally, this prewhltener is a multivariable filter which whitens and
decorrelates the residual process (note that we don't really expect to be able
to achieve a white process in reality since the residual errors are only mod-
eled as stochastic; the true errors are, of course, nonstationary). While a
multivarlable filter may represent an optimal procedure for the design model,
it, in general, has one major drawback for the current problem. In general, a
multivarlable filter can (depending on the nature of the frequency errors)
take residuals which have failures that show up in fixed directions in resid-
ual space and transform them into signals which have failures that show up in
time varying directions depending on the temporal characteristics of failure
signatures. To retain the desired insensitivity to specific failure signa-
tures, we will first project the residuals into a subspace which is appropri-
ate for each test (to be based, in part, on the fixed failure directions) and
then perform a one dimensional whitening operation. This structure will sac-
rifice performance in comparison to an optimal algorithm when the frequency
characteristics of the residuals are substantially disparate, but guarantees
insensitivity of every test to the detailed failure signature characteristics
(note that results in the previous section indicate that residual errors are
very similar and so little performance degradation is expected).
To choose the characteristics of the one dimensional "whitener" for each
test, first note that the design model which includes low frequency and broad-
band errors implies that a filter with a high pass characteristic is needed.
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Rather than hypothesize some detailed power spectrum and solve Weiner-Hopf
equations [32] (or equivalently design Kalman filters for some detailed state
space residual model), we will simply choose a high pass filter (HPF) struc-
ture and select its cutoff frequency. To do this, first note that the cutoff
frequency must be higher than the bandwidth of the low frequency errors of the
residuals (the very low frequency errors which vary with, e.g., velocity
changes). Secondly, the time constant of the HPF must be larger than the FDI
interval (so that the assumed coherent failure signatures are not washed-out).
As a first cut, we will assume that all six residual errors are the same. The
(very) low frequency error bandwidth is probably no higher than 0.I r/s. The
failure signatures are probably not coherent for more than about 2-5 seconds
and the desired (longest) FDI interval is about two seconds which is consis-
tent with the length of time that the signature is coherent. As a result, a
first order high pass filter with cutoff frequency of 0.5 r/s is preliminarily
chosen for each test. This frequency may change for tests which require
longer FDI intervals (e.g., because the signatures may have only lower fre-
quency content).
Triggers - The structure for the trigger test is based on the projection-
HPF structure discussed above, and
i. the assumption that the projected/filtered residual error is white,
and
2. the assumption that the projected/filtered failure signature is
constant.
These assumptions are reasonable since we assumed that tile failure signature
is coherent and that the time constant of the high pass filter is much longer
than the FDI interval. The resulting test takes the form,
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k-_T+lST = _(j ) >< tT
j=k
(5-52)
which is just a moving window average of the projected and high-pass filtered
residuals. This is shown in Fig. 5-23. The absolute value function takes
into account the uncertain failure sign (see subsection 3.3). As discussed in
subsection 3.3.1, this test will reliably detect coherent failures of some
minimal magnitude and all failures which are larger than this minimal value.
The parameters of this test must now be designed. For these purposes, it is
convenient to think of the HPF as coming before the projection operation in
Fig. 5-23 since the first cut design has all HPFs (i.e., for each test)
identical.
TRIGGER FLAG
FOR i'th
FAILURE
R- 3387A
Figure 5-23. Structure of Trigger Tests - Time Variant
The parameters of the trigger test are the projection operator, the win-
dow length, NT, and the trigger threshold. The selection of these parameters
are based on the following concerns. The projection vector, Pi, must be maxi-
mally sensitive to the i th failure direction while reducing the effect of real
errors (i.e., those in a truth model) on S T . Thus, the choice of Pi depends
on the choice of N T and a statistical model of the filtered residuals. The
threshold, tT, must be chosen to achieve a desired false trigger rate and it
is, therefore, a function of Pi, NT, and the statistical model. The window
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length should be as short as possible to minimize trigger delay, but should be
long enough so that important failures signatures will be detected. The spec-
ification of minimally detectable signatures is dependent on the choice of Pi,
NT, and tT and the assumed statistical model.
Given Eqs. 5-47 through 5-51, the statistics of ST can easily be computed
as a function of Pi and NT and the tradeoff between the false trigger likeli-
hood and minimally detectable (bias) failure for various values of tT deter-
mined. To select these parameters we proceed as follows.
I.
2.
Choose N T as the longest allowable trigger time for the i th failure.
Choose Pi to maximize the distinguishability of the i th failure by
maximizing the d 2 metric for the random variable ST as a function of
Pi assuming that the failure direction is C i and that the HPFed sig-
nature is a constant. That is, compute the mean and variance of ST
under the hypotheses H o and H i from
_(sr I Uo) = 0 (5-53)
E(ST I Hi) = NTPitCifs (5-54)
Var (S T I Ho, HI) = PitlfPi (5-55)
k-_T+lwhere If is the variance of ( 9(j)), and fs is the magnitude of
j=k
the constant failure signature (in units of the corresponding control
element).* Using the results of subsection 3.3, we have
Pi = zf- Ici (5-56)
*El can be computed by forming a state variable equation for the (vector) fil-
ter corresponding to the desired sum and solving the discrete time Lyapunov
equation [57]. This can be done by component by components when the compo-
nents of _(j) are uncorrelated.
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3. Select the threshold to achieve a desired false trigger specifica-
tion. For example, to achieve PFT smaller than I0-_, we need
tT = 3 Var(ST). (5-57)
4. Find the value of fs which achieves some specified miss probability.
For example, to achieve PMT smaller than 10-3 , we need
(E(ST I Hl) - tT) = 3 Var(S T) (5-58)
5. Determine which elements of the projection vector can be made equal
to zero. This step is designed to enhance the robustness of the
algorithm in the case where actual errors are larger than the truth
model, The idea is to remove those residuals which contribute only
marginally to detectability as measured by the size of fs needed to
achieve some PMT- The procedure is iteratlve. The projection is
restricted to have nonzero elements in only a subset of residuals and
steps one to four are carried out. If fs does not increase substan-
tially (e.g., no more than one percent greater than its value with
all residuals) then the residuals which are not included do not con-
tribute to detectability and can be removed from that test.
The five steps just described provide a precise methodology for determin-
ing the values of the parameters of the trigger test in Fig. 5-23. Of course,
these values depend highly on the statistical truth model assumptions, and,
therefore, one must be careful in interpreting the results for nonstationary
errors. For example, if Eqs. 5-48 to 5-52 are derived by considering observa-
tions of real errors during many different flying modes, a high degree of con-
fidence in the resulting design may be allowed. In the remaining designing
methodologies, we will also utilize Eqs. 5-48 to 5-52, and, therefore, the
same comments apply.
Verify Test Design - The structure of the verify test is similar to the
trigger test in that a "prewhitening" high-pass filter, projection operation
occurs first. Assuming once again that the projected and filtered residual is
zero mean and white during normal operation and nonzero mean with the same
additive white noise during a failure, the optimal sequential probability
ratio test takes the form,
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k k
Sv(k) = I [ GAy(J)I - [
j=kf j=kf
GD > tV ---> Verify passes
< -tV ---> Verify fails (5-59)
The test is started when a trigger occurs (i.e., at time kf) and completes
under the conditions in Eq. 5-59 or when a time limit, NV, is reached. Figure
5-24 illustrates this test.
r- VERIFY FLAG
,L _ FOR i'th
FAILURE.OD 
R- 3388A
Figure 5-24. Structure of Sequential Verify Tests
The parameters of the verify test which must be chosen are Pi, GA, GD,
tv, and NV. For a given value of tv, GD controls the speed at which false
triggers are rejected and GA controls the speed at which failures are detec-
ted. The relationship between GA and GD determines what failure sizes will
tend to result in a passed verify test. As discussed in subsection 3.3.1,
failure signatures greater than some minimally detectable value will be detec-
ted in shorter times by this test. As in the trigger test, Pi is chosen to
maximize the sensitivity to failure i and minimize the effect of residual
errors on the test. The tradeoffs which must be made in the design of a
sequential test are similar to those in fixed sample size tests (PFA, and PMD
versus failure size) except that we must include a probability of making no
decision for tests which end in such a conclusion at their time limits.
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Unfortunately, as we have indicated, the relationship between these probabili-
ties and the test design parameters is very difficult to compute when there is
a mismatch between the design and truth models. Thus, we must make use of
heuristic methods for test design. One such method was discussed in subs,c-
tlon 3.3 and will be expanded here. The method proceeds as follows. Note
that all expectatons are taken with respect to the pdfs defined by the truth
model given in Eqs. 5-47 to 5-51.
I. Choose a maximum sample length NV. Since the verify process is
designed to validate triggers, Nv - NT is a reasonable choice.
. Choose Pi to maximize the distinguishability of the ith failure by
maximizing the d2 metric for the random variable Sv(Nv) as a function
of PI assuming that the failure direction is Ci and that the HPFed
signature is a constant. Note that unlike the trigger test we must
specify a particular time at which d2 is evaluated because the sequen-
tial test is a time varying test (i.e., it is triggered). The equa-
tions for choosing Pi are identical to those for the trigger test and
if NV - NT, then the value of Pi is also the same.
. Find the smallest value of E(yIH i) which makes the fixed sample size
test of length NV reliable; where reliability is measured in terms of
d 2 (large values of d 2 imply high reliability, see subseciton 3.3.1).
Set GA equal to this value and set GD = GA2/2. This choice implies
that failure signatures which result in average values of y which are
larger than GA/2 tend to drive the sequential test to its positive
threshold and those less than GA/2 tend to drive it to its negative
threshold.
. Determine thresholds which result in low probabilities of false alarm,
missing a minimally detectable failure, and making no decision. To
accomplish this, consider the ideal SPRT. Let the desired detectable
mean be m, and the process, y, be white with variance o2. Then from
[33] we have GA = m/o 2, GD = m/(2o2), and tV = -Ln[(PM)/(I-PF)] , where
PM and PF are upper bounds on the desired missed detection and false
alarm probabilities. An interesting point in the test is when
E(Sv(k) IHi) equals tV (note that the symmetry of the test implies that
this is the same point as when E(Sv(k) IHo) equals -tv). Denote the
value of k for which this is true by k t. Then it is easy to show that
the d2 metric between the hypothesis of zero mean and the hypothesis
of mean m (with additive white noise) for Sv(k t) is just 2t V. We now
use this information to select thresholds for test Eq. 5-59 using the
truth model distribution.
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.
4a) Find k t such that d 2 for Sv(k t) = -2Ln[(PM)/(I-PF)] (assume that
the parameters of the test are given by steps two and three and
that the hypothesis H i includes a mean of minimally detectable
magnitude; i.e., E(yIH i) = GA.
4b) Set tV to make E(Sv(kt)IHi) = -E(Sv(kt)IHo) = tv, viz.
tV = k t GA2/2 = k t GD.
As in the trigger test, an iterative procedure to zero projection
elements which contribute little information to the test may follow.
Note that this may be unnecessary if NV = NT since the projections
are then the same as those of the trigger test.
Isolation Test Design - The isolation tests are also started when a trig-
ger occurs and completed when either a decision or a time limit, NI, is
reached. The isolation tests must have the property that failures which are
larger than some minimal value should result in faster decisions. To achieve
this we will use the failure magnitude invariant tests described in example
three of subsection 3.3.2. In these tests, the projection operation we need
to specify is orthogonal to one failure and maximally sensitive to another.
Ideally, two "rejection" tests for each hypothesis pair would be implemented.
However, to avoid some computational complexity, we will only perform one test
for each hypothesis pair. As for the verify tests, the isolate test structure
is based on the SPRT for detecting a constant in the projected and filtered
residuals with additive white noise. The structure is shown in Fig. 5-25 and
takes the form,
k k
Sl(k) = I [ yi(t)l - I I _j(t)l > tl -->
t=kf t=kf
test i over j passes
test j over i fails (5-60a)
< -t I _> test j over i passes
test i over j fails (5-60b)
144
ALPHATECH, INC.
ISOLATION FLAG
FOR FAILURE i
vs. FAILURE j
R-3389A
Figure 5-25. Structure of Sequential Isolation Tests
The parameters of the isolation test are the two projection operations
Pi/j and Pj/i (both assumed to be unit vectors), tl, and the time limit N I.
The projections are unit vectors because choosing otherwise would bias the
test towards detecting smaller mean values in either Yi or yj. (Note, such a
case may be desirable since the average values of the corresponding control
element which achieve equal size failures in Yi and yj could be different).
The projection Pi/j is orthogonal to failure direction j and sensitive to
failure direction i, and conversely for Pj/i" The threshold, tl, and the time
limit, NI, control the error likelihoods and the probability of making no
decision (since "no decision" will be the conclusion if neither Eq. 5-60a nor
5-60b is true when k=kf+Nl). The sequential nature of this test, again, makes
the relationship between the test parameters and the test goals difficult to
compute. Therefore, a heuristic procedure similar to that used in the verify
test is used. The procedure is described as follows.
I.
2.
Choose a maximum sample length N I.
Choose the projection Pi/j to maximize the d 2 metric for the quantity
kf+N I
( Z yi(t)) subject to the constraint Pi/j t Cj = 0, and similarly
t=kf
for Pj/i"
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3. Find the smallest values of s = E(Yi) = E(Vj) which make the fixed
sample size test of length NI based on SI(N I) reliable where relia-
bility is measured in terms of d 2. To compute d 2 for SI(NI) we have,
E(SIIHo) = NIS (5-61)
E(sIJHj) = -NIs (5-62)
t
VarCSllHi, Hi) _ (Pi/j If Pilj) + (Pj/i If Pj/I ) (5-63)
kf_N I N Nwhere Zf is the covariance of v(t), where v(t) is the HPFed
t=kf
.
De
residual vector, and where the inequality is due to neglecting the
eovariance between the absolute value terms in Eq. 5-60 (note that
this inequality may give rise to some conservatism in the design of
the isolation tests. A tighter bound would substract 2Pi/j EfPj/i
from 5-13).
Find the value k t at which d 2, for Sl(kt) , is equal to -2 Ln[Pe/
(l-Pe)], (Pc is a lower bound on the desired probability of error).
Set t I = kt_ (is E(SI(kt)IH i or Hi) = tI for failures which make
E(TilHi) or E(TjIH) equal to s.
Iterate on steps two through four to determine which residuals con-
tribute little information to decision reliability. This is done by
examining the increase in the average values of the failure signature
required to achieve s for both failure modes. That is, let
t
fi = s / (Pi/j Ci) (5-64a)
t
fj = s / (Pj/i Cj) (5-64b)
A residual may be removed from the test (its projection zeroed) if, for exam-
ple, the resulting value of (fi + fj) is no bigger than I.I times ito value
with all residuals considered.
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5.1.4 Detailed Design and Test Results
In this subsection, we present a detailed design of an aircraft path con-
trol element FDI system using the design procedures discussed in subsecion
5.1.3, evaluate its expected performance and demonstrate its capabilities
using simulation data from NASA's nonlinear B-737 simulation. This subsection
starts wlth a discussion of error budgets for use in the statistical truth
model of Eqs. 5-47 to 5-51. Preliminary detectability results based on this
error budget are computed by designing trigger filters for each of the seven
control element failures considered as potential failures (left and right
engines, ailerons and horizontal tails, and the rudder). Horizontal tail is a
fictitious element used to represent elevator or stabilizer since these sur-
faces are indistinguishable. Several design iterations are then discussed
qualitatively ending with the final error budget and design figures. Results
of testing the resulting FDI algorithm using data from NASA's simulation are
then presented. These results include false alarm checks and detection/isola-
tion checks for various maneuvers and failures and a short investigation of
alternative algorithm structures and threshold schedules. The subsection then
concludes with a discussion of the results and conclusions about the FDI algo-
rithm an___ddthe design procedure.
ERROR BUDGET ANALYSIS
For the design procedure described in subsection 5.1.3, a statistical
truth model taking the form of three independent error sources for each resid-
ual was required. The three error sources consisted of a white noise term, a
first order low-frequency term and a first order high-frequency term. An
error analysis is now used to determine the bandwidths and energies in these
processes.
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All of the error analyses to be used here are based on a linearization of
the residual equations. Table 5-3 shows the dimensional derivatives which
comprise this model. Constant terms and velocity terms are neglected because
they only contribute to very low frequency errors which are washed out by the
"prewh$tenlng" high pass filter. Both elevator and stabilizer surfaces are
listed separately since they may not always be used proportionally in the con-
trol law, and spoiler panels are also listed since they may also be used.
TABLE 5-3. DIMENSIONAL DERIVATIVES
e(dell) It(degls) p(desls) q(degls) c(desls) Tl./TIt(ki bs) SUSit(deg) EL.It=It(des) AIJAIt(dell) It(des) SPL./SIPId
0 .0_0,30'9 0 .342 .02/. I. .0CR89 .0113 0 -.0|81_
.0131 .0372 "%00179 .202 _.0185
-.00355 -.00474 °o 248 -. 116 -. 133 0 .133
- .0367 .0126 z.O02[ z.Oll9 ±.005S6 _'.0t18 .0147 .;.-013
-.0113 .00620 -.036 -.0167 -.0047.31 0 .0019;
- .00267 - .00300 z.Ot24 -'.000883 z.O00S06 _.000955 - .OlTA ;.002
_x (fc/s2} .576 0
_y (f¢/s 2) - .663
_z (lois2) -3.60
_p (rls _) - .0829
_q (r/s _) - .0327
_r ( _ls2 ) .0[$9
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White Noise Budget - The white noise term represents errors due to sensor
noise and discretization of the sensor measurements. The total variance of
the white noise term is computed by taking the root sum square (rss) of the
contributions of each measurement to each residual. That is,
o2 . = c.z.o2
_1 _ 1] _1
(5-65)
where Cij represents the sensitivity of the ith residual to the jth measure-
ment and oj is the standard deviation of the corresponding measurement noise.
(Note that accelerometer measurements and angular acceleration computations
are also taken into account in Eq. 5-65). Table 5-4 shows the sensor noise
values used in this study.
TABLE 5-4. SENSOR NOISE BUDGET
Measurement o Units
.4 degrees
8 .4 deg
p .02 deg/s
q .02 deg/s
r .02 deg/s
TL/TR .06 klbs
SL/SR .i deg
R .I deg
EL/ER .i deg
AL/AR .I deg
SPL/SPR .I deg
Ax .32 ft/s/s
Ay .32 ft/s/s
Az .32 ft/s/s
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_2
The resulting white noise budget (i.e., the Unwi in Eq. 5-65 with the Cijs in
Table 5-3 and o2 of Table 5-4) is shown in Table 5-5.
J
TABLE 5-5. WHITE NOISE BUDGET
Measurement o Units
X .39 ft/s/s
y .42 ft/s/s
z 1.5 ft/s/s
p .035 r/s/s
Q .017 r/s/s
R .012 r/s/s
Low Frequency (LF) Budget-The "low" frequency errors to be modeled are
mostly due to parameter errors; i.e., errors in Cij of Eq. 5-65. These errors
are modulated by changes in the measurements yj which multiply Cij in the
(linearized) residual generation equations. The first parameter to be speci-
fied for the LF errors is the cutoff frequency for each residual. The param-
eters aLF i are then determined from
-_LFi(At)
aLF i = e (5-66)
where _LF i are the cutoff frequencies in radians/sec and At is the sample
time. There are several ways in which the cutoff frequency could be computed.
For example, examination of the closed-loop transfer functions (TFs) for the
control law in use would indicate the frequency ranges in which each measure-
ment may be excited. For the control law in [58], for example, transfer
functions begin to roll off from anywhere between .2 r/s and I0 r/s. Such an
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analysis indicates that more than a single LF error term may be needed since
the different transfer function bandwidths can affect a single residual. In
spite of this fact, the dominant TF roll off frequency is about 2 r/s. Since
this is consistent with the covariance functions observed in subsection 5.1.2,
we will use _LF i = 2 r/s for each residual.
The magnitude of the LF errors in each residual are specified in terms of
the total variance of the process nLF i. Since these errors are mainly due to
parametric errors, we must translate a specification of each parameter error
into the total variance of the corresponding LF error process. There are sev-
eral ways in which this can be accomplished, however, in every case, some
notion of a design envelope is required.
The design envelope is introduced in order to determine the potential
size of the contribution of any parametric error to the residuals. The design
envelope amounts to a specification of the largest variations of each measure-
ment in the bandwidth of interest. Since the HPF washes out errors below
.5 r/s and the LF bandwidth is 2 r/s, the bandwidth of interest is [.5,2] r/s.
Table 5-6 shows the design envelope used in this project. Note that we
assumed that spoilers are not used in the control law (but are used in the
residual generation process, thus affecting the white noise budget). These
numbers were determined from representative simulations of the aircraft
response to various maneuvers using the control law of [58].
The total variance of each LF term is now computed as follows.
specify the maximum variation (in percent) for each coefficient Cij.
worst case error for each residual and then divide by three to get the total
standard deviation of the corresponding LF term. That is,
First
Find the
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TABLE 5-6. DESIGN ENVELOPE
Measurement Max Variation Units
a 5.0
5.0
p 20.
q I0.
r I0.
TL/TR 3.0
SL/SR I0.
R I0.
EL/ER I0.
AL/AR I0.
SPL/SPR 0.0
10.
Ay 2 •0
Az 15.
degrees
deg
deg/s
deg/s
deg/s
klbs
deg
deg
deg
deg
deg
ft/s/s
ft/s/s
ft/s/s
1
= _ I ACij yjmax Ii j
(5-67)
where ACij is the worst case error in Cij and yjmax is the corresponding mea-
surement's design envelope. The division by three is used because the stand-
ard deviation represents a typical value and we used a worst case analysis in
summing errors. Furthermore, the design methodology detailed in 5.1.3 utilized
measures in which error probabilities are roughly equal to a 30 significance
level. Thus, it is expected that the worst case LF errors will just barely
cause decision "errors" (actual errors or no decisions) to be made in the
hypothesis testing procedures. For five percent errors in every coefficient
and the design envelope of Table 5-6, the LF residual errors are given in
Table 5-7.
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TABLE 5-7. PRELIMINARY LF ERROR BUDGET (I-oVALUES)
Measurement o Units
X 0.096 ft/s/s
Y 0.I0 ft/s/s
Z 0.47 ft/s/s
P 0.033 r/s/s
Q 0.024 r/s/s
R 0.0077 r/s/s
At this point it is worthwhile to compare the values in Table 5-7 to the
control derivatives in Table 5-3 to get some idea of detectability. For exam-
ple, we'd expect the pitch residual to play a major role in detecting elevator
failures. However, in order for the effect of an elevator failure to be reli-
ably detected, it should be about six times greater than the i-o value of the
corresponding LF error (d2 = 6 ---> Pe = 10-4)" This would imply a need for a
an average deflection of 8.6 degrees! Although smaller failures could be
detected, this is the minimum which achieves the desired reliability. Thus,
it appears that the design envelope may be too conservative. More will be
said about this in subsequent discussions.
High Frequency (HF) Budget - High frequency errors in the residuals may
be caused by neglected sensor dynamics and neglected flexure modes. For this
study, we assumed that only the first-asymmetric and first-symmetric wing
bending modes contribute to high frequency error. Furthermore, we assumed
that these modes are excited above about 15 r/s.
The first order high pass Markov process described in subsection 5.1.3 is
a poor model for the effects of these errors. This is true for two reasons.
153
ALPHATECH, INC.
First, the frequency shape does not correspond to the "peaky" nature of the
real errors, and second, the power spectrum defined by the cutoff frequency of
15 r/s (with the sample period of .05 sec.) is virtually the same as any other
spectrum with cutoff frequency above about i0 r/s. The latter effect is due
to the specific realization of the HF errors which in the limit (as _LF--> =),
looks like a one time step lag. Due to these shortcomings, and to the lack of
wing bending models in the simulation to be used for testing purposes, the
final design will be based on no HF errors. Nevertheless, it is instructive
to see an example of HF error budget modeling.
For the first asymmetric wing bending mode, the primary residual affected
is _p. The dynamic errors associated with this mode are excited mostly by
differential aileron motion and somewhat by rolling motion due to rudder
deflection. Assuming that the major contribution is due to differential aile-
ron, we can define the total variance in the HF error in _p by
opHF = 1 i Cp_ A A_A max I
3
1
= - (.012)(20) = 0.08 (5-68)
3
Similarly, for the first symmetric wing bending mode, the primary residuals
which are affected are Uq and Uz- The HF errors in both residuals are excited
by collective aileron deflection and by vertical wind gusts. Assuming that
vertical wind gusts result in a change of _ of no more than five degrees the
total variance of the resulting HF errors is,
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OqHF = ! [IC q_A E_A + I Cqma_ _max I ]
3
1
= - [(.005)(20) + (.033)(5)] = .088 (5-69)
3
1 max
Oz HF = - [ I Cz_A E_A
3
I + [ Cz_ _maxl]
1
= - [ (.13)(20) + (3.6)(5)] = 6.9 (5-70)
3
DESIGN ITERATIONS
Several design iterations involving changes to the LF error specifica-
tions were made before a final specification was utilized in a full scale
design. A short diary of these iterations is given here. In every design
iteration it is assumed that the maximum length for a test is one second
(Nma x = 20) and that a first order HPF with cutoff frequency of 0.5 r/s is
employed as a preprocessor.
The first design iteration utilized the error budgets developed above to
design trigger tests. For the one second maximal trigger window length, pro-
jections were computed, false alarm thresholds were set to achieve (nominally)
PF = 10-4 (i.e., at 3o[ST(20)]), and the average values of control "deflection"
required for reliable detection (i.e., I-P D = 10-4 for Gaussian statistics)
were determined. This information is shown in Table 5-8. The projections are
computed without any attempt to zero useless components (see subsection 5.1.3).
Also, the aileron projections are incorrect due to a transcription error in
the design software data. The detectability level is the average value of
control deflection required for reliable detection (as defined in Table 5-8.
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TABLE 5-8. AVERAGE VALUES OF CONTROL DEFLECTION REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE I-PD=I0 -4
(SIGNATURE "SIZE" 60 [ST(20) ])
CONTROL TL/TR SL/SR EL/ER AL/AR R
Projection
(For left
side where
different)
DETECTABILITY
LEVEL
X .089 .013 .013 .017 0
Y 0 0 0 .001 .020
Z 0 -.006 -.006 0 0
P .012 .17 .17 .16 .061
Q .068 -.97 -.97 -.96 0
R .99 .16 .16 .21 -.99
1.97 klbs 3.2 deg 6.4 deg 6.9 deg 2.3 deg
All these values are quite large, as expected from preliminary comparisons of
control derivatives with the LF error budget. It is deemed that these values
are not satisfactory.
The only way that detectability levels can be reduced is by restricting
the envelope of operation such that low frequency errors are reduced. This is
obviously not a satisfactory solution by itself. However, the use of thresh-
old scheduling permits us to reduce the nominal envelope and achieve the same
false trigger alarm rates by scheduling thresholds during periods where errors
are expected to be large. The resulting detectability levels are, of course,
only valid for flight within the nominal envelope and deviations from this
envelope will cause thresholds to be increased and detectability levels to
increase.
We first considered eliminating the largest errors from the LF budget.
This then implies that schedules which are a function of the corresponding
measurelnents will be necessary. The largest errors are due to coefficients of:
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I. e for Vx
2. 8 for Vy
3. e for Vz
4. 8 and p for Vp
5. SL/SR for Vq
6. r and B for Vr
.
Setting the errors in these coefficients equal to zero results in a smaller LF
error budget and detectability levels of
TL/TR : 1.4 klbs
SL/SR : 1.7 deg
EL/ER : 3.4 deg
AL/AR : 3.6 deg
R : 1.5 deg
These detectability figures are more acceptable.
The last design iteration was accomplished after observation of the size
of the residuals generated by processing simulation data from NASA's B-737
simulation. The observed residuals during a mild climbing turn maneuver were
consistent with the maximum LF (model) errors used in the previous error bud-
get. However, during roll, pitch and yaw doublets, were substantially (in
magnitude) larger than what would have been predicted by this budget.
Since we ignored the largest errors in the previous budget, one explana-
tion of the observations is that it is these errors which are being excited
and should be accounted for by threshold scheduling. However, the temporal
characteristics of the residuals are not correlated with the coefficient
errors which were ignored in this budget. Thus, some other means of develop-
ing reasonable error budgets is necessary.
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To expedite our further work, a final design was created using an error
budget based on observed errors. Using i-o values corresponding to 2/3 of the
maximum LF error observed during the climbing turn maneuver, we expect that
errors which are twice as large as those observed during this maneuver to be
The standard deviations of the LF errors used in theadequately handled.
final design are,
X : .20
y : .033
z : .20
p : .020
q : .0050
r : .0034
ft/s/s
ft/s/s
ft/s/s
r/s/s
r/s/s
r/s/s
These budgets are larger than the previous design iteration for X, Y, Z, and P
residuals and smaller for Q and R residuals. The resulting reliable detecta-
bility levels for the triggers (now with useless projection elements zeroed)
are,
TL/TR : 1.8 klbs
SL/SR : 1.0 deg
EL/ER : 2.0 deg
AL/AR : 5.6 deg
R : 1.5 deg
Table 5-9 shows the "optimized" trigger projections. Notice that for detect-
ing aileron failures, several residuals are required. This is due to the low
overall effectiveness of the ailerons and to the fact that their effectiveness
is spread amongst many axes. The use of only the r residual for rudder detec-
tion and only the q residual for horizontal tail detection is consistent with
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TABLE 5-9.
CONTROL
OPTIMIZED TRIGGER AND VERIFY PROJECTIONS FOR FINAL BUDGET
HORIZONTAL TAlL
TL/TR SL/SR & EL/ER AL/AR R
Projection
± indicates
sign for
left/right
controls
X .011 0 0 0
Y 0 0 0 0
Z 0 0 -.006 0
P 0 0 ±.189 0
Q 0 1.0 -.905 0
R +I .0 0 ±.380 I.0
qualitative expectations, as is the use of both x and r residuals for aircraft
path engine failures.
The procedures for designing verify and isolate tests described in sub-
section 5.1.3 were followed and projections, thresholds, and distinguishabil-
ity levels computed. Table 5-10 summarizes the distinguishability results.
Each entry in the table represents a particular isolation test. The first
number corresponds to the average control deflection needed for the test to
"pass" (pass means that the test decides in favor of the control identified by
the column heading) and the second number corresponds to the average deflec-
tion needed for the test to "fail" (fail means that the test decides in favor
of the control identified by the row heading). The largest of these numbers
represents the overall distinguishability level for each surface and is shown
at the right in Table 5-10. The tests corresponding to the largest values are
highlighted.
Finally we note that the detectability and distinguishability levels are
substantially larger than those determined in subsection 5.1.2. This is
because the error budgets used in the design process were substantially larger
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TABLE 5-i0. DISTINGUISHABILITY LEVELS FOR ISOLATION TESTS
RT LHT RHT R LA RA
OVERALL
DISTINGUISH-
ABILITY
LEVELS
LT 1.5 / 1.5 1.8 / .68
RT
LHT
RHT
R
LA
1.8 / .68
1.8 / .68 _/Q Q/ 3.5 1.8 / 3.9 1.9 klbs
1.8 / -68 Q/Q 1.8 / 3.9 G/ 3.5 1.9 klbs
Q /Q .62 / 1.3 2.4 /Q 1.2 / 5.5 3.7 deg
--- .62 / 1.3 1.2 / 5.5 2.4 / 6.0 3.7 deg
...... 1.4 / 3.4 1.4 / 3.4 1.7 deg
.......... 4.3 / 4.3 6.0 deg
than the observed values and because the FDI algorithm was purposely not
optimized for the statistical (truth) model used in the evaluation process.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations of a modified B-737 aircraft were performed at the NASA
Langley Research Center and the required data were recorded on magnetic tape
and delivered to ALPHATECH for use in simulating the FDI algorithm. The NASA
simulation is a full six degree of freedom nonlinear simulation with nonlinear
aerodynamic coefficients, accurate actuation models, sensor errors, and turbu-
lence simulation using the Dryden spectra [59]. A total of 41, 60-second,
simulation runs were made encompassing many categories of tests. For aircraft-
path failures, these categories included:
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I. False alarm checks with three "doublet" maneuvers and a climbing
turn, with and without turbulence and sensor noise,
2. Detection checks for totally missing control surfaces, with and
without turbulence and sensor noise, and
3. Detection checks for varying degrees of partially missing failures
with and without turbulence and sensor noise.
In all of the runs, the control law defined in [58] was used.
The results to be presented next are for the climbing turn maneuver.
Discussions of performance during the doublet maneuvers follows• Investiga-
tions of alternate algorithm structures (threshold scheduling and forced deci-
sions) are presented next and we conclude with a discussion of the lessons
learned.
Climbing Turn Results (No Failure) - Simulation data of the climbing turn
maneuver with no failure were processed by the FDI algorithm. The climbing
turn maneuver is accomplished by commanding pitch and bank angles (regulated
by the control law of [58]). The commands are given by
At I0 sec 8c = 7.5 deg/sec and _c = 1.5 deg/sec
At 14 sec 8c = _c = 0
At 21 sec 8c = -7.5 deg/sec and _c = -1.5 deg/sec
At 25 sec 8c = _c = 0
Three cases were examined: no turbulence or sensor noise, sensor noise but no
turbulence, and both turbulence and sensor noise present. During each of
these runs, no false trigger was ever recorded.
The maneuver begins at ten seconds• Figure 5-26 shows the attitude,
angular rates, and linear accelerations of the aircraft during the maneuver.
Figures 5-27 through 5-32 show the six residuals for the turbulence and sensor
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Figure 5-26. Normal Aircraft Response During Climbing Turns
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noise case. Figure 5-33 shows the trigger test for the left aileron.* Note
that an initiation transient due to large low frequency errors causes the
trigger to cross its threshold, however, an "inhibit" flag prevents decisions
from being made for the first four seconds (two time constants of the HPFs) of
operation. Other triggers look similar to Fig. 5-33. Low frequency errors
which are excited during the maneuver are clearly evident, however, the design
methodology's selection of thresholds account for the impact of these errors.
-9.40
-9.60
-9.80
-10.00
LA TRIG
I t I I I I I
_{11_1_ _ TRIGGER 7
._.i ......... _. THRESHOLD
5.0 10.0 15.0 20,0 25.0
TIME (SECS)
30.0 35.0 40.0
R-4442
Figure 5-33. LA TRIG
*The scaling on all hypothesis test plots in this section do not correspond to
the design data given in the previous subsection. This is because standard
log-likelihood-ratio software was used to generate the simulation results.
These log-likelihood-ratio tests are functionally equivalent to the ones
specified above.
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Climbing Turn Results (Detection of Totally-Missing Failures)- For these
results, totally missing failures were similated (Effectiveness = 0 at 5.0
seconds before the initiation of the climbing turn maneuver at ten seconds).
The simulations were run without turbulence but with sensor noise. No air-
craft path engine failures were available. Both elevator and stabilizer fail-
ures were simulated, although no attempt was made to distinguish between the
indistinguishable modes (same side elevator and stabilizer). Table 5-11 shows
the trigger times and isolation times for each failure mode. Note that trig-
gers for elevator and stabilizer failures occur before the maneuver because
they are providing nonzero forces and moments to the aircraft during straight
and level flight.
TABLE 5-11 TRIGGER AND ISOLATION TIMES FOR TOTALLY MISSING SURFACE FAILURES
Failure Trigger Isolate
Mode Time (sec) Time (sec)
LS 6.15
RS 6.25
LA 10.9 11.70
RA 10.9 11.55
R II.i0
LE 5.4 (First) Out of time
(ambiguity group = LHT/RHT)
RE 5.4 (First) Out of time
(ambiguity group = LHT/RHT)
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Figures 5-34 through 5-39 show the residuals for the rudder failure case.
The trigger, verify, and isolate tests are shown in Figs. 5-40 to 5-47.
Notice that the last isolation tests to decide are the hardest ones (as judged
by Table 5-10), namely, R/RT and R/LT.
The elevator failure modes are not isolated (to the corresponding hori-
zontal tall mode) during this run. This is due to the fact that the most dif-
ficult test (LHT/RHT) can not decide by its time limit. Figure 5-48 shows the
LHT/RHT isolation test during both left and right elevator failures. Notice
that triggers occur frequently and that in the greater majority of cases, the
isolation statistics are heading in the correct direction. Examination of the
elevator position indicates that its average value within the FDI bandwidth
(.5 r/s to 6 r/s) is about six to seven degrees. Comparing this to the 7.4
degrees needed for distinguishability (Table 5-10; a factor of two times hori-
zontal tall requirement due to 50 per cent effectiveness of elevator with
respect to stabilizer), we see that the totally missing elevator failure for
this maneuver is only marginally detectable (i.e., the likelihood of missing
it is larger than desired). To see if, in fact, this failure mode is a criti-
cal failure, Fig. 5-49 shows the aircraft response during this failure.
Comparison of Figs. 5-49 and 5-26 indicates that, in spite of the missing
elevator, the climbing turn maneuver is successfully accomplished with little
performance degradation. Thus, the qualitative assessment of this failure is
that, for the control law being used, it is not severe.
Finally, Table 5-12 shows the trigger and isolate times for varying
effectiveness levels of left aileron failures. The results are as expected.
Smaller failures result in longer isolation times. When the failure is small
enough, triggers occur, but isolation decisions can not be made (in this case
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due to the inability to verify the failure). When the failure is exception-
ally small, no triggers are recorded.
TABLE 5-12. TRIGGER AND ISOLATE TIMES FOR LA FAILURES DURING CLIMBING TURN
LA Failure Trigger Isolate
Size Time (sec) Time (sec)
100% 10.9 11.7
80 11.3 12.15
60 11.65 (Flrst) 16.60
40 12.15 (First) Verify Fails
20 None None
Doublet Maneuvers - Several doublet maneuvers were simulated to test the
algorithms reaction to severe maneuvers with a broad spectrum of excitation
frequencies. The doublet maneuvers are defined by the following pitch and
bank angle commands.
Pitch Doublet: At _ I0 sec 8c = 5 deg
At ~ 15 sec 8c = -5 deg
At _ 25 sec 8c = 0 deg
Roll Doublet : At ~ I0 sec 8c = 45 deg
At ~ 15 sec 8c = -45 deg
At _ 25 sec 8c = 0 deg
These runs were made with no turbulence and sensor noise was added in a post-
simulation processing function (i.e., not fed back to the commands in the con-
trol law). Figures 5-50 to 5-55 show the residuals for the roll doublet with
no noise.
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During the pitch maneuver with no failure, several LHT triggers occur,
but the verify test either runs out of time or indicates a false trigger.
Figure 5-56 shows the LHT trigger and verify tests for this case. For the
roll doublet, triggers of every control element occur at one time or another,
however, failures are not identified because the verify tests either run out
of time or indicate a false trigger.
Examination of the residuals during these maneuvers indicates that the LF
errors are substantially larger than those budgeted in the design. Thus, the
results are not unexpected. In fact, it is surprising that in spite of the
many false triggers, no failures are incorrectly declared. Apparently, the
verify tests perform their function of declaring false triggers quite well
during these maneuvers.
Forced Decisions - One of the options which was discussed in subsection
3.3 regarding the design of sequential tests was the possibility of making a
fixed sample size decision when a sequential test's time limit is reached. It
would be expected that smaller failures could be detected in this case, but
that the likelihood of false alarms during severe maneuvers (e.g., the doublet
maneuvers) would increase. Since i00 percent missing elevator failures could
not be detected during the climbing turn maneuver, we decided to examine the
results of this case when isolation decisions are "forced" at the time
limits.
The forcing of decisions is accomplished by comparing the isolation sta-
tistic Sl(Nl)(see 5.1.3 for definitions) to zero. If it is larger than zero,
the isolation test "passes" (decides in favor of Hi) , and if it is less than
zero, the test fails (decides in favor of Hj). Figure 5-48 indicates that
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this procedure should work very well in the majority of trigger cases for the
climbing turn maneuver. Simulation results for this case result in both left
and right elevator failures being detected and isolated (to the corresponding
LHT or RHT mode) by t=6.4 seconds. In the case of left elevator failures, the
LHT/RHT test passes due to the forced decisions and for the right elevator
failure, the LHT/RHT and RHT/R tests pass due to the forced decisions.
To see the impact of forced decisions on false alarm performance, the
roll doublet was executed with no failures. Since many triggers occur, the
likelihood of making an incorrect decision should be larger when isolate test
decisions are forced at their time limits. However, no incorrect failure
identifications are declared for this case. Part of the reason for this per-
formance is that verify test decisions are not forced. Thus, many false trig-
gers are indicated due to verify tests being unable to decide at their time
limits. If verify decisions were also forced, it is possible that false
alarms could have been declared.
Threshold Scheduling - Methods for scheduling both fixed sample size
tests and sequential tests were discussed in subsection 3.3. These methods
were applied to the aircraft-path FDI system to see if false triggers during
severe maneuvers could be avoided.
Basically, threshold scheduling is accomplished through the use of fail-
ure insensitive estimates of upper bounds on the size of the residuals due to
errors which were not accounted in the nominal design. In the beginning of
this subsection, we noted that improved "nominal" performance (in terms of
detectability levels) could be achieved by reducing the design envelope and
scheduling thresholds so that periods of potentially large error do not cause
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incorrect decisions.
of the form,
Thus, a natural choice of scheduling parameters would be
Ei(k) = _ I Kij Yj l (5-71)
J
where j is summed over the measurements which were ignored in the error budget
and Kij represents an upper bound on the error in the corresponding dimen-
sional coefficient. (Note that since these errors represent errors in the
residuals, and the residuals are hlgh pass filtered, the "error terms" must
also be hlgh pass filtered). Unfortunately, the results obtained with such a
procedure are not adequate. Figure 5-57 shows the LHT trigger test for the
pitch doublet maneuver with no noise or turbulence. The threshold schedules
correspond to flve percent errors in the coefficients which wereignored in
the error budget. Clearly Eq. 5-71 does not characterize the errors which are
being experienced during this maneuver.
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Severalattempts were made to find the proper signals upon which thresh-
old scheduling could be based. These included the use of deflection measure-
ments, acceleration measurements, angular rates, and others. No combination
was found which satisfied the requirement of eliminating false triggers during
all doublet maneuvers. More investigation of these issues is, therefore,
necessary. However, we note that in the search for appropriate threshold
schedules, it was observed that errors in the longitudinal residuals may be
correlated with _. Since no _ term was modeled in the residual generation
equations, it is possible that this is an important source of error•
Discussion - There are several conclusions about the aircraft-path FDI
algorithm and its design methodology which can be drawn from these tests•
Broader conclusions about the entire effort are given in Section 6. The
conclusions drawn here are based on the results which have been presented as
well as a more detailed analysis of several simulation results.
In general, we feel that the aircraft path FDI algorithm performed quite
well, and as expected, under conditions for which it was designed• It per-
formed surprisingly well during conditions in which errors were substantially
larger than those included in the design procedure's error budget•
Room for improvement, of course, still exists, and several comments in
this regard are given below.
I. Although no engine failure tests were run, examination of throttle
commands indicates that some engine failure modes (e.g., stuck: in
the aircraft path) may produce lower frequency signatures than the
other failure modes• In order to accommodate such modes, it may be
desirable to reduce the bandwidth of the HPF only for tests involving
the engine failures•
2. Increased sensitivity to failures and greater flexibility in the
design of isolation tests may be achievable if the full matrix of
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isolation tests (i.e., "pure" rejection tests) is implemented. This
is as opposed to the combined test described by Fig. 5-25.
Decreased decision delays may be achievable by starting the sequen-
tial tests prior to the trigger time. This process would require
storage and processing of residuals over the "rollback" interval.
The disadvantage of such an approach is that the same errors which
might create false triggers could then be present in the verify tests
(i.e., the verify test is not an independent test).
In keeping with the desire to make the verify test independent to
reduce false alarms, we could reinitialize the HPFs at the trigger
time. Although this would remove the effect of large LF errors which
Cause false triggers from the verify test, it would also remove the
effect of failures. Continued excitation during the sequential test
interval is then required. This procedure might be most effective
when a "rollback" interval is used.
The FDI interval and the length of time in which the failure signa-
tures remain constant are close enough to warrant investigation of
noncoherent processing schemes. That is, trigger, verify, and iso-
late tests might perform better if they were based on sums of pro-
jected and squared residuals.
The sequential test design procedure seems to produce a relatively
conservative choice of thresholds when errors are within the budget.
This conclusion is based on observing that, in cases where failures
are not correctly detected, the isolation tests which run out of time
are clearly heading in the direction of a correct decision. Some
further refinement and/or analysis of the current design procedure is
desirable.
When high frequency unmodeled errors are present, it is possible that
the likelihood of making incorrect decisions early in a sequential
test could increase. If adequate high frequency error models are
used in the design procedure, the thresholds will increase to accom-
modate this. However, an alternative scheme which might allow
greater sensitivity in the sequential tests would be to start the
sequential test with large thresholds and reduce them as the high
frequency errors become less important. No formal theory or heuris-
tic design procedure exists for such a concept and if important, the
concept should be investigated further.
More work is needed to define meaningful threshold schedules for
operation of the algorithm during severe maneuvers.
The moving window average nature of the trigger tests is a very
inefficient implementation of a low pass filter (LPF). It was chosen
on the basis of the optimal fixed sample size hypothesis tests.
Other LPF filter structures which achieve similar noise rejection and
perhaps have a better transient response with less computation may be
of interest.
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5.2 ACTUATOR PATH FDI ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
Two distinct actuator path FDI algorithms were investigated for this
project. The first algorithm is a "fixed" or constant threshold algorithm
which maintains a desired false alarm rate during worst case model error at
the expense of reduced failure sensitivity during all phases of operation.
The second algorithm uses the threshold scheduling concepts developed in sub-
section 3.3 to achieve reduced failure sensitivity only during times when
large error is expected. This latter approach was demonstrated on only two
surfaces (left and right aileron) because errors other than those assumed in
this approach were evident in the other surfaces. The development of both
algorithms and corresponding simulation results are described below.
5.2.1 Residual Generation
Both actuator FDI algorithms described in this section are based on the
same residual generation mechanism. For this project, "open-loop" (see sub-
section 3.2) actuator residuals are generated by passing the commanded control
value through an actuator model to produce an estimate of the "actuator" out-
put position and subtracting this estimate from a measurement of the actuator
output. Although other residual generation mechanisms are possible (e.g.
finite memory or closed loop residuals) it is felt that this mechanism pro-
vides the best ratio between failure sensitivity and model error effects.
The actuator model (and, hence, what we mean by an actuator) is defined
by the locations of actuator commands and output measurements. Table 5-13
shows the definitions used for this project. These definitions assume that
the only input which drives each control element is computed by a digital
flight control system (DFCS) that incorporates both stability augmentation and
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TABLE 5-13. B-737 ACTUATOR DEFINITIONS
SURFACE COMMAND OUTPUT UNITS
L&R Stabilizer DFCS Command Position at Hinge degrees
L&R Elevator DFCS Command Position at Hinge degrees
Rudder DFCS Command Position at Hinge degrees
L&R Aileron DFCS Command Position at Hinge degrees
L&R Throttle DFCS Command EPR (Scaled) k-lbs
pilot inputs. Thus any failure between the DFCS output and the control mea-
surements is considered as an actuator failure. Control surface deflection
measurements are taken on the hinge (possibly using an LVDT on a control rod
or an RVDT on the hinge itself).
The estimated control value (for the "next pass") is obtained using a
generic actuator model which incorporates linear first order dynamics, rate
and position limits, and static cable stretch. The sequence of operations
used to generate the control estimate and residual for each actuator are,
Dynamics: 6k = e-_A_k-I + (l-e-_A) _c (k-l) (5-72a)
Rate Limiter: -  k-1]/A> RL M
THEN _k = _k-I + sgn(6k- _k-l) " RLIM-A (5-72b)
Cable Stretch: _k = I_ _k
1 + Q-SF
(5-72c)
Position Limit: IF (_k > Max) THEN _k = _mx
IF (_k < M_in) THEN _k = Min (5-72d)
Residual: Vk = _m(k) - _k (5-72e)
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where _m denotes the control measurement, _ denotes the estimate, Min and Max
are the position limits, Q is dynamic pressure, SF is a stretch factor, RLIM
is the rate limit, _ is the first order bandwidth and sgn is the signum func-
tion. The parameters of this model for each control element are given in
Table 5-14. The sample time, A, is .05 seconds. The elevator command and its
corresponding measurement is assumed to be given relative to the mechanical
trim while all other surface positions are relative to some body oriented
coordinate frame. For the throttle, different bandwidths are used for spool
up (6 c > _k-l) and spool down (6 c < _k-l)-
TABLE 5-14. ACTUATOR MODEL PARAMETERS
°
SURFACE _ RLIM SF MIN_ MAX UNITS
L&R Stabilizer 1.5 r/s ±I0 deg/s 0.0 -14, 3 degrees
L&R Elevator 22 r/s ±20 deg/s .0023 -I0, I0 degrees
Rudder 22 r/s ±18 deg/s 0.0 -10.3, 10.3 degrees
L&R Aileron 20 r/s ±20 deg/s .0016 -20, 20 degrees
L&R Throttle 2.0 r/s (spool up) None 0.0 (I0), (60) k-lbs
1.0 r/s (spool down)
Several error sources which result in non-zero residuals are present.
The first, and most obvious is sensor errors. These include bias and sensor
noise as detailed in Table 5-15. Scale factor errors result from errors in
SF. Errors which are excited by high frequency commands are present due to
inaccuracies in the dynamic model. Finally, rate limit errors may be present.
This last error is particularly true for the rudder in which the actual rate
limit is a nonlinear function of surface position. Also, the throttle command
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TABLE 5-15. SENSOR ERRORS
SURFACE NOISE (I-o) BIAS (MAX) UNITS
L&R Stabilizer .I .I degrees
L&R Elevator .I .I degrees
Rudder .I .I degrees
L&R Aileron .I .I degrees
L&R Throttle (.01) (.02) k-lbs
to EPR model may have scale factor errors due to uncertainty in the scaling of
both commands and EPR to thrust units (klbs).
Simulation runs using the maneuvers defined in subsection 5.1.4 were made.
Figures 5-58 to 5-66 show the residuals for each control element during the
roll doublet maneuver with no noise or failures. In these figures, the initial
blas Is removed. There are clearly many error sources besides sensor noise
present. For the ailerons and elevators errors occur mainly during the command
steps which initiate each phase of the maneuver. These errors are consistent
with dynamic inaccuracies at high frequencies. The stabilizer errors have a
lower frequency content than those of the elevators and ailerons. These errors
are also consistent with high frequency dynamic errors since the bandwidth of
the stabilizer is substantially lower. For the errors observed in the rudder
and throttle, it is likely that scale factor errors and the existence of vari-
ous nonlinearities in the simulated engine models play a large role in contrib-
uting to residual errors. For the rudder, it was discovered that nonlinear
rate limits are used in the simulation to account for varying aerodynamic loads
during surface motion. The error between this nonlinear rate limit and the
constant rate limit used in Eq. 5-72b is evident in Fig. 5-62.
191
ALPHATECH, INC.
u)
J_
1.o
0.0
-1.0
-2.0 I t
0.0 5.0 10.0
i I i i I I
,. "%
I
i
f
,!
f\
ii %.
I ! I l I
15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
TIME (SECS)
Figure 5-58. LT RES
400
R-4469
oo
..Q
2.0
1.0 --
0.0
-I .0
0.0
I I I I I I I
I
k\
'.,,.J
I
i
i
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
TIME (SECS)
i I I
25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
Figure 5-59. RT RES
R-4470
192
ALPHATECH, INC.
0.30
0.20
oO
Q,)
0.10
C_
"0
0.00
I I I I I I I
-0.10 I I I I t I I
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
TIME (SECS)
R-4471
Figure 5-60. LS RES
0.10
0.05
03
(D
0.00
-0.05 -
-0.10
0.0
I I I I I I I
I\,
I
\ .... !
_, /"
! /
",,..._._ ./
t I i i I
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
TIME (SECS)
Figure 5-61. RS RES
I \
\. ____------------_
40.0
R-4472
193
ALPHATECH, INC.
4.0
2.0
O3
tD
o.o
O3
-2.0
-4.0 t
0.0 5.0
I
!i
I I I I I
It
i!
I
10.0
t !
15.0 20.0
TIME (SECS)
,'L ____..." X_#
I I I
25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
R-4473
Figure 5-62. R RES
0.40
0.20
O3
tD
0.00
"0
-0.20
-0.40
0.0
I I I I i I I
!
L, I
Y- k
F-J
p
..._-
/
/
J
I
i : I t i
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
TIME (SECS)
Figure 5-63. LE RES
30.0 35.0 40.0
R-4474
194
ALPHATECH, INC.
0.20
o.oo
q)
'10
-0.20
0.0
I I
\J
I I I I
I I I t
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
/
/
TIME (SECS)
I I I
_.0 _.0 _.0 _.0
Figure 5-64. RE RES
R-4475
-0.20
(t)
o.oo
-,-j
0.20 -
0.0
I I I I I I I
5.0
IjI
I
I"
!
10.0
'i t
'; i
""\... __j_
°_
II
15.0 20.0
TIME (SECS)
¢
I
i'
t
/
i
Figure 5-65. AL RES
i i i
25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
R-4476
195
ALPHATECH, INC.
0.40
0.20
•"o 0.00
-0.20
i ; j _ t I I
'3,1
/"
./
"// t
t!
J I
,!
\,
%,.
1 ! I I I
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0
TIME (SECS)
Figure 5-66. RARES
R-4477
These results motivated the development of the two decision processes
discussed at the beginning of subsection 5.2. The primary focus for this
project was on test and validation of a fixed threshold algorithm for every
control element. Time permitted only preliminary investigation of the thresh-
old scheduling algorithm for the aileron controls.
5.2.2 Fixed Threshold Actuator Decision Process
A structure for a fixed threshold actuator FDI algorithm is shown in Fig.
5-67. This structure implements the trigger/verify procedure described in
Section 3 for dealing with unknown onset times. As in the aircraft-path FDI
decision process, a "prewhitening" filter which assumes that the primary error
sources are white noise and very low frequency error is employed. This filter
is a high pass filter whose cutoff frequency is determined by the length of
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Figure 5-67. Fixed Threshold Actuator FDI Structure
time failure signatures are expected to remain constant, the length of time
expected to be needed for failure detection (trigger and verify), and the
bandwidth of the very low frequency errors. We assume that about one second
is needed for failure detection, that the failure signatures of importance are
coherent over this interval, and that the very low frequency errors have band-
widths of less than 0. i r/s. The high pass filter bandwidth is selected at
0.5 r/s (i.e., between .I r/s and i r/s). The HPF is implemented with a first
order digital filter defined by
1--(1-a)z-1 (5-73)
1-az-1
where a = e-0"5A, and where z-I is a unit delay.
The trigger process is based on the log-likelihood ratio test for distin-
guishing a bias of unknown sign in white noise from white noise.
statistic is,
The trigger
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ST(k) = _ v(k-j+l) (5-74)
j=l
The trigger design procedure is as follows. First, N is chosen as I/A times
the desired trigger delay (0.5 second --> N = i0). This choice will ensure
adequate averaging of high frequency errors while not reducing the effect of
failures. Next, the threshold is set so that the likelihood of false alarms,
during worse case errors, is small. Worst case errors, Ewc , were determined
from simulation runs using the three doublet maneuvers, and are shown for each
control in Table 5-16. If the white noise on each control measurement is 0.2
degrees (twice the allotted size in Table 5-15 for safety; this does not
impact the design a great deal), then the thresholds are selected from
to = Ewc + 3o//N (5-75)
where _ is the .2 degree noise standard deviation.
Table 5-17.
TABLE 5-16.
SURFACE
L&R Stabilizer
L&R Elevator
Rudder
L&R Aileron
L&R Throttle
WORST CASE ERRORS
The results are shown in
0.5 deg
0.75 deg
3.0 deg
0.50 deg
1.5 klbs
The verify process is based on the SPRT for the alternate hypotheses
defining the trigger test. The verify statistic is,
k k
Sv(k) = I I GV v(j) [ - I Gc
j=kf j=kf
(5-76)
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TABLE 5-17. TRIGGER THRESHOLDS
SURFACE
L&R Stabilizer 0.6 deg
L&R Elevator 0.85 deg
Rudder 3.1 deg
L&R Aileron 0.60 deg
L&R Throttle 1.6 klbs
The test is run until k = kf + NV. The time limit Nv is taken to be I0
samples (0.5 seconds). This is deemed long enough to accomplish averaging of
high frequency errors and short enough so that failure signatures are not
substantially reduced. The parameter GV is chosen as one and G c is one half
the minimally detectable failure signature, m/2. The minimally detectable
signature is taken to be twice the worst case error. Finally, the threshold
is determined so that false triggers are frequently rejected by NV/2 and
minimally detectable failures are frequently detected by NV/2. This is
accomplished by choosing the threshold as the expected value of Sv(Nv/2).
Table 5-18 shows the selected thresholds.
TABLE 5-18. VERIFY THRESHOLDS
SURFACE
L&R Stabilizer 2.5 deg
L&R Elevator 3.75 deg
Rudder 15. deg
L&R Aileron 2.5 deg
L&R Throttle 7.5 klbs
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False alarm checks were made by processing the residuals during several
maneuvers with no failures according to the decision process described above.
The three doublet maneuvers and the climbing turn maneuver with noise added to
the sensors before processing resulted in no false triggers as expected. The
climbing turn maneuver with turbulence and sensor noise resulted in false
triggers of the left and right ailerons but the verify processes were able to
reject these triggers as false in each case. The trigger and verify tests for
the left aileron are shown in Fig. 5-68.
Detection checks were then made using the climbing turn maneuver and
stuck failures (_.e., stuck at the position at the time of failure) for each
control element. Unfortunately, only runs with turbulence and sensor noise
were made. Since turbulence tends to excite the controls, the detection
performance discussed below is presumably better than that which would be
obtained without turbulence in the simulation. The failure is implemented at
5.0 seconds and the maneuver occurs at ten seconds. Table 5-19 shows the
times at which the stuck failures are triggered and verified. The label
(first) indicates that one or more false triggers were indicated by the verify
process before a trigger is verified. Throttle failures are not detected
because the deviation of the measured EPR from the estimated EPR (in klbs)
does not exceed the minimally detectable level. Only one trigger occurs for
the left throttle, but the signature is not large enough to be verified. This
is shown in Fig. 5-69. The right elevator failure is of some interest since
several triggers occur before the failure is verified. This is shown in Fig.
5-70. For the first trigger the signature is so small that the verify SPRT
passes its negative threshold. For the second trigger, the verify time limit
_s reached and the failure is identified on the third trigger.
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TABLE 5-19. TRIGGER AND VERIFY TIMES FOR STUCK CONTROLS
SURFACE TRIGGER TIME (SEC) VERIFY TIME (SEC)
Left Throttle 24.6 ---
Right Throttle None None
Left Stabilizer 11.25 11.5
Right Stabilizer 10.9 II. 1
Rudder 6.15 6.3
Left Elevator 6.05 6.3
Right Elevator 7.0 (first) 10.7
Left Aileron 5.45 (first) 6.4
Right Aileron 5.95 6. I
The fact that throttle failures were not detected must be weighed against
the severity of the failure. Inspection of the aircraft response for both
failed and unfailed cases shows that almost no performance is lost during this
maneuver when a single throttle is stuck. The difference appears in the air-
speed in which the lowest airspeed achieved during the maneuver is five knots
lower with the throttle failure. Otherwise the force and moment imbalances
resulting from the throttle failure seem to be adequately compensated by the
nominal FCS of [58].
DISCUSSION
The simulation results indicate that the actuator path FDI process
described by Fig. 5-67 can be designed to virtually eliminate false alarms
during realistic and severe maneuvers. However, the design relied on observa-
tion of the size of normal errors. Estimation or bounding of such errors is
not an easy task for real aircraft. Thus, extensive flight records may need
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to be examined to determine the size of errors. If these errors are expected
to be constant over the flight envelope and over time, and if they are small
enough (as in this study) so that important failures can be detected, then the
system described above can be made to perform adequately. Otherwise, schedul-
ing and/or adaptation mechanisms may be required.
5.2.3 Scheduled Threshold Actuator FDI Decision Process
One Of the limitations of the fixed threshold algorithm is that the
thresholds must take into account worst case error. This can sometimes limit
the sensitivity to failures during times when this error is not likely to
appear. The decision process developed here utilizes the single-input, single-
output threshold scheduling ideas developed in subsection 3.3 to adjust thresh-
olds when errors (due to dynamic model errors) are expected to be large. Time
permitted only application to the aileron actuator system. These were chosen
since the residuals suggested that dynamic errors were of greatest importance
for these actuators.
The structure for the alternate actuator decision process is shown in
Fig. 5-71. The trigger is based on the development in subsection 3.3. It is
assumed that an error filter exists whose squared magnitude bounds the (rela-
tive) frequency dependent errors in the residuals. That is, the error filter
in Fig. 5-70, £m(m), must bound E(m)/H(w) where E(_) is defined in Eq. 3-125,
and H/m) is the true actuator transfer function. The trigger equations are,
I
ST(k) - NT _(k-j+l) 2 (5-77)
j=l
tT(k ) = to + ! _T e(k-j+l) 2
NT j=1
(5-78)
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LPF = (Low Pass Filter); D T = (Constant Multiplier)
The trigger window length, NT, must be chosen as long as possible to ensure
that the impact of the approximation of Eq. 3-128 by a finite sum is not too
severe, but should not be longer than the desired FDI delay if possible.
Since the time constant of the aileron actuator model is small, NT is chosen
as i0 (0.5 sec.). This will permit substantial averaging of the high fre-
quency content in the residuals. The error filter is a first order HPF with
break frequency corresponding to the aileron actuator model bandwidth. This
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is based on the assumption that the first order actuator model is inaccurate
above its break frequency. The nominal threshold, to, is now selected only to
account for sensor noise since we assume that all model error will be
accounted for by the threshold schedules. Thus, if v(k) is white noise with
intensity of .I degrees, then the variance of ST is about .02 degrees. We
choose to as three times this or .06 degrees. Notice that this is substan-
tially smaller than the fixed threshold algorithm. Thus, very small actuator
failures can be detected during periods of quiescent operation (low frequency
actuator commands) in which the threshold offsets will be small.
The verify process is based on the assumption that the nonconstant part
of Eq. 5-78 is an estimate of the size of the residual error (due to dynamic
mismatches) at time k. This estimate is used to modify the verify thresholds
to maintain the likelihoods of error at each stage of the process as described
in subsection 3.3.
The constant KH is used to modify the high frequency gain of the error
filter. The verify statistic is defined by the constants GV and G c. As in
the trigger process GV is chosen to be one and Gc is one half of the minimally
detectable failure signature. Without errors, this signature is quite small.
We chose, however, to use 0.5 degrees as a minimally desirable failure signa-
ture since smaller signatures are deemed to be unimportant and since other
errors besides those accounted for by threshold scheduling may be present.
The nominal threshold is chosen as in subsection 5.2.1 and takes the value of
1.25.
Several experimental design iterations were made to determine a suitable
value for KH. Choosing KH so that the error filter has a high frequency gain
of I (i.e., 100% error relative to the surface estimate) resulted in no
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triggers during doublet and climbing turn maneuvers with no turbulence and
post simulation added sensor noise. False triggers (no false alarms) occurred
during the climbing turn with turbulence. Figure 5-72 shows the aileron trig-
ger for the climbing turn maneuver. The schedules seem to be conservative
(too large) but occur at the proper times. Figure 5-73 shows the same test
when turbulence is added. The large high frequency excitation of the control
surface results in errors which appear to be larger than those accounted for
with KH chosen to make the high frequency gain of the error filter equal to I.
It was determined that the high frequency gain of the error filter needed to
be ten (kH = 7) to prevent triggers during the climbing turn with turbulence.
Figure 5-74 shows the resulting trigger test. The threshold offset for this
test is frequently larger than required. Although it is believed that large
relative error is indeed possible for some frequencies, it is likely that it
is not constant over a large frequency range as in the error filter. This may
explain the over conservativeness of the test shown in Fig. 5-74. An alter-
nate method which utilizes absolute error can easily be derived (amounting to
using the actuation command instead of the estimate in the error filter) and
may produce better results.
Finally, detection checks were made using simulations of stuck actuators
during the climbing turn maneuver with turbulence and sensor noise. Although
failures are easily detected, no significant improvement in detection time
(over the fixed threshold case) was observed. Figure 5-75 shows the trigger
and verify tests for this case.
DISCUSSION
It is beieved that more work on the threshold scheduling method is needed
before meaningful conclusions can be drawn.
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SECTION 6
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This effort has developed and explored the use of a decentralized
approach to failure detection and isolation for use in restructurable control
systems. This work has produced,
I. A method for evaluating fundamental limits to FDI performance,
2. Application of this method using flight recorded data,
3. A working control element FDI system with maximal sensitivity to
critical control element failures,
4. Extensive testing of this system on realistic simulations, and
5. A detailed design methodology for this system whfch involves
parameter optimization (with respect to model uncertainties) and
sensitivity analyses.
For this project, we have concentrated on detection and isolation of generic
control element failures since these failures frequently lead to emergency
conditions and since knowledge of remaining control authority is essential for
control system redesign. The failures we considered are generic in the sense
that no temporal failure signature information was assumed. Thus, various
forms of "functional failures" are treated in a unified fashion. Such a
treatment results in a robust FDI system (i.e., one that covers all failure
modes) but sacrifices some performance when detailed failure signature infor-
mation is known, useful, and employed properly. We assumed throughout this
project that all sensors are validated (i.e., contain only in-spec errors) and
that only the first failure of a single control element needs to be detected
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and isolated. The FDI system which has been developed will handle a class of
multiple failures.
The FDI system which was developed using the design methodologies out-
lined in Section 3 worked quite well during simulation tests on data from
NASA's modified B-737 simulation. This is true despite large errors between
the models used in the FDI system and the models used in the simulation. Fur-
thermore, this system worked as predicted when errors between the simulation
model and the FDI models were within the envelope used to choose FDI parame-
ters (thresholds, etc.). The design methodology discovered the inherent
indistinguishability of same-side elevator and stabilator panels (on the basis
of force and moment imbalances alone) early in the project resulting in a sys-
tem which does not attempt to do what is impossible.
Improvements in the design methodology, system detail, and implementation
are still possible. Some over-conservatism was observed in the design proce-
dures for sequential tests. Alternative filter structures may speed up the
FDI process. The use of "probe" signals during the isolation phase would
allow enhanced isolation capability, (including the isolation of stabilizers
from elevators). And, finally, further exploration of the importance and
design of threshold schedules is needed.
The remainder of this section provides a more complete summary of this
report. It also provides a discussion of some of the unexplored alternatives
in the design, implementation, and testing of the FDI system, and suggestions
for further work.
DECENTRALIZED FDI
In Section 3 of this report, ALPHATECH's decentralized approach to FDI
was described. This approach requires an assessment of all sources of
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redundancy (including analytical redundancy) and the utilization of this
redundancy to produce decoupled or decentralized residual signals that are
then processed to produce FDI decisions. This method represents a suboptimal
approach to the data fusion problem (i.e., combining all sources of informa-
tion for decisi0nmaking purposes) under ideal circumstances (no modeling
error), but prevents the mixing of well known relationships with poorly known
relationships when modeling error exists. As a result, the decentralized
approach can be superior when significant modeling errors exist.
The first application of this idea to the control element FDI problem
resulted in a decomposition into actuator-path and aircraft-path subproblems.
Measurements of actuator inputs and outputs allowed this decomposition. The
advantage of this decomposition is that uncertainties about aerodynamic models
do not affect the ability to detect actuator path failures and uncertainties
about the actuation mechanism do not affect the detectability of aircraft path
failures. The disadvantage of this decomposition is that some configurations
of actuator output sensors may be vulnerable to failure thereby complicating
the (assumed) sensor validation process. Fortunately, however, the distinc-
tion between the alrcraft-path and the actuator-path is somewhat arbitrary so
that the aircraft path subsystem can easily be designed to detect actuator
failures when actuation outputs are not available.
The second application of decentralization is in the method of forming
aircraft-path residuals. Since only force and moment balance relationships
are affected by aircraft-path failures, residuals based on these relationships
are desired. Translational accelerometer measurements allows this to be
accomplished for the force balances, however, rotational dynamic relationships
must also be used since rotational acceleration is not measured. This method
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of formingaircraft path residuals has two advantages. The first is that
errors in other relationships which would affect centralized (Kalman filter-
like) residual generators do not affect these decentralized residuals. A
prime example is the effect of acceleration of the airmass on the transla-
tional kinematic relations. The second advantage is that control element
failures show up in fixed directions in residual space. This permits the dis-
tinguishability of alrcraft-path control element failures independent of the
detailed failure signatures. Only the relative magnitude of imbalances in
different residuals is necessary for failure isolation.
FDI SYSTEM
The structure of a generic FDI system which efficiently solves the
unknown onset time problem was developed in subsection 3.1. This structure
involved a monitoring or trigger process which is used to reject the hypothe-
sis of normal dperation and to trigger a verification and isolation process to
reject false triggers and to identify the source of a failure. This structure
is used to achieve performance advantages which approach the performance of
the known onset-time case. These advantages include greater failure sensitiv-
ity, lower false alarm rates, and shorter detection delays.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem - The aircraft-path trigger was designed to make
the probability of missing a critical failure small. Thus, each failure mode
had an explicit trigger function which is optimized for triggering under the
corresponding failure mode. Each trigger satisfies the condition that IF a
particular minimal failure occurs, THEN the corresponding trigger test will
"pass." Since the converse is not true and since false triggers are possible,
we need to perform verify and isolate tests.
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The verify and isolate tests are sequential tests and are designed so
that failures which are larger than some minimal value will be detected and
isolated in shorter time periods. If they reach a maximal time limit, no
decision is made, although it is also possible to make a fixed sample size
decision at this time.
The isolation process recognizes the fact that only the rejection of
failure modes is possible when signature information is not used. This fact
results in principle, in a matrix of isolation tests, each designed to reject
a failure mode with maximal sensitivity to another failure mode. Although
this structure appears complex, it guarantees optimal performance for every
failure mode and allows detailed analysis and optimization of each part of the
system. In practice, the off-diagonal tests in this isolation matrix were
combined for efficiency. Also, in principle, only those failure modes which
are in the "trigger-implied ambiguity group" need to be isolated, although in
practice all failures were consdiered as possible following any trigger. To
declare a failure, all isolation tests must "vote" in favor of that failure.
Actuator-Path Subsystem - The character of the actuator residuals (all actua-
tor failure directions are mutually orthogonal) resulted in one actuator-path
subsystem for each actuator failure. Thus, no isolation process was needed.
These subsystems, like the aircraft-path subsystem, also used a trigger/verify
structure to "solve" the unknown onset time problem. Two decision processes
were created and tested; a fixed threshold and a varying threshold algorithm.
The fixed threshold algorithm was designed to accommodate the observed
low frequency behavior in each residual, sensor noise, and other high frequency
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errors. The result of a trigger crossing its threshold is the initiation of a
sequential verify test. If the verify test passes, the corresponding control
element is declared as failed. If a verify fails, a "false trigger" is
declared. Because fixed thresholds were used to accommodate low frequency
errors, the sensitivity to actuator path failures was higher than originally
expected (though by no means unacceptable).
The varying threshold algorithm was based on the concept derived in
Section 3 for single-input, single-output systems with transfer function
errors. It assumed that all transfer function errors were high frequency
relative errors. Observations clearly indicated that this was not the case,
and consequently, this decision process did not perform as well as expected.
Further work in this area is needed before substantive conclusions can be
drawn.
DESIGN METHODOLOGIES
One key to the successful deployment of any FDI concept (or any aircraft
system concept for that matter) is the development of an analytical design
methodology which permits engineers to assess the impact of various contin-
gencies on performance and modify the design accordingly. In Section 3 of
this report, we have outlined the structure of such a methodology and have
given examples of how the many analysis and synthesis tasks could be per-
formed. The reason such a methodology is important is that exhaustive simula-
tion and flight testing for purposes of design is expensive and may never
encompass all contingencies of interest. An analytical design method provides
quicker and cheaper answers to the same questions and should allow all contin-
gencies to be considered.
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For the FDI problem, the contingencies of interest are the size of poten-
tial error sources and the magnitude and character of the maneuvers which
excite them. In Section 4 we demonstrated how an error budget might be formed
and utilized in the design process. This error budget serves to define a
truth model for which parameters in the FDI system (which is designed on the
basis of a design model) are optimized.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Substantial testing of both subsystems was performed using data from
NASA's B-737 simulation. These tests included drastic model mismatches
between the FDI models and the actual simulation model, sensor noise and scale
factors and turbulence. Various combinations of sensor noise and turbulence
i
were used to evaluate the impact of each on the FDI system. A total of 41
60-second simulation runs were made by NASA and data recorded for use in this
project. All runs were made using the control law of [58].
Aircraft-Path Subsystem - Three categories of simulation runs were used
to test this subsystem. These included:
I. False alarm checks with three "doublet" maneuvers and a climbing
turn. The climbing turn checks were made with no turbulence or sen-
sor noise, with sensor noise alone, and with both sensor noise and
turbulence. The doublet maneuver checks were made with no sensor
noise and no turbulence and with sensor noise and no turbulence.
Q Detection checks were made using I00 percent effectiveness failures
of all control elements except the engine (simulation capability for
this case was not available) during a climbing turn maneuver. These
checks were made with sensor noise alone--no turbulence.
. Detection checks were made for varying levels of partial effective-
ness failures for the left aileron during a climbing turn with sensor
noise and no turbulence.
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For the nine false alarm check runs which were made, no false alarm was
ever generated. No false triggers occurred during any of the three climbing
turn cases. During the two pitch doublet maneuvers triggers of the left "hor-
izontal tail" control occur, but are verified as false. During the two roll
doublet maneuvers, triggers of every control element occur, but are also veri-
fied as false.
Of the seven control elements which were failed I00 percent in the second
category of simulation runs, five were correctly isolated within two seconds
of either the failure time (for surfaces with loads in straight and level
flight) or the maneuver time. Left and right elevator failures continually
caused triggers to occur, but no unanimous decision could ever be reached dur-
ing the climbing turn maneuver. Fortunately (and as expected), the degrada-
tion in maneuver performance due to these failures is slight and they clearly
do not represent an emergency situation for the aircraft with the control law
being used. In no cases was an incorrect isolation ever made. Of course, no
attempt was made to isolate same side elevator and stabilizer controls from
each other since they were deemed indistinguishable (using force and moment
imbalances alone) during the design process. Thus correct isolation for the
stabilizers implies isolation to a fictitious horizontal tail surface. The
elevator failures which were not unanimously isolated turned out to have
signatures which were considered only marginally detectable by the design
4
methodology and thus this is an expected result.
Finally, of the five left aileron failures of varying partial effective-
ness, three were correctly isolated. It was concluded that failures of greater
magnitude than sixty percent loss could be correctly isolated during this
maneuver and of less magnitude than forty percent could not be unanimously
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isolated. The forty percent failure case caused triggers to occur and the
twenty percent case did not. Isolation times varied from less than one
second for i00 percent failures to five seconds (two triggers) for the sixty
percent failure. These results are consistent with the notion that for a
given maneuver, the signature magnitude decreases with failure severity, thus
reducing the ability to detect and isolate and increasing the length of time
needed for the sequential decision process to conclude.
No detection checks were made with turbulence, however, it would be
anticipated that due to increased excitation of controls, performance would be
equal or better to what was observed. Some experimentation with "forced iso-
late decisions" were made leading to the conclusion that, for the case tried,
such a procedure may provide significantly enhanced detection performance with
little degradation in false alarm performance. More discussion of the results
is provided at the end of subsection 5.1.
Actuator-Path Subsystem - For the fixed threshold decision algorithm
false alarm and detection of stuck-at-failure checks were made. The false
alarm checks were made using a climbing turn with sensor noise and no turbu-
lence and with both noise and turbulence and using three doublet maneuvers
with sensor noise and no turbulence. Detection checks were made using the
climbing turn with sensor noise and turbulence. Time did not permit examining
the effects of sensor noise and turbulence independently. Thus detection per-
formance as sited here is presumably better than what would be ovserved with
no turbulence.
None of the four maneuvers with noise and no turbulence produced a false
trigger. When turbulence was added during the climbing turn maneuver false
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triggers of the left and right aileron were observed, but no false alarms were
generated.
Of the nine stuck-at failures implemented, seven were correctly detected.
Only the engine failures were missed due to the lack of sufficient excitation.
Examination of the impact of missing these failures showed that little degra-
dation in performance occurred (five knot transient airspeed difference).
Failure detection times varied from 150 milliseconds to greater than three
seconds. The longer detection times were due to the fact that triggers
occurred in unloaded surfaces before the maneuver as a result of excitation
due to turbulence.
The varying threshold algorithm was also tested, however, too few results
are available to draw significant conclusions.
UNEXPLORED CONCEPTS, FURTHER WORK, AND OTHER NOTES
A list of other comments including concepts and implementatlons which
were left unexplored, some suggestions for possible algorithm improvement, and
other notes is provided below. This is in addition to the suggestions made at
the end of subsections 5.1 and 5.2.
i. In the design methodology, a more detailed truth model might be used
to alleviate some of the conservatism inherent in the current design.
This might include modeling of the pilot and the control law to
obtain more accurate statistical descriptions of the residuals. Per-
haps a continuous time domain methodology would be more useful than
the discrete models currently being used. Note, however, that these
statistical models would still assume, at least, piecewise station-
arity and that nonstationarity is a large issue which must be handled
in some fashion.
2. In the design methodology, more detailed sensitivity analyses would
be useful in demonstrating the tradeoffs associated with the design.
. Computational savings and even performance improvement may be
achieved by implementing the verify and isolate tests on a "trigger
implied ambiguity basis." The ambiguity, of course, depends not only
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on the physics of the problem, but also on the trigger design. For
example, if only the yaw residual is used to trigger rudder failures,
then a rudder trigger alone eliminates those controls which can not
excite yaw imbalances.
In the design process the notion of an FDI bandwidth arose. Failures
whose signatures lie outside this bandwidth will not be detectable.
If it were desirable to detect such failures (especially very low
frequency signatures), one might consider the design of a mmltiple
bandwidth FDI system. Such a system would have higher detectabili-
ties for failures which are outside the current bandwidth without
sacrificing the performance obtained with the current system. Of
course, the limiting case of a multiple bandwidth system would be a
concept involving Fourier transforms and statistics and thresholds
for combinations of frequency elements.
In the evaluation of fundamental limits to FDI performance, it would
be useful to process more segments of flight data and to average the
results. Use of other spectral estimation methods might also be
useful, particularly the perlodogram approach (i.e., taking averages
of DFT's). These may be explored in subsequent work.
One dissapointment of the current work was the need to rely on
observed data in the design process. Studies relating to the crea-
tion of more accurate error budgets need to be accomplished in order
for the design methodology to be maximally useful.
•r'
A reduction in computational requirements for the aircraft path algo-
rithm might be achieved by a system which performed only a single
rejection test for each control element. Such a system would, of
course, sacrifice sensitivity to failures. However, this approach
might be tried first and evaluated to see where specific sensitivi-
ties need to be enhanced. The system concepts developed in this work
could then be applied only where increased sensitivity was needed.
Relaxation of sensor validity assumptions is an important future
effort. To detect sensor and control element failures, additional
redundancy relations are needed. The work of Deckert, et al., [16]
provides an excellent starting point since it was used as a basis for
the approach developed in this work. Reliability issues also need to
be addressed in this context to ensure that the tradeoff between
hardware and analytic redundancy is made properly.
The actuator models used in this work required a substantial amount
of detail (scale factors, rate limits, etc.). The most significant
detail seems to have been rate limits since errors due to incorrect
rate limits can affect both low and high frequency behavior.
For the varying threshold actuator decision process, improved
performance may be possible if bounds on the absolute error (rather
than the relative error) are used to schedule thresholds.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS FROM LINEAR MODELS
Assume that the linear perturbation model was derived through a first
order Taylor expansion of Euler's equations. That is, the linear model
x =Ax + Bu (A-l)
represents the dynamic perturbations from nominal values x0 and u0, derived by
a linearization of the nonlinear rigid body equations. The state vector x is
(U, V, W, P, Q, R) and the control vector u is composed of the "deflections,"
_i (including throttle). Equation A-I was derived from a linearization of the
following equations.
m(U + WQ - RV) = X
m(V + UR - PW) = Y
m(W+VI'- QU) = Z
IxP + (Iz - Iy)RQ = L
lyQ + (Ix - Iz)PR = M
IzR + (ly - Ix)QP = N
(A-2)
(A-3)
(A-4)
(A-5)
(A-6)
(A-7)
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The forces and moments (X Y Z L M N) were expressed in Eqs. 5-7 through
5-18 in terms of a measurement vector, yT = (VT, =, B, P, Q, R) and the
nondimensional coefficient which we wish to solve for.
can be rewritten,
= f(y, _ ; C)
Thus, Eqs. A-2 to A-7
(A-8)
where C is a vector of nondimensional coefficients. Since y is a function of
x the partial derivatives _j I XoUo
i
and
fXUUo
can be obtained as a func-
tion of C (Note: m _ )e
_xj _yj _xj
These partials are then assigned to the
numerical values specified by the A & B matrices in Eq. A-I and the coeffi-
cients C found.
In particular, if we assume that V T is constant, then the solution for C
is unique and is given below.
Stability Terms:
r,_0, (_
CX_ = m[_) (-V T sin _ cos 8) + -_ + Q) V T cos a cos B]/QS
,_
CXQ = m_+ W) 2V T / c QS)
CyB L._ + R) (-V T cos _ sin B) + i_) V T cos B + -_ - P)
(-V T sin = sin B)] / Q--S
c_
Cyp =._- W) (2V T / bQS)
._
CyR =_+ U) (2V T / DQS)
(A-9)
(A-t0)
(A-tZ)
(A-12)
(A-13)
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CZ_ = [t_- Q) (-VT sin _ cos B) + ( ) VT cos _ cos B] / qs
,a_
CZQ = mK_- U) (2V T / cQS)
CLB x[_) (-VT cos a sin B) + _-_) VT cos B + _)
(-V T sin = sin B)] / QSb
= z ca_'"
CLp x,_) (2VT / b2Q s)
rz ca},
CLR = L X,'_J + (Zz - ly) Q] (2V T / b_s)
CM_ = ly[(_) (-V T sin e cos B) + "aWC_-_)VT cos = cos B] / QS7
CMQ = ly(_Q) (2V T / _2QS)
CN_ _.[C_" _a_ (_"
= ._ (-VT cos _ sin B) + ._f. VT cos B + -_)
(-V T sin = sin 6)] / QSb
= z_a },-
CNp [ z,_) + (ly- Ix ) Q] (2V T / b_S)
CNR = [Iz(_) (2VT / b2QS)
Control Terms:
Cx6i = m_- i) / QS
Cy_ i = m_i) / QS
,a_
Cz8 i = m_i) / QS
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(A-14)
(A-15)
(A-16)
(A-17)
(A-ZS)
(A-19)
(A-20)
(A-21)
(A-22)
(A-23)
(A-24)
(A-25)
(A-26)
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= I c_P --
CL6 i x,_i) / QSb (A-27)
= _ ) / QSc (A-28)CM6 i ly( i
CN6 i = Izt_i) / QSB (A-29)
In the above, y and u are evaluated at their nominal values and the partials
are obtained from the values of matrices in the linear model• This method
ignores contributions to forces and moments due to = and assumes that VT is
constant• Relaxation of these assumptions is possible, but the solution pro-
cedure is more difficult.
Two flight conditions were evaluated using this method• The constant
coefficients (basic lift, drag, etc.) are determined by ensuring that x = 0.
Notice that the nondimensional coefficients at the two flight conditions are
substantially different• This is most likely due to large control nonlineari-
ties and the effect of flap deflection on basic aircraft characteristics and
on horizontal tail nonlinearities.
FCI is defined by:
V = 160 KIAS
h = 3500 feet
G = 0 (Gear Up)
Flaps = 15°
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FC2 is defiaed by:
V = 140 KIAS
h = 1500 feet
G = I (Gear Down)
Flaps = 30 °
Other assumptions
S = wing area = I000 ft 2
b = wing span = I00 ft
c = average chord = I0 ft
m
The resulting coefficients are shown below in Table A-I.
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TABLE A- I.
FCI
CXB
0.11159E+01 ALPH
0.33830E-01 Q
0.I1541E-01 THRUST L
0.I1541E-O1 THRUST R
0.71224E-03 D STAB L
0.71224E-03 D STAB R
0.O0000E+O0 D RUDDER
0.33401E-03 D ELEV L
0.33401E-03 D ELEV R
0.38211E-03 D AILE L
0.38211E-03 D AILE R
-.61064E-03 D SPLR L
-.61064E-03 D SPLR R
-. 91344E-O1 K
CYB
-. 12764E+01 BETA
O. 14274E+00 P
O. 40748E+00 R
0.00000E+O0 THRUST L
0.O0000E+O0 THRUST R
0.O0000E+O0 D STAB L
O.00000E+O0 D STAB R
0.68085E-02 D RUDDER
O.O0000E+O0 D ELEV L
O.O0000E+O0 D ELEV R
0.60524E-04 D AILE L
-.60524E-04 D AILE R
0.62347E-03 D SPLR L
-.62347E-03 D SPLR R
-.54122E-15 K
CZB
-.69370E+01 ALPH
-.38821E+00 Q
-.16000E-04 THRUST L
-.16000E-04 THRUST R
-.83883E-02 D STAB L
-.83883E-02 D STAB R
-O.O000E+O0 D RUDDER
-.39325E-02 D ELEV L
-.39325E-02 D ELEV R
-.44963E-02 D AILE L
-.44963E-02 D AILE R
0.44794E-02 D SPLR L
0.44794E-02 D SPLR R
-. 52182E+00 K
NONDIMENSIONAL COEFFICIENTS
CXB
FC2
0.12661E+01ALPH
0.26276E-01Q
0.15070E-01 THRUST L
0.15070E-01 THRUST R
0.52730E-03 D STAB L
0.52730E-03 D STAB R
O.00000E+00 D RUDDER
0.25056E-03 D ELEV L
0.25056E-03 D ELEV R
0.28252E-03 D AILE L
0.28252E-03 D AILE R
-.70234E-03 D SPLR L
-.70234E-03 D SPLR R
-.16288E+00 K
CYB
-.13282E+01 BETA
0.27300E+00 P
0.30631E+00 R
O.00000E+00 THRUST L
O.00000E+00 THRUST R
0.00000E+00 D STAB L
O.00000E+00 D STAB R
0.68867E-02 D RUDDER
O.O0000E+00 D ELEV L
O.O0000E+00 D ELEV R
0.44354E-04 D AILE L
-.44354E-04 D--AILE--R
0.85356E-03 D SPLR L
-.85356E-03 D SPLR R
-.55180E-15 K
CZB
-.74416E+01ALPH
-.42188E+00 Q
-.16445E-04 THRUST L
-.16445E-04 THRUST R
-.84034E-02 D STAB L
-.84034E-02 D STAB R
O.00000E+00 D RUDDER
-.39927E-02 D ELEV L
-.39927E-02 D ELEV R
-.45015E-02 D AILE L
-.45015E-02 D AILE R
0.60711E-02 D SPLR L
0.60711E-02 D SPLR R
-.10091E+01K
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TABLE A-1.
FCI
CLB
-.24436E+00 BETA
-.58055E+00 P
0.20669E+00 R
0.I0871E-03 THRUST L
-.I0871E-03 THRUST R
0.61458E-03 D STAB L
-.61458E-03 D STAB R
0.75713E-03 D RUDDER
0.2874!E-03 D ELEV L
-.28741E-03 D ELEV R
0.61045E-03 D AILE L
-.61045E-03 D AILE R
-.70755E-03 D SPLR L
0.70755E-0E D SPLR R
-.I0716E-15 K
CMB
-.17373E+01ALPH
-.33986E+02 Q
0.57743E-02 THRUST L
0.57743E-02 THRUST R
-.33534E-01 D STAB L
-.33534E-01 D STAB R
0.00000E+O0 D RUDDER
-.15602E-01 D ELEV L
-.15602E-01 D ELEV R
-.44041E-02 D AILE L
-.44041E-02 D AILE R
0.18332E-02 D SPLR L
0.18332E-02 D SPLR R
-.90779E-02 K
CNB
0.13662E+00 BETA
-.13149E+00 P
-.14715E+00 R
0.18818E-02 THRUST L
-.18818E-02 THRUST R
0.13354E-03 D STAB L
-.13354E-03 D STAB R
-.26346E-02 D RUDDER
0.76452E-04 D ELEV L
-.76452E-04 D ELEV R
0.14500E-03 D AILE L
-.14500E-03 D AILE R
-.35808E-03 D SPLR L
0.35808E-03 D SPLR R
0.17944E-15 K
NONDIMENSIONAL COEFFICIENTS (Continued)
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FC2
CLB
-.27875E+00 BETA
-.57419E+00 P
0.25012E+00 R
0.14199E-03 THRUST L
-.14199E-03 THRUST R
0.61540E-03 D STAB L
-.61540E-03 D STAB R
0.76630E-03 D RUDDER
0.29215E-03 D ELEV L
-.29215E-03 D ELEV-R
0.63462E-03 D AXLE L
-.63462E-03 D AXLE R
-.96394E-03 D SPLR L
0.96394E-03 D SPLR R
-.I0434E-15 K
CMB
-.24619E+01 ALPH
-.33929E+02 Q
0.75395E-02 THRUST L
0.75395E_02 THRUST--R
-.33518E-01 D STAB L
-.33518E-01 D STAB R
O.00000E+00 D RUDDER
-.15877E-01 D ELEV L
-.15877E-01 D ELEV R
-.43994E-02 D AILE L
-.43994E-02 D AILE R
0.23797E-02 D SPLR L
0.23797E-02 D SPLR R
-.12474E+00 K
CNB
0.14165E+00 BETA
-.13610E+00 P
-.15230E+00 R
0.24579E-02 THRUST L
-.24579E-02 THRUST R
0.12025E-03 D STAB L
-.12025E-03 D STAB R
-.26849E-02 D RUDDER
-.70973E-04 D ELEV L
0.70973E-04 D ELEV R
0.15758E-03 D AILE L
-.15758E-03 D AILE R
-.45348E-03 D SPLR L
0.45348E-03 D SPLR R
0.20830E-15 K
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF OVERALL ERROR RATE EXPRESSIONS
This appendix derives expressions for overall system error probabilities
for the aircraft path FDI system. These probabilities are based on the indi-
vidual error probabilities of the hypothesis tests which are performed. First
we define some fundamental events.
Let,
T i = event of the ith trigger indicating possible failure (B-I)
V i = event of the ith verify test choosing Hi over Ho (B-2)
ll/j = event of the i, jth isolation test choosing H i over
Hj (B-3 )
i,j, = I, ..., 7 (i.e., seven control element failures)
Also, we define the aggregate events,
r _
7
U Ti = the event that some trigger indicates
i=l failure (B-4)
7
V = U vi = the event that some verify chooses Hi
i=l over Ho (B-5)
d i = TOV i N li/j = the event that failure i is
j¢i declared (B-6)
The relevant probabilities which we wish to calculate are,
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PFA = probability of choosing any failure mode i when
there is no failure (B-7)
PFC = probability of choosing H i when Hj is true (B-8)
In order to compute the above, several intermediate probabilities are
needed.
The probability of false trigger, PFT, is the probability that T is true
when there is no failure. Using Eq. B-4, we have
7
T = N Ti (B-9)
i=l
and
PCR = P(_[Ho) = P(TI[Ho )7 = [I-P(Ti[Ho)] 7 (B-10)
assuming independent tests. Finally, PFT = I-PCR.
Similarly, the probability of false verification, PFV, is the probability
that V is true under Ho and is computed from
PFV = P(VIHo = I-[I-P(VilHo)] 7 (B-If)
again assuming independent tests.
In the following, the a priori probabilities of each failure mode are
assumed to be equal, and all tests are assume to be independent.
The false alarm probability, PFA, is given by
PFA = P[ U di[Hol (B-12)
i_0
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Since the events, di, are disjoint,
PFA = _ P(dilHo)
i
= _ PFT " P(VilHo) " n P(Ii/jlHo) (B-13)
i j=1
Assuming that P(VilH o) is the same for all i and P(Ii/jlHo) is the same for
all j, we have
PFA = 7 PFT " P(VIIHo " P(Ii/jlHo )6 (B-14)
Assuming that choosing H i over Hi, l_j_o, when H o is true is completely
random, i.e., P(II/jlH o) ffi1/2, we have,
7 • P(VilHo)PFA <-6-_ " PFT (B-15)
The probability of false classification, PFC, is computed from
PFC = I-Pcc where
= P _ U di N H iPCC
{i_O
(B-16)
Using Bayes rule and the fact that the events di N H i are disjoint, Eq. B-16
can be rewritten,
PCC = _.P(dj[Hj) • P(Hj[ [3 Hj) (B-17)
j j_-0
or when all of the a priori probabilities are equal,
7i
= _ [ P(dj IHj )PCC
j=l
(B-18)
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Now using Eq. B-6, the fact that each V i and ll/j event is a subset of T,
each test is independent, and the assumption that the individual test proba-
bilities are equal for each failure mode, we have
PCC = P(T[Hi) P(VilHi) " P(Ii/jlHi )6 (B-19)
• P(TilH i) P(VilH i) P(Ii/jlHi )6 (B-20)
Example
Suppose e(TilHi) = P(Tilao) = P(VilHo) = P(Vilai) = P(Ii/jlHj,j,i ) = 10-_.
Then we have,
PFT < 10-3
PFA < 10-8
PFC < 10-3
The false alarm spec, if expressed as 1 in 108 samples, represents better than
1 in 800 hours of flight time for a .03 second sample interval.
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APPENDIX C
FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING DETAILS
The flight data values used by the Failure Detection and Isolation system
are derived by converting the flight data of the tape Into the required
formats, by use of two external programs, CRUNCH and CONFIG. CRUNCH inputs
the ASCII data and converts it Into a binary, sequential file. CONFIG then
converts the binary data into FDI required values and outputs them into
another binary, sequential file. The conversions are as follows:
I. converts velocity from knots to feet/sec
2. computes the yaw rate by taking the mean of the two intermediate
values from four sensor readings
3. the left and right thrust are computed from throttle positions based
on a flrst-order system
a. first, the previous thrust value is initialized
prey left_thrust = .298 * left__throttle__pos
prev__right_thrust = .298 * right throttle__pos
b. then, for every time step:
average throttle = (left__throttle__pos + right throttle__pos)/2
left thrust = exp(-0.5 * delta time)*prev left-thrust + (exp(-0.5
• delta time)-l)_-2*.298*left throttle
prey left__thrust = left_thrust
right-thrust = exp(-0.5*delta__time)*prev__right_thrust + (exp(-0.5
• delta__time)-l)_-2).298*right throttle
prev_right__thrust = right thrust
4. invert normal acceleration measurement so that it is consistent with
residual generation definition
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5. compute stabilizer position from pilot units
stab = 3 - pilot_unit
6. correct rudder for bias in measurement
rudder = rudder - 5.6
7. make the aileron measurements complementary of each other
left aileron = - left aileron
rlght_aileron = right_aileron
8. compute spoiler positions
left_spoiler = (left_spoill + left__spoil2)/2
rlght_spoiler = (rlght__spoill + right_spoil2)/2
All other input values are channeled to the output file untouched. In
addition, this program initializes the variable QBAR (dynamic pressure) to
zero so that it can be computed in FDI. The output file is headed by an
integer indicating the number of channels in the output file. This is
followed by the channels themselves, listed by vectors of time. The first
nine measured surface deflections are repeated at the end to serve as dummy
A list of the output file channels is givencommanded deflection values.
below:
0 TIME
I VT
2 ALPHA
3 BETA
4 P
5 Q
6 R
7 AX
8 AY
9 AZ
I0 QBAR
II ALTITUDE
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measured values:
commanded values:
12 LEFT THRUST
13 RIGHT THRUST
14 STABILIZER
15 STABILIZER
16 RUDDER
17 LEFT ELEVATOR
18 RIGHT ELEVATOR
19 LEFT AILERON
20 RIGHT AILERON
21 LEFT SPOILER
22 RIGHT SPOILER
23 LEFT THRUST
24 RIGHT THRUST
25 STABILIZER
26 STABILIZER
27 RUDDER
28 LEFT ELEVATOR
29 RIGHT ELEVATOR
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